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This dissertation aims to describe the role of Beethoven’s dolce indications in the 
staves of a musical score. We will thus explore Beethoven’s dolce in contexts of 
theoretical interpretation, performance, and critical descriptions of meaning in music. 
We first will examine performance practice and Beethoven’s dolce indications in a 
symphonic setting (Symphony No. 3 in E-flat Major, Op. 55, “Eroica”) and in piano 
sonatas. We will highlight historical and current performance practice to find grounds 
for the unique way Beethoven uses expressive indications (for example, dolce, 
cantabile, and espressivo) in the staff. The second part of this dissertation will 
investigate nineteenth century hermeneutics and Friedrich Daniel Ernst 
Schleiermacher’s hermeneutic theory to show the resonances between the critical 
activity of interpreting texts and the activity of interpreting and performing music. In 
the final part of this dissertation, we will discuss a critical method developed by the 
theorist, pedagogue, and music historian Adolf Bernhard Marx (1795-1866). Marx 
determines this critical method in the context of how to explicate meaning in 
instrumental music, which is namely through simile, symbolism, and psychological 
coherence. We will conclude this dissertation by describing the importance of 
material considerations in A. B. Marx’s theory of a musical Idee. Furthermore, we 
will comment on the role of the Idee as a bridge between the material considerations 
required for performance practice and the “spiritual” activity that is needed to explore 




O objectivo desta tese é descrever o papel das indicações musicais, em especial de 
dolce, no contexto dos compassos das pautas de Beethoven. Por conseguinte, vamos 
analisar as indicações de dolce de Beethoven em diferentes contextos: interpretações 
teóricas, musicais [performance] e também descrições críticas de significado musical. 
Na primeira parte da tese fazemos um estudo de interpretação musical no contexto 
sinfónico, em particular das indicações de dolce que podemos encontrar na Sinfonia 
n.o 3 em Mi Bemol Maior, Op. 55 “Eroica,” e ainda nas sonatas para piano de 
Beethoven. Analisamos as teorias históricas e actuais sobre a interpretação 
[performance] destas peças para desenvolver um fundamento para a tese de que 
Beethoven compõe usando dolce, e ainda outras indicações como cantabile e 
espressivo, de uma maneira única e particular. A segunda parte da tese analisa a teoria 
hermenêutica de Friedrich Daniel Ernst Schleiermacher para demonstrar a ressonância 
entre uma actividade crítica textual e a actividade de interpretação musical 
(performance e crítica). Dedicamos a terceira parte da tese a uma explicação da teoria 
crítica do significado musical desenvolvida pelo historiador da música, pedagogo e 
teórico Adolf Bernhard Marx (1795-1866). A teoria crítica de Marx indica que o 
significado de música instrumental pode ser explicado através dos conceitos de 
símile, simbolismo e coerência psicológica. Concluímos esta tese com uma descrição 
da importância das considerações materiais do conceito de uma ideia musical [Idee] 
de A. B. Marx. No final, discutimos como considerações da matéria musical podem 
fazer a ponte entre a interpretação musical [performance] e a actividade espiritual 
necessária para estabelecer um significado profundo em música. 
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Beethoven’s Dolce:	  Interpretation, Performance and Description – The Case of Music	  
 
This dissertation addresses the interpretation of expressive word cues within the staff 
of Ludwig van Beethoven’s scores. We study word cues that are generally overlooked 
in analysis and take the form of instructions for expression (for example, dolce, 
espressivo, and cantabile). We are specifically interested in instances where 
Beethoven uses these indications in paradoxical or unintuitive ways. This comes to 
the forefront when Beethoven writes dolce in the staff for a passage that does not look 
(nor particularly sound) "dolce."  
 
The first part of this dissertation begins with examples of dolce indications in 
Beethoven’s Symphony No. 3 in E-flat Major, Op. 55, “Eroica.” We examine 
expressive word cues in the staff of the first movement of this symphony and 
illustrate that they have a purpose beyond serving as structural signposts. We compare 
these passages to Beethoven’s use of dolce in the “Appassionata” sonata (Op. 57) to 
show how formal treatises on performance (for example, works by Heinrich 
Christoph Koch, Johann Georg Sulzer, and Carl Czerny) recommend a generalized 
cantabile technique to play dolce, espressivo, and cantabile indications alike. We 
suggest that, in certain cases, Beethoven is pointing to meaning beyond performance 
practice. When Beethoven desires that the piano (or orchestral instruments in the 
context of a symphony) should sing in performance, this ideal sound questions not 
only the capabilities of musical instruments and the possibilities of interpretation 
through technique, but also musical meaning on the whole. It seems music must speak 
to the listener on a level as though a human voice were singing the tune; this 
subsequently challenges musical interpretation to find how and what the music might 
communicate in order to create this otherworldly sound. In the end, this chapter serves 
as a building block toward a more satisfactory approach to musical meaning, beyond 
formal and material considerations, which we will achieve through investigations into 
hermeneutic theory and A. B. Marx’s Idee.  
 
The topic of the second part of this dissertation is nineteenth century hermeneutics 
(specifically the writings of F. D. E. Schleiermacher) and musical interpretation, 
where we find a juncture between musical notation and philosophical criticism. We 
argue that we can understand Beethoven's music, and Beethoven’s innovative use of 
performance marks, through Schleiermacher's theory of hermeneutics. We address 
how music can be described using a language-based theory through a “grammatical” 
(that is, normative) interpretation of music, balanced with considerations of historical 
interpretation and performance practice. We make these observations based on the 
premise that to interpret a text is a critical activity that is similar to what is involved in 
the performance or analysis of a musical work. In the chapter on Schleiermacher’s 
“psychological method,” we show how a composer’s biography can influence how we 
view a particular musical work’s form and content. Schleiermacher's concepts of 
thoughts, ideas, and secondary ideas help to provide a platform for us to speak about 
compositions on a deeper level that goes beyond elaborating meaning through 
narratives and extramusical descriptions.  
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The third part of this dissertation is about the music historian, pedagogue, and theorist 
A. B. Marx (1795-1866) and Marx’s concept of a musical Idee with relation to 
Beethoven’s music. We include an analysis of A. B. Marx’s understanding of musical 
meaning based on the critical tools of similes, symbolism, and psychological 
coherence. We provide a fresh look at psychological coherence and symbolism with a 
foundation in G. W. F. Hegel’s aesthetics and theories about symbolic art. The end 
result illustrates that the way we interpret expressive word cues in the staff of 
Beethoven’s scores shares a great similarity with the interpretation of symbols in 
literature and art. It is through an adequate evaluation of these word cues that we find 
deeper meaning in Beethoven’s notation, which is beneficial for both performance 
and critical interpretation. 
 
We conclude this dissertation with a more general discussion of the importance of 
material considerations in arguments about musical meaning. To accomplish this, we 
follow a question put forward by the musicologist Scott Burnham: “And what governs 
the curious contradictions of [A. B. Marx’s] notion of the Idee, a spiritual essence that 
seems all too material?” Our answer to this question illuminates the importance of the 
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RESUMO DOS CAPÍTULOS 
 
O Dolce de Beethoven: interpretação, performance e descrição – o caso da música 
 
Esta tese elabora uma interpretação das indicações de expressão que Ludwig van 
Beethoven inclui nas suas pautas (no interior dos compassos). Estas indicações são 
muitas vezes tidas como irrelevantes para a analise musical. Por exemplo, dolce, 
espressivo e cantabile são muitas vezes vistas como meras instruções para a 
interpretação musical [performance] de uma determinada peça. O meu interesse 
incide nas situações em que Beethoven utiliza estas palavras na pauta de uma maneira 
paradoxal – ou seja, como entender os casos em que Beethoven inclui dolce para uma 
série de compassos que não soam nem parecem particularmente “dolce.” 
 
Esta tese tem três partes. A primeira parte oferece vários exemplos de dolce na 
Sinfonia n.o 3 em Mi Bemol Maior, Op. 55, “Eroica.” Começamos por examinar as 
indicações musicais de expressão no contexto sinfónico, e a constatar como estas 
indicações têm mais do que um uso estrutural na composição. Fazemos depois uma 
comparação entre as indicações de dolce na “Eroica” e as indicações de dolce na 
Sonata em Fá Menor, Op. 57 “Appassionata” para demonstrar como os tratados 
musicais sobre  interpretação musical [performance] (por autores como Heinrich 
Christoph Koch, Johann Georg Sulzer e Carl Czerny) têm muitas vezes uma visão 
demasiado generalizada, e meramente fundada na técnica chamada cantabile para 
explicar os compassos mais estranhos, que ainda assim, têm uma indicação de dolce. 
Neste contexto, sugerimos que Beethoven está a usar estas indicações de uma maneira 
particular, chamando à atenção para uma técnica mais complexa, que não se deixa 
restringir à interpretação musical [performance]. Deste modo, Beethoven está a 
assinalar um aspecto do significado da sonata em geral. Quando Beethoven deseja que 
o piano (ou a flauta por exemplo, no contexto sinfónico) canta, este som idealizado 
põe em questão não só as capacidades dos instrumentos e a técnica dos músicos, mas 
também o significado das composições. Parece que a música instrumental devia falar 
com o público como se fosse cantada por uma voz, em vez de ser tocada por 
instrumentos; esta formulação obriga à seguinte questão: como oferecer uma 
expressão fiel ao som ideal de uma peça musical? No final, este capítulo serve como o 
começo de uma investigação na direcção de uma abordagem mais satisfatória à ideia 
de significado musical –  o significado musical que está para além das considerações 
materiais e formais. O conceito de significado musical será abordado, no que se 
segue, a partir de considerações hermenêuticas, assim como, o conceito técnico de 
Idee elaborado por A. B. Marx.  
 
A segunda parte desta tese incide sobre a hermenêutica do século XIX (em particular 
a teoria hermenêutica de F. D. E. Schleiermacher) e a interpretação musical como 
uma junção entre notação musical e filosofia crítica.  No desenvolvimento do 
capítulo, argumentamos que podemos perceber a música de Beethoven, e a sua 
maneira inovadora de usar indicações de expressão (como dolce), através da teoria 
hermenêutica de Schleiermacher. O argumento estabelece que uma peça musical pode 
ser estudada a partir de uma teoria com base linguística e textual. Para tal, é 
necessário estabelecer a premissa de que para interpretar música é igualmente 
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necessário elaborar uma actividade crítica, em muito semelhante à que usamos 
quando interpretamos um texto. A diferença entre o lado “gramatical” e o lado 
“psicológico” da teoria hermenêutica de Schleiermacher é destacada no contexto 
biográfico. De que maneira pode a biografia de um compositor influenciar a 
interpretação da forma e conteúdo de uma peça musical? Os conceitos de pensamento, 
ideias, e ideias secundárias da teoria de Schleiermacher são discutidos no contexto de 
um significado musical mais profundo em contraste com uma explicação narrativa ou 
descrições extramusicais.       
    
A terceira parte aborda o trabalho do musicólogo, teórico e pedagogo A. B. Marx 
(1795-1866) e o seu conceito de ideia musical (Idee) em relação com a interpretação 
da música de Beethoven. O fio condutor do capítulo é o significado musical que Marx 
define no seu trabalho, o qual é baseado em princípios críticos, tais como: símile, 
simbolismo e coerência psicológica. Oferecemos uma perspectiva nova sobre estes 
princípios no contexto da música de Beethoven, com base na filosofia hegeliana e as 
teorias estéticas hegelianas (nomeadamente a arte simbólica). No desenvolvimento do 
capítulo, mostramos ainda que as indicações de expressão na pauta musical partilham 
uma similaridade com a interpretação de símbolos na literatura e a arte.  É através de 
uma avaliação adequada destes conceitos que encontramos um significado mais 
profundo na notação de Beethoven, um significado benéfico tanto para a interpretação 
crítica tal como para a interpretação musical [performance].  
 
No final da tese, respondemos directamente à seguinte pergunta elaborado pelo 
musicólogo Scott Burnham: “O que determina as contradições curiosas da noção de 
Idee, uma essência espiritual que parece muito material?” A nossa resposta a esta 
pergunta ilumina as questões materiais em face de princípios críticos e estabelece o 












Plate 1. Ludwig van Beethoven, Sonata in F Minor, Op. 57 (“Appassionata”), mvmt. 
I. Autograph copy [Music Department, Bibliothèque nationale de France]  23 
 
 
Plate 2. Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart, Sonata in F major (K. 332), mvmt. III, Allegro 
assai, mm. 12-21. Autograph score [Scheide holdings, Scheide M134, K332-4r. 
Courtesy of William H. Scheide, Princeton, N.J.]      70 
 
 
Plate 3. Ludwig van Beethoven, Sonata in C-sharp minor, Quasi una fantasia, Op. 
27, no. 2 (“Moonlight” [1801]), Adagio sostenuto. Autograph, BH 60, 3r [Beethoven-
Haus Bonn]         154 
 
  










Dolce is an article of musical notation; many composers use it within the staff of a 
score to express that a passage or melody should be played differently than the music 
that came before it. Ludwig van Beethoven also uses dolce indications in the staff, but 
oftentimes in a peculiar way that calls our attention to what is going on in the musical 
work as a whole and not just a singular passage. To understand the dimensions of the 
meaning of Beethoven’s dolce indications, we find it is necessary to explore practical 
questions with relation to notation and musical meaning. Rainer Maria Rilke 
describes music and, in virtue of this, musical meaning in the following way: 
 
 
 AN DIE MUSIK1  
 
 Musik: Atem der Statuen. Vielleicht: 
 Stille der Bilder. Du Sprache wo Sprachen 
 enden. Du Zeit, 
 die senkrecht steht auf der Richtung vergehender Herzen. 
 
 Gefühle zu wem? O du der Gefühle 
 Wandlung in was? ––: in hörbare Landschaft. 
 Du Fremde: Musik. Du uns entwachsener 
 Herzraum. Innigstes unser, 
 das, uns übersteigend, hinausdrängt, –– 
 heiliger Abschied: 
da uns das Innre umsteht 
 als geübteste Ferne, als andre 
 Seite der Luft: 
 rein, 
 riesig, 




 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Rainer Maria Rilke, “AN DIE MUSIK” / “TO MUSIC,” Ahead of All Parting: The Selected Poetry 
and Prose of Rainer Maria Rilke, ed. and trans. Stephen Mitchell (New York: The Modern Library, 
1995), 142-143. The title of Rilke’s poem is an allusion to Franz von Schober’s poem “An die Musik,” 
which Franz Schubert set in the lied An die Musik (D. 547). 	  






Music: breathing of statues. Perhaps: 
silence of paintings. You language where all language 
ends. You time 
standing vertically on the motion of mortal hearts. 
 
Feelings for whom? O you the transformation 
of feelings into what? ––: into audible landscape. 
You stranger: music. You heart-space 
grown out of us. The deepest space in us, 
which, rising above us, forces its way out, –– 
holy departure: 
when the innermost point in us stands 
outside, as the most practiced distance, as the other 
side of the air: 
pure, 
boundless, 
no longer habitable. 
 
When we read the first verse of the poem from the perspective of our present 
investigation, instead of a statue like Auguste Rodin’s “The Age of Bronze” [L’Âge 
d’airain], we see a musical score. We find that this idea is grounded in the notion that 
we observe a musical score in a similar way as we would observe a statue: the score is 
stiff and unmoved, as though made out of bronze or marble. We can describe sections 
of a score using vocabulary from music theory and analysis, but we do not experience 
a work of music fully unless we are in the presence of a performance (a recording is a 
poor substitute, but is sometimes our only possibility to hear a work). A statue also is 
most persuasive when we are in its presence and can look at it from all sides. When 
Rilke writes “silence of paintings,” this seems to address the way in which paintings 
“say too much;” paintings are often figurative, full of colors, events, and situations, 
and offer a more literal illustration of what the artist is trying to depict. Music escapes 
what is literal, and the sophisticated scrutiny of analysis does not get to the bottom of 
musical meaning – it seems to describe a musical meaning that is different from the 
one Rilke alludes to in the poem. Normative analytical devices often articulate 
meaning as though the meaning of a musical work could be equated to the contours of 
a statue. The “silence of paintings” is what a painting cannot express on its surface 
despite colors and figures – what is essentially the deeper meaning in a painting – and 
is akin to deeper meaning in music. 
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One of the difficulties we encounter in any determination of musical meaning is 
whether we should discuss it with reference to a score or a performance. This is a 
particularly thorny topic because we debate the necessity of particulars (a score, a 
performance) within an implicit context of a universal dimension of musical meaning.  
A score can be used for analytical purposes, and the score remains relatively 
unchanged through the ages. (A change in our perception of a score is always 
possible, for example, if an old draft is found and interferes with the structure of how 
theory has viewed a particular work.) A performance seems to be the most adequate 
object to discuss, as it is truly what imparts meaning in music, but the ephemerality of 
a performance and the discord between witnessing a performance and hearing a 
recording is so great that meaning becomes difficult to measure. Furthermore, one 
should ask: “Did the performance really express the score and its meaning?” Thus, we 
concede that to evaluate musical meaning we need a little of both: the blueprint (the 
score) and the building (a performance). 
 
From the perspective of a general problem of musical meaning, which we have 
established here, this dissertation begins with a question that we describe throughout: 
What does Ludwig van Beethoven’s dolce indication mean in the exposition of the 
Sonata in F Minor, Op. 57 (“Appassionata”)? From here additional questions emerge, 
for example: What does the dolce mean in the “Appassionata” at the start of the 
second group? And what does the dolce mean that appears in the recapitulation 
(illustrated in Plate 1)? Expressive word cues in the staff of musical scores are unique 
tools and surprisingly little is written about their persuasive messages. Part I of this 
dissertation addresses the expressive word cues we are interested in – dolce, 
cantabile, espressivo – which appear within the staves of a score (thus not as a 
heading or indication of tempo). These indications only started to become a staple of 
musical notation within the staff in the late-eighteenth century. We find them with 
minimal frequency in Franz Joseph Haydn’s late keyboard sonatas, and exceedingly 
more often in the compositions of Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart and Muzio Clementi. 
The dolce indications in the staves of Beethoven’s scores, however, tend to be more 
unique because the music in a dolce passage generally looks different than the music 
Mozart or Clementi would attach a dolce to (the “Appassionata” is only one example 
of many, but it is perhaps the most illustrative). In the staff, a term like dolce has an 
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ambiguous aspect about it. It would seem that the music should be “sweet,” and the 
indication is telling us: “Play this part sweet!” But what does that mean? There are 
many historical music lexicons that offer different kinds of adjectives to enlighten our 
understanding, but it is difficult to find a source that says anything about a case when 
the music does not sound particularly sweet when it is accompanied by a dolce in the 
score. Surely, we think, the music must mean something beyond dolce. Thus, there is 
no easy answer to the dolce question. To tackle the problem seems to require an 
investigation into performance practice, comparisons with other scores from the time, 
and discussions of musical meaning. This is precisely what we try to do in this 
dissertation. 
 
Traditional hermeneutics attempts to explicate meaning in texts. We call upon 
hermeneutic methods especially when the meaning of a text is obscure. In the early-
nineteenth century, F. D. E. Schleiermacher outlined a new hermeneutic method to 
understand texts and conversations with the belief that texts and conversations contain 
thoughts and ideas. We dedicate Part II of this dissertation to an elaboration on the 
strengths of Schleiermacher’s hermeneutic theory in an evaluation of music; this is 
founded on the premise that to interpret a text is a critical activity that is similar to 
what is involved in the performance or analysis of a musical work. Schleiermacher’s 
hermeneutic theory, which involves thoughts and ideas, takes on a universal aspect 
when we compare Schleiermacher’s theory to A. B. Marx’s musical Idee in Part III of 
this dissertation. Not only were these methods commonly used to determine meaning 
in texts and music in the nineteenth century – as Beethoven’s music is from this same 
era – but these methods seem to explicitly touch on the notion that a score (as a text) 
is important for understanding meaning; moreover, these methods emphasize that we 
should deliberate on the details of how we form a description of musical meaning 




We put Schleiermacher’s hermeneutics into practice to elaborate on the way in which 
Schleiermacher’s method can enlighten musical meaning and uncover aspects of the 
score that traditional analysis does not. We attempt a more lengthy hermeneutic 
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analysis to examine deeper meaning in the three-note motto of Beethoven’s Sonata in 
E-flat Major, Op. 81a, Lebewohl (“The Farewell,” see Part II, chapter 2).  
 
We also consider A. B. Marx’s musical Idee in the context of a critical method Marx 
puts forward to facilitate the understanding of musical meaning. As a prominent 
scholar in the nineteenth century, with interests in music theory, music history, 
aesthetics, and pedagogy, Marx’s approach to musical meaning and pedagogy departs 
from most other nineteenth century music criticism. In Part III, we highlight one of 
the extraordinary critical methods Marx elaborates in the context of Beethoven’s 
“Eroica” symphony. Marx’s method explicitly promotes a series of tools (that 
resonate with certain notions in Schleiermacher’s hermeneutics), which assist an 
explication of musical expression and determinate meaning in instrumental music. To 
demonstrate how Marx’s tools can help inform our understanding of music, we 
explore Beethoven’s Symphony No. 9 in D Minor, Op. 125 (“Choral,” see Part III, 
chapter 2), with respect to how we can elucidate meaning in the symphony through 
psychological coherence in concert with recent criticism.  
 
The concepts we present with relation to Beethoven’s works, as the end result of an 
interpretative effort, seem light-hearted in comparison with the music they address. 
This conclusion illustrates how difficult it is to bridge the gap between music 
experienced in the medium of performance, music in a score, and our descriptions of 
music. The subtitle of this dissertation – interpretation, performance, and description 
– captures the essence of how critical interpretation enters into a dialogue with 
performance practice, and that both of these sides feed into a general description of 
musical meaning. 
 
The conclusion of this dissertation is directed principally at a question posed by 
musicologist Scott Burnham, who famously elaborated on A. B. Marx’s concept of a 
musical Idee. In a seminal article, Burnham asks: “And what governs the curious 
contradictions of [A. B. Marx’s] notion of the Idee, a spiritual essence that seems all 
too material?”2 In our conclusion we attempt to answer this question, at least with 
relation to the role of the material in a concept that describes something “spiritual.” 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2 Scott Burnham, “Criticism, Faith, and the ‘Idee’: A. B. Marx’s Early Reception of Beethoven,” 19th-
Century Music, Vol. 13, No. 3 (Spring, 1990): 183-192, 189.	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Our ultimate aim is not just to answer one of Burnham’s concerns, but is also to 
address the questions that the earlier parts of this dissertation bring up. These 
questions arise, in part, from our attempt to grab hold of meaning in music as Rilke 
illustrated it in “To Music.” First, when we encounter a dolce in Beethoven’s scores, 
many times Beethoven is not only instructing us to play the passage “dolce” but offers 
us a glimpse into the deeper meaning of the work. Rarely does a musical score 
volunteer signposts of significance, but expressive word cues in the staff are as close 
as one may get to such a signpost in the late-Classical and early-Romantic periods. 
This is one of the reasons why the material of music is so important for understanding 
musical meaning – the score, in this sense, “speaks” (or perhaps “breathes” is a better 
word). Second, once we have a vague notion that there is meaning, we should uncover 
it, and try to describe it; and A. B. Marx’s critical toolbox (that includes similes, 
symbolism, and psychological coherence) is useful for this task. But the more we say, 
the more musical meaning seems to escape. When we describe it, we point at 
something, and we gesture toward it. But much like in Rilke’s poem, this meaning 
continues to move “vertically” away from us in the direction of what is more 
universal. 
 
In the end, Beethoven’s dolce is this: an invitation for critical activity into musical 
meaning and the meaning of a musical passage. It encourages us to question what is 
local (one measure, or a sequence, that has a dolce indication) and compare what is 
local to what is global (a work as a whole, musical notation in general, and larger 
questions of musical meaning). Our method to make musical meaning more palpable, 
more visible or comprehensible is through every tool we have at our disposal – 
performance, criticism, and analytical apparatuses. These work together in 
hermeneutic interpretation to form the most elegant solutions possible for elusive 
problems of musical meaning, which are elaborated in the pages of this dissertation.  
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Plate 1. Ludwig van Beethoven, Sonata in F Minor, Op. 57 








In the exposition of the Sonata in F Minor, Op. 57 (“Appassionata”), Beethoven offsets the 
dolce indication to the second note of the accompaniment figure. Beethoven replicates this 
position of the dolce in the first announcement of the second group, and in the recapitulation 
(shown here in final measure of the fourth system). Notice the low range of the 
accompaniment figure in this measure (F1), which reaches to these depths with an awkward F 
major triad that rocks back-and-forth between F1 and F2. Moreover, we differentiate the 
dolce from indications of dynamics (for example, ff: / p: / ff: in the first system), which appear 
flush left with the bar line or are specifically marked for a chord (see sfp [sforzando piano] in 
the second measure of the third system). The placement of dolce in this location of the 
accompaniment has yet to be represented in available printed scores and urtexts.  
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Used with kind permission of the Music Department, Bibliothèque nationale de France. 




PART I:  
 
Introduction to the Study of Expressive Indications 





 Beethoven’s Symphony No. 3 in E-flat Major, Op. 55, “Eroica” and dolce 
 
 
As a way to introduce our problem, we will look at Beethoven’s Symphony 
No. 3 in E-flat major, Op. 55, “Eroica,” to observe a few curious instances of dolce 
indications within the staves of the score. We will find that the dolce and espressivo 
indications suggest meaning that goes beyond form and are not merely structural 
signposts. From this study we will also explore how Beethoven uses expressive word 
cue indications in piano sonatas and compare the unique (and sometimes 
counterintuitive) use of expressive indications within the staff to Beethoven’s 
indications in the “Eroica.” We will address how indications such as dolce and 
espressivo, in formal performance treatises on expression, generally suggest a 
cantabile technique to play the passages. Contrariwise, we will scrutinize the presence 
of expressive word cues in the staff as instances where Beethoven is actually pointing 
to meaning beyond technical reproductions of sound. When Beethoven desires that 
the piano sing in performance – a comment that inherently integrates an 
understanding of cantabile from performance practice – the composer is describing an 
ideal sound that not only questions the capabilities of musical instruments and the 
possibilities for interpretation in virtue of technique, but also the meaning of music. It 
seems Beethoven describes an ideal expression that connects with the listener on a 
certain level, as though a human voice were singing the tune; this idea challenges 
musical interpretation and inspires us to ask: “how does music create this 
otherworldly sound?” and “what does it communicate to us?” This chapter aims to 
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address these questions from the perspective of Beethoven’s notation and 




A. Introduction to expressive indications in the first movement of the “Eroica” 
 
In the following, we will consider dolce indications in the first movement, 
Allegro con brio, of Beethoven’s Eroica. We will examine how Beethoven’s notation 
encourages us to question the purpose of these indications, the meaning of the 
notation, and what these indications might sound like in performance. In the “Eroica,” 
Beethoven often uses dolce indications paired with dynamics, with dolce only marked 
for specific instruments. Ultimately what is curious about this is (1) sometimes these 
instruments are not playing a solo melody, but are merely integrated into a greater 
conglomerate of instruments that form the accompaniment (oftentimes these other 
instruments do not have dolce written into their parts) and (2) one instrument may 
play a melody marked dolce where a second instrument may echo back that melody 
but it is not marked dolce, which consequently gives the appearance of an expressive 
superiority of one instrument over the other. With dolce notation, Beethoven explores 
expressive dimension in the accompaniment and expressive melodic variations for 
themes that are generally considered less important from the perspective of form (i.e. 
these are dolce themes that are neither the first nor second themes of the exposition). 
We argue that Beethoven is calling our attention to these themes as expressive entities 
that offer meaning for the symphony beyond formal definitions and concepts.  
Miriam Sheer has studied the way Beethoven uses dynamics in the “Eroica” to 
reinforce aspects of form and structure in the composition. She describes how 
Beethoven utilizes dynamics to set certain musical ideas apart from others:  
 
[Beethoven] knew that overuse of too many tension-producing effects would 
turn out to be ineffective and tiring after a while. Therefore, his aim was to 
save the strongest impact for crucial points within a movement. The 
expanded length of many movements as well as the frequent multiplicity of 
musical ideas within a single movement made this task difficult. These 
situations made him search for a cohesive means of unification.4  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Miriam Sheer, “Patterns of Dynamic Organization in Beethoven’s Eroica Symphony,” The Journal of 
Musicology, Vol. 10, no. 4 (Autumn, 1992): 483-504. Henceforward “Eroica.” See Sheer, Eroica, 485. 
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With this comment, Sheer brings to the forefront the complexity that arises 
from the “frequent multiplicity of musical ideas within a single movement;” this 
aspect in Beethoven’s compositions is certainly not limited to the “Eroica” symphony. 
As she points out, Beethoven’s “Middle period,” ca. 1801-1814,5 where we find 
works such as Beethoven’s opera Fidelio (Op. 72) and the “Eroica” symphony, is 
marked by compositions that have dramatic shifts in dynamics from unexpected 
loudness with sudden declines to soft levels. When we examine Sheer’s argument in 
more detail with relation to the score, we begin to see how Beethoven treated different 
thematic material with varying dynamics depending on whether it was strategic to do 
so in the composition (i.e. to mark the “crucial” points of a movement).6 As Sheer’s 
study is driven by dynamics, she refers to Beethoven’s indications of dolce and 
espressivo as qualifiers of piano dynamics. Although Sheer finds that these expressive 
word cues are subsidiary to dynamic indications, we argue that dolce and espressivo 
have crucial roles of their own with respect to meaning – the word cues impel us to 
locate meaning in another realm that is beyond formal considerations and dynamics. 
 
B.  Dolce, dolce crescendo, espressivo in the “Eroica” 
 
The first passage we will examine is from the first movement of the “Eroica.” 
It is a passage that is often cited with respect to how the symphony deviates from 
standard theories of second groups and secondary themes in sonata form.7 James 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 See Miriam Sheer, “Dynamic Organization in Beethoven’s Instrumental Works,” The Journal of 
Musicology, Volume 16, No. 3, New Perspectives on Beethoven Sources and Style (Summer, 1998): 
358-378, 358. She notes that her understanding of Beethoven’s “Middle period” is different from 
Joseph Kerman and Alan Tyson’s distinction in The New Grove Beethoven (New York and London, 
1983), 91. William Kinderman, in his biography Beethoven (William Kinderman, Beethoven, 2nd ed. 
[Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009]), divides this vague notion into three stylistic periods in 
Beethoven’s life: Heroic Style I: 1803-1806; Heroic Style II: 1806-1809; Consolidation: 1810-1812.  
However, generalizations about the years of Beethoven’s “middle period” or “heroic period” appear 
usually based on compositions rather than years, per se, such as the Leonore overture and Fidelio, Op. 
72; Symphony No. 3 in E-flat major, Op. 55, etc., and thus the “heroic” of  “heroic period” speaks to 
heroic ideas or feelings in the works, which problematically can apply to many of Beethoven’s other 
works beyond 1803-1812. 
6 When we consider the first movement of the “Eroica,” the main climax section of the development 
contains a fortissimo area for 32 measures (the longest in the movement) and Sheer argues it is the 
“most intense” section of the first movement. See Sheer, “Eroica,” 485. Sheer’s understanding of 
expressive indications such as dolce and espressivo in function of dynamics is especially present in her 
Figure 1, 488-9. 
7 This is notably discussed by William Horne in William Horne, “The Hidden Trellis: Where Does the 
Second Group Begin in the First Movement of Beethoven’s Eroica Symphony?” Beethoven Forum, 
Volume 13, No. 2, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press (Fall 2006): 95-147. Horne describes Leon 
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Hepokoski and Warren Darcy describe this passage of the “Eroica” (Figure 1.1, 
starting at m. 45). They write that it presents an example of a “preparatory module 
that sets up or otherwise precedes what strikes one as the ‘real’ initial theme of the 
zone.”8 At m. 45, we find a “lighter” theme, as opposed to the “real” or proper theme 
of the section.9 These types of preparatory S themes “normally feature a drop to piano 
and display ‘thematic’ S-features (perhaps energetic, perhaps lyrical). As themes they 
do launch S-space and yet seem also to prepare the way for the arrival of something 
different that is more stable.”10 When Hepoksoki and Darcy describe this 
phenomenon in the “Eroica,” beginning at m. 45, they illustrate it as: 
 
a locus classicus of a more prolonged, S0 theme. . . . The forte-dynamic 
V:HC MC11 is reached with an almost disturbing abruptness at m. 45. A new, 
“questioning” theme, piano is sounded over the dominant of B-flat major 
with the upbeat to m. 46. This dominant in the bass is prolonged for several 
measures – with thematic material above – until the moment of its decisive 
tonic resolution at m. 57, which then launches a new theme, S proper.12 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Plantinga’s thought: “In m. 45 an abrupt shift is made to the dominant B-flat in conjunction with 
contrasting new material, but we are not yet allowed to rest comfortably in the new key; an active, 
brilliant modulatory passage beginning at m. 65 sounds exactly like bridge material, and its inexorable 
conclusion in B-flat (m. 83) established this point as the ‘real’ beginning of the dominant key area” 
(Leon Plantinga, Romantic Music: a History of Musical Style in Nineteenth-Century Europe [New 
York: W.W. Norton, 1984]), 38–39. Horne also writes that Thomas Sipe considers the thematic interest 
at m. 45 to be a “transitional theme,” where the dominant area does not begin until the established “‘C 
theme in [the] dominant’ at m. 83” (Thomas Sipe, Beethoven: Eroica Symphony [Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998], 97). Richard Taruskin (Richard Taruskin, The Oxford History of 
Western Music, Volume II: The Seventeenth an Eighteenth Centuries [Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2005], 659-60), Carl Dahlhaus (Carl Dahlhaus, Ludwig van Beethoven: Approaches to His 
Music, trans. Mary Whittall, [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991], 174-5), and James Webster (John 
Webster, “Sonata Form,” in New Grove Dictionary of Music and Musicians, Stanley Sadie, ed., volume 
23 [London: Macmillan, 2001], 678-701), have similar opinions about the official placement of the 
second group, at least agreeing that it should appear after the transitional material mm. 45-56. See 
Horne, 96n2, 103n3. Horne supports Hepokoski and Darcy’s view that the second group begins at m. 
45 (see Horne, 104). 
8 James Hepokoski and Warren Darcy, “The Secondary Theme (S) and Essential Expositional Closure 
(EEC)” in Elements of Sonata Theory: Norms, Types, and Deformations in the Late-Eighteenth-
Century Sonata (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 142. 
9 Hepokoski and Darcy describe these as, e.g. for secondary theme areas: S0 and S1.0. 
10 Hepokoski and Darcy, 142. 
11 The abbreviations of “HC” and “MC” in the above citation stand for “half-cadence” and “medial-
caesura.” As the authors state in their “Terms and Abbreviations” section, “V: HC MC represents an 
MC built around V/V… the presence of an MC identifies the exposition-type as two-part – the most 
common type – and leads directly to an S theme,” Hepokoski and Darcy, xxvi. 
12 Hepokoski and Darcy, “The Secondary Theme (S) and Essential Expositional Closure (EEC)” in 
Elements of Sonata Theory: Norms, Types, and Deformations in the Late-Eighteenth-Century Sonata, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006, 143. What Hepokoski and Darcy determine as the “proper 
secondary theme” of the movement starting at m. 57 (not explored here) is understood to have a crucial 
role in the composition of the symphony. They describe that the theme, at m. 57, “is now grounded on 
the tonic: this is one of the few themes of the symphony that Beethoven kept more or less invariant in 
his multiple continuity drafts, and it is also a theme alluded to in m. 673,” 143. They cite Lewis 
Lockwood’s work on the drafts of the “Eroica.” The continuity drafts maintain this specific passage 
(what Lewis Lockwood terms ‘Unit C’) from early drafts and is roughly determined as such in its final 
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Figure 1.1 Ludwig van Beethoven, Symphony No. 3 in E-flat Major, Op. 55 
(“Eroica”), mvmt. I, Allegro con brio, exposition, mm. 45-53.13  
 
 
We see in the exposition of the “Eroica,” at this controversial section (Figure 
1.1), a dolce indication appears in m. 45 after a fortissimo section. At m. 45, 
Beethoven dramatically alters the fortissimo dynamic to a piano and dolce dynamic. 
The dolce indication is placed below the oboe melody, which enters this problematic 
section with a theme from the secondary key area (F major). This same short theme is 
echoed with interval variances in the other wind instruments (clarinet in B-flat, flute, 
then back to the oboe). This exchange between instruments is repeated until the 
bassoon doubles the clarinet’s melody and transitions this piano section into another 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
form (although the theme did evolve rhythmically). Surrounding this theme, ‘Unit C,’ “are shaped 
thematic units that have much further to go before they reach their final linear and harmonic form” 
Lewis Lockwood, “‘Eroica’ Perspectives: Strategy and Design in the First Movement” in Beethoven 
Studies 3, ed. Alan Tyson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 85-105, 103. Lockwood 
explains that these four continuity drafts of the exposition are found in Landsberg 6: no. 1, pages 10-
11; no. 2, pages 12-13; no. 3, pages 14-15; no. 4, pages 20-21. We assume, thus, with respect to 
establishing the “proper secondary theme” of the exposition, the strength of ‘Unit C’ upholds 
Hepokoski and Darcy’s argument from a genetic point of view. 
13 Urtext edited by Jonathan Del Mar, Kassel: ©1999, Bärenreiter-Verlag. Reproduced with kind 
permission of Bärenreiter. 
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sudden fortissimo area (m. 55, not pictured in Figure 1.1). As we near the closure of 
this section (Figure 1.1, mm. 53-54), the first note of the “dolce” theme is marked 
with a sforzando, which destabilizes the subtle piano and dolce indications in the 
oboe. We assume the dolce indication pertains to the oboe theme, and specifically to 
the first appearance of the theme. The flattened scale degree of the melody, with a 
sforzando on the flattened note, changes the feel of the theme and aids in the 
transition to the next fortissimo section.  This particular section (starting at m. 45) is 
determined by the piano and dolce oboe theme, although the other instruments (even 
when they echo almost identical themes) only have piano indications; nevertheless, 
when those instruments play the melodic theme at a piano dynamic, the oboe is 
undoubtedly an influence upon them. We contrast these instruments to the string 
section and the horns in E-flat that play an accompaniment at an unqualified piano 
dynamic – the accompaniment here is not necessarily influenced by the oboe dolce. 
To complicate matters, nonetheless, the first violin has a variant of the melodic theme 
with a different slur (Figure 1.1, mm. 48-9): the first two notes are slurred and the 
final quarter note stands alone, separated from the figure, mimicking the motions of 
the theme at a distance. The violin I is also in a higher register, two octaves above its 
sister violin II, which contributes to how the violin I demarcates its brief 
independence from the string family (Figure 1.1, mm. 48-9; m. 52). 
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Figure 1.2 Ludwig van Beethoven, Symphony No. 3 in E-flat Major, Op. 55 
(“Eroica”), mvmt. I, Allegro con brio, development, mm. 165-178.14  
 
In the development (Figure 1.2), we see dolce is applied to each respective 
instrument when they play the melodic theme during mm. 166-169 (a theme we first 
discussed in the exposition starting at m. 45 in Figure 1.1).15 This thematic material is 
treated differently in the development than in the exposition; in the development, the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Urtext edited by Jonathan Del Mar, Kassel: ©1999, Bärenreiter-Verlag. Reproduced with kind 
permission of Bärenreiter. 
15 This theme is the same represented in Figure 1.1 (occurring from mm. 45-55), although transposed 
into the key of G major. 
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theme is given to the bassoon instead of the clarinet, and the first violin 
accompaniment doubles the flute melody in a non-dolce reiteration (Figure 1.2, m. 
169 and m. 173). Furthermore, the first violin accentuates the sustained sforzando and 
marcato rhythmic gestures that it shares with the bassoon (see Figure 1.2 mm. 167-
170); it echoes the important melodic and accompaniment moments, but omits any 
dolce sensitivity or melodic superiority.  The melodic importance of the strings slowly 
magnifies in the transitional period of this section, which begins around m. 174, 
building toward their dominating melodic position in the next system. A feeling of 
foreshadowing enhances this effect, which is carried out by the cellos and basses with 
their elongated interpretation of the sforzando-marcato figure (Figure 1.2, mm. 175-
177). They prepare the way for their truncated pianissimo statement of the 
movement’s main theme in C minor at m. 178. 
 The szforzando motif in the second system of Figure 1.2  – shared by the 
bassoons, oboes, and flutes, in this order– has an insistent quality about it that 
frequently displaces the strong beat of the respective measures (i.e. m. 172, m. 174, 
m. 175). Overall, the harmonic variances in the melodic theme (the marcato 
indications on many of the final notes of the motif in the flutes and bassoons), the new 
distribution of melodic material to different instruments, and the incorporation of 
dolce for flutes and bassoons demonstrate a heightened complexity in the 
development (Figure 1.2) versus the earlier appearance of this theme in the exposition 
at m. 45 (Figure 1.1). The rich blend of rhythmic manifestations of intensity, which is 
layered with lyrical dolce thematic material, substantiates the claim of a structural 
change and the importance of this theme irrespective of the question of whether it is 
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Figure 1.3 Ludwig van Beethoven, Symphony No. 3 in E-flat Major, Op. 55 
(“Eroica”), mvmt. I, Allegro con brio, development, mm. 324-331.16  
 
 
In the second part of the development, Beethoven provides expressive depth 
for transitional thematic material (Figure 1.3, m. 328). In this example, Beethoven 
places dolce markings alongside crescendo indications, which intensifies the tone of 
the crescendo in an expressive direction (Figure 1.3, m. 328). This particular device 
appears after a decrescendo in both the clarinet in B-flat and the bassoon. The string 
section has a crescendo without a dolce indication, which signals that there are two 
different kinds of crescendos occurring simultaneously in mm. 328-9. The dolce 
crescendo is both in the clarinet and bassoon at the conclusion of their melodic 
segment (Figure 1.3, m. 328). This device also sets the tone for a transition to the 
melody, which is taken over by the flutes and first violins at m. 330. The dolce 
crescendo at m. 328 is a texture that should be heard over, and distinct from, the 
accompanying figure in the string section; we find this device in the sequence of the 
melodic line, and this enhances our ability to hear the dolce crescendo. The dolce 
calls attention to itself in this way, and suggests the figure has a superior role over a 
non-qualified crescendo. The dolce specifically addresses to how this melodic phrase 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Urtext edited by Jonathan Del Mar, Kassel: ©1999, Bärenreiter-Verlag. Reproduced with kind 
permission of Bärenreiter. 
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should be played, and further highlights the special care that should be taken with 
how to end the phrase. The dolce crescendo forces the theme toward a more intricate 
conclusion. The dolce crescendo adds depth to this theme – a theme that was first 
stated earlier in the development, mm. 284-299 – as though it has matured. More than 
just a structural marker, the theme shows that the subtle dolce ornamentation is 
indicative of a heightened sensibility that comes through experience and repetition.  
 
 
Figure 1.4 Ludwig van Beethoven, Symphony No. 3 in E-flat Major, Op. 55 
(“Eroica”), mvmt. I, Allegro con brio, recapitulation, mm. 408-420.17  
 
 
In the recapitulation (Figure 1.4), the horn in F and the flutes play with a dolce 
modification. The melody (in F), which the first dolce applies to, is reminiscent of the 
primary theme of the exposition (in E-flat). The primary theme is heard in the tonic at 
the very start of the recapitulation, played on the instrument (cello) that introduced the 
theme at the beginning of the piece. The primary theme, when taken up by the horn in 
F, is modified in the fourth measure of the sequence (Figure 1.4, m. 411): after an 
ascending major triad arpeggio in quarter notes, the final note of the arpeggio is 
sustained in m. 411 and continues with a pedal figure for several measures, resolving 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Urtext edited by Jonathan Del Mar, Kassel: ©1999, Bärenreiter-Verlag.  Reproduced with kind 
permission of Bärenreiter. 
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on a quarter note played at a piano dynamic that is one half-step higher. At this point, 
the horn in F resounds an artistic fusion of the main theme of the exposition played by 
the cellos and the first violin accompaniment (see Figure 1.5, mm. 3-6 and mm. 7-10, 
respectively). This moment in the score recalls Hegel’s argument in the Aesthetics, 
where he states that the meaning of a musical theme is “exhausted” in its first 
announcement. 18 In our view, the first announcement does not “exhaust” meaning; it 
offers authority and is a reference for all future developments. (We generally describe 
how much a theme has been modified over the course of a musical work by referring 
to the first announcement of the theme.) Our understanding of the horn melody mm. 
408-415 is greatly enhanced when we look back at the opening of the movement. A 
glimpse back at the opening measures shows us how much the theme has changed and 

















	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 This rather obscure passage in Hegel’s Aesthetics reads as follows: “The meaning to be expressed in 
a musical theme is already exhausted in the theme; if the theme is repeated or if it goes on to further 
contrasts and modulations, then the repetitions, modulations, transformations in different keys, etc. 
readily prove superfluous for an understanding of the work and belong rather to a purely musical 
elaboration and an assimilation into the manifold realm of harmonic differences etc. which are neither 
demanded by the subject-matter nor remain carried by it.” Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Aesthetics: 
Lectures on Fine Arts, trans. T.M. Knox, volume II (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975) 896. 
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Figure 1.5 Ludwig van Beethoven, Symphony No. 3 in E-flat Major, Op. 55 
(“Eroica”), mvmt. I, Allegro con brio, exposition, mm. 1-12.19  
 
 
The first time we hear the main theme at the very start of the movement (Figure 1.5), 
it is played by the cellos and marked piano. There is no dolce in sight until m. 45. 
When we hear the horn in F interpreting the main theme with a dolce ornamentation, 
on the surface we can conclude that the dolce expression gives the impression of a 
recollection of the first movement’s main idea for the sake of the recapitulation (for 
the sake of the typical form of a recapitulation in sonata form, which also follows a 
dictionary definition of the term “to restate”). Yet further inspection of the system 
suggests not only a recollection, but also a change in our overall perception of this 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Urtext edited by Jonathan Del Mar, Kassel: ©1999, Bärenreiter-Verlag. Reproduced with kind 
permission of Bärenreiter. 
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theme; when the flutes play the theme at m. 416 (Figure 1.4), they illustrate it in a 
more remote key of D-flat major. The flutes maintain the fused melody-
accompaniment variation. This mimics an omnipotent melody because it plays its 
own accompaniment.  
 
Figure 1.6 Ludwig van Beethoven, Symphony No. 3 in E-flat Major, Op. 55 




In the coda, (Figure 1.6), we find examples of espressivo and crescendo 
figures that present us with a curious problem of interpretation with respect to the 
expressive dimensions of Beethoven’s accompaniment figures. There are espressivo 
and crescendo indications in the clarinet and bassoon at m. 614. These instruments are 
playing the concluding figures of transitional thematic material. When the espressivo 
and crescendo enter, the indication of espressivo seems to apply to the last two beats 
of m. 614, preparing both instruments for the sounding G-flat in m. 615. Espressivo 
indications, when added to crescendo indications, also assert that these instruments 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Urtext edited by Jonathan Del Mar, Kassel: ©1999, Bärenreiter-Verlag. Reproduced with kind 
permission of Bärenreiter. 
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serve an expressive role in this section (even when they become subsidiary to the 
horns in E-flat at m. 615) 
 When the espressivo and crescendo appear in the flutes (Figure 1.6, m. 619), 
this time the score suggests that the espressivo directly affects the crescendo. But it 
calls our attention to the fact that the espressivo may also apply to the decrescendo 
that directly follows it at m. 621. Moreover, the score hints at something even more 
interesting: an accompaniment motif (played by the flutes) has an expressive depth 
that is more complex than the melody, even when this accompaniment is entirely 
subsidiary to the melodic frame of reference. The oboes and bassoons have the same 
rhythmic gesture in their parts; however their crescendos are not marked with 
espressivo indications. The horns in E-flat have the most prominent melodic 
component of this section because they play components of the main theme of the 
movement. The first, second, and third horns in E-flat seem to be competing with 
each other considering that their thematic material is dispersed among their respective 
parts in the fashion of the dolce theme in m. 45 (Figure 1). When we turn to the flutes 
(Figure 1.6, m. 619), their sonority assumes a particular role that is separated from the 
other accompaniment; the flutes soar over the horns with the highest pitches in these 
measures to create a euphoric accompanying figure. 
 What is noteworthy in this section is the sonorous effect created by the layers 
of dynamics with and without expressive indications. Due to the orchestration and 
competing crescendos – with commanding horns playing fragments of the main theme 
and the bass and cellos leap about octaves – we can argue this particular espressivo 
indication in the flutes (Figure 1.6, m. 619), has the appearance of being irrelevant. 
We come to this conclusion namely because it is difficult, if not impossible, to discern 
depth in this espressivo when it applies to a sustained note that is relatively high in 
pitch. Further, the espressivo poses complications for understanding unity in the 
accompaniment; the espressivo gives the impression that we should separate the flutes 
from the other woodwind instruments. In this light, the espressivo is as an example of 
a subtle compositional gesture that pierces through otherwise protected melodic 
themes. The passage requires that we pay special attention to the flutes, especially 
with relation to the attack of the note and what an “expressive” crescendo sounds like. 
When we attempt to determine the appropriate response from the orchestra, and 
consider the importance of these elements of expression that are not necessarily the 
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primary matter of the movement, we find that we need to reflect on these expressive 
word cues themselves. They invite further inquiry as to their purpose and what it is 
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Chapter 2: 
 
Unpacking word cue indications in Beethoven’s piano sonatas: 
 One study of cantabile 
  
 A.  Cantabile as technique 
 
When we reduce our vision from the grandeur of the orchestral scale to the 
intimate expression of the keyboard, the way we interpret expressive word cue 
indications will shift in a similar way; but the cues themselves will continue to be 
often enigmatic. This is the case particularly when we encounter a word cue, such as 
espressivo, in the context of keyboard literature where it seems that cantabile or dolce 
could both equally fit the bill to describe the technique needed to play the passage. As 
we will explore in this chapter, cantabile and dolce are commonly used 
interchangeably to describe performance techniques because dolce, cantabile, and 
espressivo call for a very similar touch and expression. When we consider 
Beethoven’s word cues in the staves of keyboard works, Beethoven appears to expand 
our understanding of these terms in performance practice to include meanings beyond 
normative restrictions. One example of this is in the first movement of Beethoven’s 
Sonata in A Major, Op. 101 where the left hand has an espressivo e semplice 
indication. 
Figure 1.7 Beethoven, Sonata in A Major, Opus 101, mvmt. I, Etwas lebhaft und mit 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Beethoven: The 35 Piano Sonatas. Edited by Barry Cooper with fingerings by David Ward. © 2007 
by the Associated Board of the Royal Schools of Music. Reproduced by permission of ABRSM. 
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The passage from Op. 101 recalls a cantabile style because of the step-wise 
motion in the second measure, the spacing of the voices in the chord played in the left 
hand, the slur over the bass notes, and the repetition of the dominant (B) in the 
harmony of the figure: these elements contribute to a chorale-like texture (Figure 1.7, 
mm. 25-26). But when we hear this passage performed, the word cues – espressivo e 
semplice – do not tell the whole story behind the expression of the passage. The sound 
quality of the passage gives the impression of peace because the melodic notes hang 
together in a slow-paced symmetrical pattern with a slur. The right hand 
accompaniment is sparse, and so the espressivo e semplice indications seem to apply 
only to the left hand and not equally to both hands. Beethoven’s selection of 
espressivo e semplice is not arbitrary; our focus is on how Beethoven uses indications 
like these to call our attention to meaning in the score we might not notice right off 
the bat.  
One of the most curious instances of expressive word cue indications in 
Beethoven’s piano sonata is Beethoven’s use of dolce in the first movement of the 
Sonata in F minor, Op. 57 (“Appassionata,” composed 1804-6). Beethoven’s dolce 
throughout the first movement is peculiar because dolce continually appears in 
situations that strike us as unintuitive contexts for the term. We will discuss this piece 
in more detail in Part II of this thesis, but at present we will examine the strangeness 
of the passage with this indication, and why it invites additional interpretation beyond 
what we might understand to be a normative dolce. This dolce calls into question a 
generalized cantabile technique that is used as a recourse to play problematic 
passages such as the entrance of the second group in the “Appassionata” (Figure 1.8) 
– we will subsequently reflect on the extent that material considerations can inform 
our understanding of dolce as an indication, cantabile as a technique, and the meaning 
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Figure 1.8 Beethoven, Sonata in F minor, Op. 57, “Appassionata,” mvmt. I, Allegro 




At the introduction to the second group of the exposition, we encounter a low-
lying bass accompaniment marked dolce (Figure 1.8, m. 35). This accompaniment is 
heard alone and asserts a prominent position sonorously because it emerges after a 
pedal point on E-flat (not pictured). The accompaniment sounds deep and muddy due 
to rocking back and forth between a bass note (low A-flat) and A-flat triad. The 
“muddiness” can be still heard on current pianos and, importantly, this low register 
has an indistinct and fuzzy tone on historic keyboards.23  
Once this accompaniment figure establishes itself without interruption, the 
melody finally begins at the end of m. 35 (Figure 1.8), in octaves, outlining the same 
A-flat major triad we heard in the accompaniment; the melody opens up a broad 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Ludwig van Beethoven. Beethoven: The 35 Piano Sonatas. Barry Cooper with fingerings by David 
Ward. © 2007 by the Associated Board of the Royal Schools of Music. Reproduced by permission of 
ABRSM. 
23 In a historic recording by Paul Badura-Skoda of Op. 57 on a Broadwood pianoforte (1815), the 
muddiness is present, and made even more pronounced by Badura–Skoda’s use of sustain pedal 
through the passage. See Ludwig van Beethoven, Les Sonates pour le Pianoforte sur instruments 
d’époque: Sonate en fa mineur, opus 57: with Paul Badura-Skoda, Fortepiano by John Broadwood, 
London ca. 1815, Volume 7, E 8697 (Auvidis-Astrée, 1989). As Jonathan Del Mar writes about the 
difference between current instruments and historic keyboards with respect to the “Appassionata” 
sonata: “To a certain extent, to perform a keyboard work by Beethoven on a modern piano is to play a 
transcription of music conceived for a very different type of instrument. It was one whose touch was 
lighter, whose attack was cleaner, and whose sustaining power was considerably weaker, especially in 
the upper register. The hammers were covered in leather rather than the felt of modern instruments, and 
the frame was wooden, not metal,” Jonathan Del Mar and Misha Donat “Performance Practice,” 
introduction to Sonata in F Minor for Pianoforte, Op. 57, “Appassionata,” by Ludwig van Beethoven, 
Bärenreiter Urtext, ed. Jonathan Del Mar (Kassel: Bärenreiter-Verlag Karl Vötterle GmbH & Co., 
2014), vi-viii. 
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sonorous space over the clumsy left hand figure – it sounds as though someone has 
opened the door to a room we have been anxiously waiting to enter. Both the melody 
and the accompaniment are phrased with slurs, creating a dual legato effect in all 
sounding registers. Two crucial questions emerge in this section with respect to the 
dolce: (1) for how long do we play the passage dolce – i.e., cautiously until m. 41; (2) 
to what does this indication apply (the melody, the accompaniment, or both)? 
There is no easy answer to either of these issues. Our intuition is to look at context 
even though this may lead to more questions than answers, i.e. if Beethoven wanted 
only a dolce accompaniment, then this register seems to be an odd choice because of 
its tessitura. Perhaps the only straight answer for making sense of these indications is 
to look at performance practice because while the jury is still out on what the role of 
this dolce is, somebody is going to have to play it before any official decision is 
made. 
Barry Cooper comments on the “Appassionata” second group dolce saying: “the 
dolce in bar 35 also implies a slight stretching of the time, and these very low notes 
need to be played as softly and lightly as possible, so that the noble cantabile melody 
can sing out above them while remaining quite soft.”24 Cooper’s comments express 
that this passage is not limited it one single mood or dynamic; the section is “soft” in 
the accompaniment and has a “noble cantabile melody,” which should have a distinct 
tone and touch from the accompaniment (moreover the accompaniment should be 
played “softly and lightly” even though it is a cumbersome figure for the hand.) The 
tone Beethoven desires for the passage appears to require these two different 
techniques at the same time, which leaves a lot of room for the performer to choose 
how to bring out the dolce to its full potential and become a “noble cantabile 
melody.” A word cue like cantabile challenges our understanding in music, such as 
the “Appassionata,” when the context of the term is complex. Cantabile, as a 
technique, is one thing; dolce, when it appears in a score and is supposed to bring out 
a cantabile sensibility in performance, is quite another. And yet the clarity of this 
distinction deteriorates when we look deeper into the question: “what is a cantabile 
melody versus a dolce melody?” In the end, the ambiguity we encounter with relation 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Barry Cooper, “Commentaries,” In Ludwig van Beethoven: The 35 Piano Sonatas Edited by Barry 
Cooper with fingerings by David Ward, Volume III (London: The Associated Board of the Royal 
Schools of Music, 2007), 7. 
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to cantabile is a discrepancy between cantabile as an article of notation and cantabile 
as a description.  
When a cantabile indication appears in the staff, does this make the passage more 
comprehensible because we know it requires a cantabile technique, feel, and mood? 
In fact we find when Beethoven uses cantabile in piano scores, he writes the 
indication for passages that are often just as enigmatic as the “Appassionata” dolce 
irrespective of an assumed cantabile technique. In the Sonata in C Major, Op. 2, n. 3, 
we find a passage written with a dolce in the staff, but the passage implicitly demands 
a cantabile technique for its proper performance. 
 




What we are calling an “assumed cantabile technique” is when a cantabile 
technique is implicitly required to play a passage, e.g. the middle subject of the final 
movement of Beethoven’s Sonata in C Major, Op. 2, No. 3 (Figure 1.9). Czerny 
describes this passage accordingly: “the middle subject (in F) to be played legatissimo 
and cantabile and the melody on the upper part to be well brought out. The left hand 
afterwards in the following way.”26 The hymn-like texture in the right hand and the 
organ-like octaves in the left hand have the stiff beauty of a Bach chorale. Beethoven 
then pairs this with a sensibility for a low-lying bass accompaniment that helps the 
melody shine. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Beethoven: The 35 Piano Sonatas. Edited by Barry Cooper with fingerings by David Ward. © 2007 
by the Associated Board of the Royal Schools of Music. Reproduced by permission of ABRSM. 
26 Carl Czerny, On the Proper Performance of all Beethoven’s Works for the Piano, ed. Paul Badura-
Skoda ([Vienna]: Universal Edition, 1970) 27. 
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The first time we find the term cantabile explicitly written within the staff of one 
of Beethoven’s piano sonatas is in the second movement of the Sonata in E-flat, Op. 
81a, “Lebewohl” or “Les Adieux” [The Farewell], composed in 1809. When we 
consider the melody Beethoven has marked cantabile (Figure 1.10), it does not look 
more “cantabile” than the “Appassionata” dolce second subject (Figure 1.8, mm. 35-
7).  
Figure 1.10 Beethoven, Sonata in E-flat major, Op. 81a, “Lebewohl” or “Les 




In the “Lebewohl” sonata’s second movement, the melody marked cantabile jumps 
around anxiously despite that we find it in the slow movement. The chromaticism and 
delicate ornaments lend the melody a lovely charm. The melody, nevertheless, 
appears better suited with a dolce than a cantabile indication. This causes us to ask 
what this cantabile might really mean, as far as the material of the score and formal 
discussions can tell us.  
Generally speaking, conclusions about the interpretation of expressive word 
cue indications in Beethoven’s music are derived from research into historical 
dictionaries and lexicons dating from the eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries. 
However, when we explore many of these sources with respect to our current 
problem, they do not shed much light on what the term cantabile means beyond 
denoting something that is song-like or has a singing quality (e.g. a melody that could 
be easily sung by a voice). One example is from a lexicon by Johann Gottfried 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Beethoven: The 35 Piano Sonatas. Edited by Barry Cooper with fingerings by David Ward. © 2007 
by the Associated Board of the Royal Schools of Music. Reproduced by permission of ABRSM. 
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Walther [1684-1748], who has an entry on the Italian term cantabile.28 Walther 
determines that a work is considered cantabile when all voices and [instrumental] 
parts can sing or, that a “fine” melody [with this quality] is brought forth. Similar 
contemporary sources for resolving questions of definitions, compositional use, and 
performance practice in the late Classical and Romantic period include Johann 
Abraham Peter Schulz [1747-1800] and Heinrich Christoph Koch [1749-1816], with 
their Allgemeiner Theorie der Schönen Künste [1771-1774], Musikalisches Lexikon 
[1802], respectively. Schulz and Koch’s texts impart comparable information with 
respect to cantabile: it is a term that is indicative of a “singable” melody, or a melody 
with properties that would make it easily carried by the human voice.29 Koch’s 
lexicon entries for “cantabile” and “singend” borrow much for Schulz’s earlier 
work,30 with two noticeable differences (described by Günther Massenkeil in 
“Cantabile bei Beethoven”).31 These are namely (1) cantabile is the opposite or 
antonym of a noisy (rauschenden) type of musical writing and (2) the cantabile 
indication, when written at the beginning of a movement, designates a slow 
movement whose melody sings in such a way that it does not require any additional 
specific technique for playing it.32  
Nevertheless, Carl Philipp Emanuel Bach [1714-1788] provides us with a 
different approach to cantabile; rather than addressing the term directly in examples 
of a score, Bach refers to a type of cantabile technique that delves further into 
practice than traditional lexicons. He writes:  
 
As a means of learning the essentials of good performance it is advisable to 
listen to accomplished musicians […] above all, lose no opportunity to hear 
artistic singing. In so doing, the keyboardist will learn to think in terms of 
song. Indeed, it is a good practice to sing instrumental melodies in order to 
reach an understanding of their correct performance. This way of learning is 
of far greater value than the reading of voluminous tomes or listening to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 “Cantabile ital. cantable gall. heisset: wenn eine Composition, sie sey vocaliter oder instrumentaliter 
gesetzt, in allen Stimmen und Partien sich wohl singen lässet, oder eine feine Melodie in solchen 
führet,” Johann Gottfried Walther, Musicalisches Lexicon, Leipzig, 1732 (Facsimile reprint: Kassel and 
Basel: [n.p.], 1953), 134. 
29 See entry for “Singend” in Heinrich Christoph Koch, Musikalisches Lexikon, Frankfurt am Main, 
1802, and 1390-1391 also, Massenkeil, 155. 
30 See Günther Massenkeil, “Cantabile bei Beethoven” in Beiträge ’76-78: Beethoven-Kolloquium 
1977, Dokumentation und Aufführungspraxis, ed. Rudolf Klein (Kassel: Bärenreiter, 1978), 154–159, 
155. 
31 Günther Massenkeil, “Cantabile bei Beethoven” in Beiträge ’76-78: Beethoven-Kolloquium 1977, 
Dokumentation und Aufführungspraxis, ed. Rudolf Klein (Kassel: Bärenreiter, 1978). 
32 See Massenkeil, 155. Also Koch’s entries for “Cantabile” and “Singend” in Musikalisches Lexikon 
(Frankfurt am Main: August Hermann, 1802), 299-300 and 1390-1391, respectively.   
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learned discourses. In these one meets such terms as Nature, Taste, Song, and 
Melody, although their authors are often incapable of putting together as 
many as two natural tasteful, singing, melodic tones for they dispense their 
alms and endowments with a completely unhappy arbitrariness.33 
 
In C. P. E. Bach’s discussion, a cantabile technique is a requisite for artistic 
playing, learned directly from experiencing song, and singing, first-hand. In the 
sequence of C. P. E. Bach’s argument, the word cue cantabile apparently would not 
need to be written into the staff because a cantabile technique would be an essential 
characteristic of a good performance of any keyboard music.34 Bach’s theory hinges 
on an intelligent performer who learns through experience. This is a practical form of 
education that is earned through thoughtful listening and doing for oneself. This 
practice is juxtaposed with lexicons that, in Bach’s opinion, do not decipher true 
musical meaning nor explain how to perform the beauty of a piece. For Bach, an 
instrumentalist should imagine other performances (such as opera or oratorio) where 
the voice is displayed as a robust instrument of expression, and apply a singer’s 
sensibility for melody to their own playing. We note this rudimentary aspect of 
musical expression as song, “to think in terms of song,” in Beethoven’s use of 
cantabile, dolce, and espressivo – these indications call our attention to musical 
expression at its most fundamental, as communication from one person to another.  
Bach complains of the inadequacies of works on musical aesthetics that utilize 
a specific kind of vocabulary and “scholarly” understanding of music. In Bach’s 
opinion, “learned discourses” do not help the performer perform melodies better. The 
“learned discourses” are treatises from an ivory tower that have little to do with the 
actual practice of music. From this standpoint, it seems the best treatises on musical 
meaning should come from composers and musicians themselves – persons who have 
a direct connection with actual scores. Concepts like “Nature” and “Melody” do not 
offer much advice about how to play a particular melody unless, when reading 
treatises on these subjects, one thoughtfully integrates these ideas into one’s playing. 
There is no clear answer with respect to how to do this, and for performers who are 
not charitable toward philosophical ideas the task would be a chimera. Bach does not 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Carl Philipp Emanuel Bach, Essay on the True Art of Playing Keyboard Instruments [1759-1762], 
ed. and trans. William J. Mitchell (New York and London: W.W. Norton & Company, 1949), 152. 
34 See also Stephanie Frakes, “The Government of cantabile: Notes on Eighteenth-Century Musical 
Meaning,” in The Ohio State Online Music Journal, Volume 1, Number 2 (Autumn 2008). Frakes 
describes cantabile as a positive characteristic of artistic music of the eighteenth-century and the notion 
of cantabile in theory versus practice. http://osomjournal.org/issues/1-2/frakes/ 
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consider this possibility of “enlightened” playing through the application of 
philosophical ideas into performance in the context of his treatise. The reason for this 
is because Bach is looking for unambiguous solutions for performing, and he does not 
take on larger questions of aesthetics and meaning outside of the scope of 
performance practice. If a keyboardist were to make all melodies “sing,” however, 
then we would be unable to discern between the delicate differences between a 
“singing,” song-like melody (the “Appassionata” second theme dolce melody) and a 
less “singing” melody (the “Lebewohl” sonata’s second movement cantabile 
melody). This difference begets an aesthetic question of its own. To address this, we 
will continue to explore C. P. E. Bach’s pragmatic, practice-oriented advice. 
 In one of many implied conditional arguments within a general remark about 
performance practice, Bach notes: if performers execute the simple task of singing the 
melody of the piece they are studying, then performers will perform the work better 
(on their instrument). In this case, we can say performers will be “singing” through 
their playing, imitating the way in which they sang a melody through touch and the 
articulation of musical phrases. A chasm opens in this hypothetical argument between 
actual singing (in Bach’s terms) and the definitions of historical lexicons; when we 
read conceptual definitions that elaborate on what is “song-like,” or a tune well-
adapted for the human voice, these definitions do not seem to draw us closer to 
understanding the term cantabile. Lexicons may even do us a disservice and lead us to 
believe Beethoven’s cantabile of the “Lebewohl” sonata (Figure 1.10), is a singing or 
song-like melody. Our intuition about this melody – that it would be unintelligible if it 
were sung by a human voice – would be irrelevant if we were to take the information 
in lexicons at face value.  
When performers come across a cantabile indication in the staff of a score, 
they will most likely associate the passage or melody with the singability of the 
musical phrase. These material considerations of the score, nevertheless, leave us at 
the doorstep of greater aesthetic questions. Material considerations might not have an 
immediate implication on how a musical phrase should be played, but reflection on 
them can lead to deeper meaning (that can also be expressed through performance).  
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Bach’s discussion of a general cantabile technique that will inspire a good 
performance appears in a chapter specifically on performance in his treatise.35 Bach 
describes an implicit cantabile technique in the following passage:  
 
 
Good performance, then, occurs when one hears all notes and their 
embellishments played in correct time with fitting volume produced by a 
touch which is related to the true content of a piece. Herein lies the rounded, 
pure, flowing manner of playing which makes for clarity and 
expressiveness.36 
 
 Bach emphasizes technique as what brings out the “true content of a piece.” 
Bach is not interested in the “true content” of the music from a philosophical point of 
view. Bach’s focus is, of course, practice and technique. Ideal technique, nevertheless, 
is intertwined with the capabilities of the instrument at the player’s disposal and the 
player’s ability to produce these sounds on this instrument. This implies that a 
performer must adjust their attack accordingly to the material of the instrument 
itself.37 Despite hindrances, one of Bach’s desired ends for his treatise is “to 
encourage a more musical way of portraying rage, anger, and other passions by means 
of harmonic and melodic devices rather than by an exaggerated, heavy attack.”38 In 
this statement, we find Bach alludes to “true content” in music that cannot be 
expressed merely through a player’s attack. Bach insists that “a more musical way” of 
interpretation, or a more thoughtful expression of the “passions,” must exist in 
performance practice beyond touch. Technique limits the dimensions of expression if 
our resource for the expression of rage or anger is only “an exaggerated, heavy 
attack.” In this statement, Bach appeals to a critical vision of music that examines 
harmonic and melodic devices for insight into the “true content” of music, which 
shows that Bach considers musical interpretation and musical content to be more 
complex than a distinct equation that determines a specific touch needed to play a 
designated mood.  
The performance of musical meaning was more limited in Bach’s time than 
even in Beethoven’s time due to the physical capabilities of keyboards. This leads us 
to question whether the performer Bach has in mind can really obtain a cantabile, 
“flowing manner of playing.” We wonder if descriptive notation, even in Beethoven’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 See Bach, “Chapter Three: Performance,” Essay on True Art of Playing Keyboard, 147-166. 
36 Bach, 148. 
37 See Bach, 148-9. 
38 Bach, 149. 
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compositions, reflects an ideal sound (one that must be imagined but can never be 
truly portrayed in performance) and an imaginary technique; does expressive word 
cue notation have an intrinsic relation to the “true content” of music, which is content 
that cannot be fully represented in the score?   
Bach takes into account the physical limitation of the keyboards at the time of 
his treatise (ca. 1750):39  
 
The keyboard lacks the power to sustain long notes and to decrease or 
increase the volume of the tone or, to borrow an apt expression from 
painting, to shade. These conditions make it no small task to give a singing 
performance of an adagio without creating too much empty space and a 
consequent monotony due to a lack of sonority.40  
 
“A singing performance” highlights the crucial role a cantabile technique has, at least 
in Adagio movements. In Bach’s commentary, the empty space in an adagio, which is 
created by a slow tempo and lack of melodic movement, can put performance in a 
precarious situation of monotony. The “empty space” works against a performance to 
inspire boredom in its listeners. To maintain the audience’s interest in a musical work 
that has a slow tempo because the keyboard performer is unable to “shade” sustained 
notes through dynamics (like a violin, for example), Bach suggests a technique of 
adding ornaments to a sustained note: “[the note] must be full and so performed that 
the listener will believe that he is hearing only the original note. This requires a 
freedom of performance that rules out everything slavish and mechanical. Play from 
the soul, not like a trained bird!”41 Bach puts forward these ideas for techniques that 
contain an element of improvisation, which should, according to Bach, make music 
sound as though it came from the soul. (This position supports an argument for an 
intelligent performer, who interprets music beyond the score and the instrument’s 
capabilities – the score suggests that a note should be embellished because it shows a 
sustained note in an adagio movement, but the score does not require that the 
performer embellishes the note.)  
What is especially important to take away from C. P. E. Bach’s discussion is 
how the performer should study a piece by singing it, as well as that the performer 
should take into account the limitations of their own instrument. We can understand 
Bach’s comments as a general approach to learning, performing, and hearing a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 The date of the first edition of “Part One” of Bach’s work is 1753. 
40 Bach, 150. 
41 Bach, 150.   
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musical work. For a performer to think of a melody “in terms of song” is crucial for 
determining the evolution of the cantabile indication. From this principle, we grasp 
the dimensions of dolce and espressivo indications that embody a cantabile aspect 
without having it written explicitly into the score. 
 
B. What the instrument, as a material means, can tell us about cantabile  
 
The importance of the instrument, as a means to convey expression music, is a 
sentiment that is present in Beethoven’s own writings. In a letter to the piano maker 
Johann Andreas Streicher in 1796, Beethoven describes the performance of one of his 
works played by one of Johann Streicher’s students.42 Beethoven writes:  
 
Your little pupil, dear St[reicher], apart from the fact that when playing my 
Adagio she drew me a few tears from my eyes, has really astonished me. I 
congratulate you on being so fortunate as to be able to display through such a 
talent your own understanding of music. . . . I assure you in all sincerity, dear 
St[reicher], that this was the first time it gave me pleasure to hear my trio 
performed; and truly this experience will make me decide to compose more 
for the pianoforte [Klavier] than I have done hitherto. Even if only a few 
people understand me, I shall be satisfied. There is no doubt that so far as the 
manner of playing it is concerned, the pianoforte is still the least studied and 
developed of all instruments; often one thinks that one is merely listening to a 
harp. And I am delighted, my dear fellow, that you are one of the few who 
realize and perceive that, provided one can feel the music, one can also make 
the pianoforte sing.43 
 
In this letter, Beethoven appears to make the case that the pianoforte will be 
taken more seriously once it has capabilities to express more – to sing. The historical 
limitations of the pianoforte sheds light on Beethoven’s innovation with respect to 
expressive word cues; not only does Beethoven broaden our understanding of notation 
by writing expressive word cues in passages that find little resonance with the 
definitions of the terms, but Beethoven’s compositions in fact make demands on the 
performer – and the instrument – to reach incomparable expressive depths. (C. P. E. 
Bach’s keyboard works rarely, if ever, have indications like dolce written into the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 Anderson conjectures that the student is Fräulein von Kissow, who was 13 years old at the time of 
the letter. 
43 Anderson, Letter 18, 25; Written from Vienna, 1796. See Emily Anderson, The Letters of Beethoven: 
Collected, Translated and Edited with an Introduction, Appendixes, Notes and Indexes, 3 volumes 
(London: Macmillan & Co Ltd, 1961). Anderson suggests the trio Beethoven heard was his pianoforte 
trio Op. 1, no. 1 in E-flat, which contains an Adagio Cantabile movement. Anderson comments Artaria 
published the three Opus 1 trios in 1795. Tilman Skowroneck suggests Elisabeth (Lisette) von Kissow 
(later Bernhard) was twelve years of age at the time (see Skowroneck’s commentary on this letter, 
Tilman Skowroneck, Beethoven the Pianist [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010], 72). 
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staff. Even if Bach’s scores did have these indications, keyboards of the eighteenth 
century simply did not have the expressive powers of Beethoven’s pianos – hence 
Beethoven’s comparison of a pianoforte to a harp.)44    
Beethoven’s comment that a pianoforte should “sing” takes C. P. E. Bach’s 
suggestion, that the instrumentalist should sing a melody, to another level.45 
Beethoven seems to apply Bach’s theory of performance to a practical case: 
Streicher’s student played the work magnificently because she was able to skillfully 
convey her teacher’s understanding of music and the instrument gave her the 
sufficient means to do so. (It is fitting that the teacher in this case is, in fact, a piano 
maker.) We find evidence here to claim that the cantabile indication does not merely 
signal a song-like melody, but advises the performer to make the instrument sound as 
though the instrument were singing. We can apply this argument to the “Lebewohl” 
sonata pictured in Figure 1.10, where a melody has a cantabile indication – the 
melody, nevertheless, does not look very song-like. To reconcile a cantabile notion 
with this passage, the melody will need to push through the dense accompaniment; 
consequently, the melody will mimic the entrance of a voice in an operatic setting, 
when the singer begins an aria and draws in all of the listeners’ attention. From a 
different angle, the cantabile passages in Figure 1.10 and Figure 1.11 must become 
established very quickly – the cantabile melody should glide into the sounding space 
with the confidence of a hockey player who takes to the ice, replacing a teammate on 







 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 See Skowroneck, 74. With respect to the “harp” comment, Skowroneck suggests Beethoven’s letter 
quoted above gave rise to the interpretation of the pianoforte as a harp. See (Skowroneck, 73n52). 
45 Czerny describes that Beethoven advised his (Czerny’s) father to immediately obtain “Emmanuel 
Bach’s book on the true art of clavier-playing,” for young Czerny, see Carl Czerny, “Recollections 
from My Life,” trans. Ernest Sanders, The Musical Quarterly, Volume. 42, No. 3 (July 1956), 302-317, 
207. Barry Cooper writes of C. P. E. Bach’s work and influence on Beethoven, “also noteworthy is 
Beethoven’s preference for C. P. E. Bach’s keyboard treatise Versuch über die wahre Art das Clavier 
zu spielen, which had appeared as long ago as 1753… he probably used this himself while studying 
with Neefe, since little else was available,” Barry Cooper, Beethoven (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2008), 111. Lewis Lockwood maintains this idea and describes how Beethoven’s instructor 
Christian Gottlob Neefe introduced Beethoven to C. P. E. Bach’s theoretical works while Beethoven 
was still in Bonn, see Lewis Lockwood, Beethoven: The Music and the Life (New York: W.W. Norton, 
2005), 16.  




Figure 1.11 Beethoven, Sonata in E-flat major, Op. 81a, “Lebewohl” or “Les 
Adieux” [The Farewell], mvmt. II, Andante espressivo, mm. 29-37.46 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 Beethoven: The 35 Piano Sonatas. Edited by Barry Cooper with fingerings by David Ward. © 2007 
by the Associated Board of the Royal Schools of Music. Reproduced by permission of ABRSM. 
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In Figure 1.11, we identify the long string of introductory material that ushers 
in the major tonality of the cantabile melody (Figure 1.11, mm. 29-30, which shows 
the second appearance of the cantabile theme in this movement). The contour of the 
cantabile melody is different from the other elements of the movement (such as the 
introductory material in Figure 1.11, mm. 29-30 and the passages of mm. 35-42). The 
Andante espressivo before the first announcement of the cantabile theme (Figure 
1.10) is dominated by the wavering major-minor sound of the movement’s main 
theme; the movement’s conclusion also repeats this material with some variation in 
mm. 37-40 (Figure 1.11). In m. 31 (Figure 1.11), we see how the cantabile sets up a 
relatively stable landscape in major for four bars, without even hinting at the 
diminished triad sound that dominates the minor sections of the movement.  Not only 
does the calm cantabile theme have a calculated and flowing melody, but this passage 
also sounds as though it were the score of a work for two different instruments rather 
than one instrument in the context of a piano sonata – the melody is so distinct from 
its accompaniment that the vocal quality comes through in an astonishing way with 
independent force. 
Johann Andreas Streicher continued to build pianos that favored a “singing 
tone,” the tone Beethoven describes in his letter, and strove to make instruments heard 
in this way. This is apparent in the booklet Streicher would include for the owner of 
new Geschwister Stein pianofortes. In this booklet, Streicher writes: 
 
It is a pity that, even though many play the fortepiano, so few try to treat it 
according to its true nature. Nothing is more common than to hear this 
resourceful instrument ill-treated in such a way that it can often make no better 
effect than a tinkling harp or a miserable Hackbrett [hammered dulcimer].47 
 
 
 There is a similarity between the “true content of piece” in Bach’s treatise, 
and the “true nature” of the pianoforte in Streicher’s note. Both comments address a 
component in a musical work, and in a musical instrument, that only a skilled 
musician can bring to the fore – a musician who has sympathy for what a composer 
expresses in a composition, and patience to discover the capabilities and limits of 
pianofortes.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 Streicher, Kurze Bemerkungen über das Spielen, Stimmen und Erhalten der Fortepiano, welche von 
den Geschwistern Stein in Wien verfertiget werden. Wien: mit Albertischen Schriften, 1801, 3-4; I refer 
to Skowroneck’s translation, see Skowroneck, 74. 
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The capabilities and limitations of keyboards during C. P. E. Bach’s time, and 
even Beethoven’s time, shift focus away from the performer alone. The instrument 
comes to the forefront in many cases of criticism or praise because of the technology 
of the instrument and its ability to express deeper meaning in music. During the 
eighteenth century, certain instruments were developed such as fortepianos, 
Hammerflügel, harpsichords, clavichords, and other early pianos or stringed 
keyboard instruments that had additional pedals, knee-levers, and stops supplying a 
wide variety of sounds no longer available in present pianos. These pedals afforded 
different and new options for timbre and layering of tones.48 These magnificent, 
innovative, awe-inspiring, and sometimes monstrous instruments seemed to grant 
performers limitless possibilities for expression.  
 
Descriptions of stringed keyboard instruments (sometimes with one or more 
auxiliary sets of organ pipes) which could produce a large variety of timbres 
by combining a number of stops were not uncommon in German-speaking 
countries in the second half of the 18th century. The idea of making a single 
Clavier capable of imitating a multitude of different voices – even the sounds 
of a whole orchestra – can easily be understood in the context of the desire to 
make expressive keyboard instruments. It seems probable too that in the 
background there was an idea of creating an effect on the listener that would 
at least remind him of divine omnipotence.49  
 
Michael Latcham describes an interesting phenomenon with respect to 
keyboard innovation: keyboard instruments were designed in such a monumental way 
that their sound would remind a listener of God, or at least of “divine omnipotence.” 
When we reflect on instruments that invoke “divine omnipresence,” we can think of 
many technological advancements in our own era of music; current recording 
techniques are so impressive that the crisp and uncanny digital cleanness, and 
accuracy of pitch in current popular music also embody qualities of “divine 
omnipotence” because a lot of current popular music sounds superhuman or 
otherworldly. And despite the impressive capabilities of these hybrid keyboards, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 Beethoven wrote in one of early sketches from his Bonn period, described by Skowroneck, “On one 
page of the Kafka sketch miscellany two distinct sets of Beethoven’s sketches for a piano 
accompaniment for Jeremiah’s lamentations, to be performed on a Klavier…during Holy Week in one 
of these years [1790-92] are preserved. These sketches contain an ‘oom-pah-pah-pah’ bass figure with 
thick crescendo–decrescendo hairpins and the written addition ‘mit dem Knie’ meaning that the player 
should lift the dampening during the ‘pahs’ with his knee” (Skowroneck, 52). Skowroneck refers to 
Joseph Kerman, ed., Ludwig van Beethoven Autograph Miscellany from ca. 1786 to 1799 (The 
“Kafka” Sketchbook), 2 volumes (London: British Museum, 1970), volume 1, f. 96r. 
49 Michael Latcham, “The Expressive Clavier: Swirling from one level of the affects to another: the 
expressive Clavier in Mozart’s time,” Early Music, Volume XXX, issue 4 (November 2002): 502-521, 
505. 
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C.P.E. Bach still reminds performers to sing the compositions they are playing. When 
we consider, nonetheless, that pianofortes had made technological advancements to 
the extent that Beethoven felt Streicher’s pianofortes could sing, there has to be more 
to a performance than a “singing” pianoforte. As technology changed, it makes sense 
that notation would also become more descriptive to reflect innovation and what the 
new instruments could do. In this way, the ideal sound expressed in word cue notation 
is not imaginary. It requires performers to learn techniques so as not to play like a 
“trained bird.” Intelligent performers will integrate ideas about their instruments to go 
beyond a cantabile technique, and reflect on the true content of the work for a more 
complete presentation in performance.  
  




This chapter initiates an inquiry into the purpose of specific word cues in the 
staff of Beethoven’s scores, and identifies what these indications call our attention to. 
Dynamics, as well as notions of tempo, which often cloud discussions of expressive 
indications, present only one facet of a greater scheme of expression and meaning. 
Expressive word cues help identify intelligible content within the score, provide 
evidence of thematic relevance and structural purpose, and also reflect deeper 
meaning in the composition.  
With relation to specific indications such as cantabile and dolce, we have 
investigated these indications from the perspective of commentary on the musical 
material in the score. This idea of commentary inspires us to reflect on the normative 
interpretation of a specific passage in a musical score and how this interpretation at 
times requires modification due to the context of the expressive indication. Further, 
by identifying the shortcomings of this type of explanation, we grasp a greater 
expressive gesture and its relation to the meaning of the work.   
When we consider the historical definitions of expressive indications found in 
Beethoven’s scores, which are used in order to potentially illuminate complex 
passages, we meet another obstacle for interpretation. To strictly follow such 
definitions, we should acknowledge that these terms assume heavily formatted 
associations with historical notions. These associations, in turn, obscure certain 
difficulties in interpretation. Thereby our aim is to show a method where we can 
establish thematic relevance to the whole of a musical work or movement from a 
structural and/or expressive standpoint, and forge relations between themes by 
working up from their expressive identifications.  When we approach specific 
expressive indications in a work beyond normative performance practice, these 
indications have shown a diverse way to unite and distinguish musical material as 
well as suggest something of a performance ideal or ideal tone. 
In our reflection on the normative definition of the term cantabile, we found 
that this term suggests more than instrumental music that should imitate vocal songs. 
To this extent, cantabile also refers to a specific type of technique generally 
applicable for playing dolce and espressivo word cues alike (as well as other passages 
that may not have such indications but have slurs or other notation that require a 
	   57	  
cantabile technique). What a performer does to push the limits of their instrument, 
like cultivating a “singing” cantabile technique, is evidence that the object of our 
inquiry is not explicit on the surface of the score or has to do with the instrument 
itself. These material considerations are important for determining the fittingness of 
certain expressive indications and how the instrument can produce an ideal sound. 
Beethoven’s piano sonatas, however, require a kind of interpretation that implies 
understanding the use of the cantabile and also the realization that expressive 
indications like dolce are calling our attention to something beyond the immediate: 
i.e. play the passage legato. Expressive word cues address meaning that is only 
understood through thoughtful reflection on the score beyond the immediate.  
We suggest that the interpretation of expressive word cues beyond immediate 
recognition and response requires both material and psychological considerations of 
the composition (in the same vein as A. B. Marx’s approach to Beethoven’s music). 
This interpretation shows that a hermeneutic understanding of music becomes 
necessary; when we follow Schleiermacher’s hermeneutics, we draw on normative 
interpretations of notation, form, and composition (something like “musical 
grammar”) and build toward conclusions of deeper content like thoughts and ideas in 
music (from here we will find a bridge to A. B. Marx’s unifying concept of a musical 
Idee that draws together seemingly disparate parts in the same musical work). These 
terms do not create an expressive, isolated block within the score, but can be 
integrated coherently into the musical score; we saw this already in the “Eroica,” 
where certain instruments in the same symphonic section, or with similar thematic 
material, can interact with one another to create a harmonious expression of meaning. 
It is not only the score and not only the instrument, but a good performance requires 
reflection on why one chooses a particular technique. This suggests a method of 
interpretation (and performance) where we become accountable for our decision to 
say it is only the accompaniment of the second group of the “Appassionata” that 
should be played dolce. What does notation, especially when used in a peculiar way, 
call our attention to? In our answer to this question, we find deeper meaning in music 
beyond a “singing tone.”  
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PART II: 
 
Schleiermacher’s Hermeneutic Theory and the Interpretation of Music: 






Friedrich Daniel Ernst Schleiermacher’s theory of hermeneutics is founded on a two-
pronged approach to interpretation: a grammatical task and a psychological/technical 
task. This is achieved in part by studying a text, work, utterance or dialogue from a 
perspective of rules of language, and the determining powers of these50 on the one 
hand, and individuality of the artist, writer or speaker on the other. For 
Schleiermacher, one of the main goals of hermeneutics is to uncover thoughts or ideas 
in a work.  
 
Schleiermacher’s theory is language-based, and his theory was developed partially in 
response to the traditional practice of hermeneutics that used specific methods to 
interpret the Bible and texts from antiquity. We find Schleiermacher’s response to the 
philological and dogmatic focuses of earlier theories of hermeneutics in the 
grammatical task of his theory. It is precisely within Schleiermacher’s wide-ranging 
discussion of grammar, and how grammar influences interpretation, that we can 
construct a bridge to apply this manner of interpretation to different mediums like 
music. At the heart of Schleiermacher’s grammatical task is the realization that the 
principles of grammar influence the interpretation of a text, and this influence can 
sometimes lead our understanding of meaning astray. In this light, we identify a 
universal platform for Schleiermacher’s grammatical task of hermeneutics. The 
cornerstone of this universality is in the way that the rules of compositional language 
can contribute to, at the same time as hinder, our understanding of ideas and meaning 
in a work. When one constructs meaning only within the scope of the rules of 
composition, normative interpretation, and traditional analysis, the meaning of a work 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 See Friedrich Schleiermacher, Hermeneutics and Criticism, and Other Writings, trans. Andrew 
Bowie (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 94. 
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becomes dependent on the functions of these rules and abnegates the necessity of 
looking beyond normative functions to establish meaning.  
 
In order to understand a musical composition as something that expresses thoughts or 
ideas, our project looks beyond the concept of a narrative that accompanies a 
composition through its progression. We will discuss thoughts and ideas in relation to 
music in a similar form as Schleiermacher, who speaks of these concepts in 
literature.51 We will describe how thoughts and ideas are presented within the medium 
of music, represented in the structure and form inherent to that medium. In this way, 
we will study musical works from the position that Gadamer advocates: “we have the 
ability to open ourselves to the superior claim the text makes and respond to what it 
has to tell us.”52 It is from this point of view that a musical thought or musical idea in 
a composition is not necessarily different from a literary thought in a text, or a 
thought expressed in dialogue; the aim remains the same for uncovering meaning as 
for understanding the content of a work’s superior claim. The medium and form is 
different in an immediate way when we discuss music versus written word, however 
the understanding of thoughts and ideas essentially require the same tools of 
interpretation.53  
 
As Schleiermacher’s theories on grammar, thought, and language are often tangled up 
with linguistic notions, and linguistic phenomena, it is important to say that we are 
not making a literal equivalence of grammar in language to “grammar” in music. 
Therefore, we will show the relevance of Schleiermacher’s grammatical task with 
respect to the direction that task takes us in; additionally we will comment on music 
as a system that has relationships (sonorous, notational, etc.). These relationships have 
consequently given way to theories, developed to explicate meaning and normativity, 
and provide us with a platform to determine compositional traditions.  
 
To contextualize Schleiermacher’s theory of hermeneutics in the study of music, we 
will discuss the passages with dolce indications in the first movement of Beethoven’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 The concepts of “thought” and “idea” are found in Schleiermacher. We follow the translations of the 
terms “Gedanke” and “Einfall,” respectively.  
52 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, trans. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall (London 
and New York: Continuum, 1989), 310. 
53 See Gadamer, Truth and Method, 309.  
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Sonata in F Minor, Op. 57, “Appassionata.” We will show how both notation and 
expression pose difficulties (with relation to normative interpretation) for critical 
analysis and performance. To complicate matters, the expressive cue dolce is a word 
(as opposed to other figures of musical notation); our present study of hermeneutics 
and music, nevertheless, regards dolce not as a word in the traditional sense of 
language and grammar (viz. as a descriptive predicate), but as an instruction for 
musical performance (indicative of an imperative phrase “play this dolce”).  It is in 
this way that Schleiermacher’s grammatical task will be seen in a position to cast light 
on the rules of composition, normative interpretation, and how these influence 
meaning (both for analysis and performance) in certain directions. 
 
When we speak about a thought or idea that Beethoven expresses in specific passages 
that are marked dolce, we are not saying we are uncovering Beethoven’s actual 
thought through this method of understanding. We attempt to understand the thoughts, 
ideas, or superior claims of a composition via Schleiermacher’s hermeneutic method 
of interpretation. Choices in orchestration and composition, phrasing, the placement 
of expressive indications and the way in which they appear in a composition can all 
point to the presence of thought or an idea in music.  
 
The activity of uncovering thought is central to Schleiermacher’s psychological task 
of hermeneutics. Gadamer describes this direction of interpretation as: 
 
Ultimately a divinatory process, a placing of oneself within the whole 
framework of the author, an apprehension of the “inner origin” of the 
composition of a work, a re-creation of the creative act. Thus understanding 
is a reproduction of an original production…a reconstruction that starts from 
the vital moment of concept, the “germinal decision” as the composition’s 
organizing center.54 
 
When we examine Gadamer’s claim, we understand the notion of “the whole 
framework of the author” is related but not identical to the author. In order to 
understand a process, a “reconstruction,” and a “reproduction,” we find the task is not 
a question of entering into the mind of the author or composer. It is rather an exercise 
in approximation. With tools to guide interpretation, we uncover what the 
composition aims at, or expresses, within the “whole framework.” Gadamer describes 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 186. 
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that this “whole framework” is determined by positive knowledge that surrounds a 
composition, an author’s life, and era. Through these notions, we discover a way to 
ground interpretation by separating it from total speculation.55  
 
Chapter 1 of Part II aims to address Schleiermacher’s grammatical task of 
hermeneutics and how this task can be utilized to discuss musical meaning, with a 
focus on Beethoven’s dolce as a case in point. By expounding on concepts from 
Schleiermacher’s grammatical task such as language area, whole, and general image, 
we will find the relevance of these concepts in music by describing how they resonate 
with arguments in the study of music, musical meaning, and analysis. The discussion 
of these concepts will be directed toward uncovering thoughts in a composition and 
the individuality of the composer. In Chapter 2 of Part II, we will discuss techniques 
for apprehending a composer’s genius and individuality, as directed toward 
understanding thoughts in a composition. These techniques include divination, 
intuition, and comparative methods that aim to reveal the individuality of the 
composer from a different angle. We also will support Schleiermacher’s notion that a 
composition illustrates, and emerges from, a particular life-moment in the composer’s 
life. The conclusion of Chapter 2 will reflect on musical meaning in the form of 
thoughts and ideas. We will ultimately defend that when we express meaning on 
conceptual and universal levels of thought and ideas, the meaning of a work will not 
be restricted to a temporal dimension imposed by a narrative and the content 
necessarily bound to that narrative. 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 When we consider elaborations on thoughts and ideas in music such as Søren Kierkegaard’s 
discussion of the daemonic in Mozart’s music, A. B. Marx’s elaboration on Beethoven’s hero in 
Beethoven’s Symphony No. 3 in E-flat Major “Eroica,” E. T. A. Hoffmann’s review of Beethoven’s 
Symphony no. 5 in C minor, and Thomas Mann’s description of Beethoven’s Sonata in C minor Op. 
111 in Doctor Faustus, these inevitably reflect on the content of ideas in Beethoven’s music (or 
Mozart’s in the case of Kierkegaard) and expresses them through text and description. See Søren 
Kierkegaard, “The Immediate Erotic Stages,” in Either/Or, Part I, ed. and trans. Howard V. Hong and 
Edna H. Hong (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), 47-135; A. B. Marx “‘Ludwig van 
Beethoven: Life and Works,’ selected excerpts,” in Musical Form in the Age of Beethoven: Selected 
Writings on Theory and Method, ed. and trans. Scott Burnham (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2006), 157-188; E. T. A. Hoffmann, “Review of Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony,” in E. T. A. 
Hoffmann’s Musical Writings: Kreisleriana, The Poet and the Composer, Musical Criticism, trans. 
Martyn Clarke (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 236-251; Thomas Mann, Doctor 
Faustus: The Life of the German Composer Adrian Leverkühn as Told by a Friend, trans. H. T. Lowe-
Porter (New York: Everyman’s Library, 1997), 49-54. 
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Chapter 1: The grammatical task  
 
A. Language area [Sprachgebiet] 
 
In Schleiermacher’s study of the grammatical task of hermeneutics, he begins 
his survey with a discussion of language area or the language common to the author 
and the original audience for whom the work was composed.56 In music, the language 
area is understood as the tradition and the compositional era of a musical 
composition. To establish a language area is something akin to designating a playing 
field one can draw on to discuss a work; a rudimentary question we can ask to 
establish a language area in music is: what is common and uncommon to a 
compositional tradition?  
 
On the one hand, this task is superficially easy as many studies exist on the 
details of compositional style, theory, and convention; on the other hand, a difficulty 
emerges that will evolve and become more defined in our hermeneutic study – this 
problem is namely the way in which a work does not conform to the conventions of 
its language area. This difficulty becomes clear when we attempt to validate 
discussions about the rules of composition, theory of musical form, and other 
theoretical devices that are applied to analyze a work, as many of these were unknown 
to the actual composer. The theoretical tradition, which spawns ever-developing 
theories on musical form, attempts to account for numerous anomalies or individual 
innovations that would otherwise render a theory of form mute with respect to a 
specific problematic piece or composer. William E. Caplin, in Classical Form (1998), 
discusses exceptions to a theoretical rule from a positive perspective by including 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 See Schleiermacher, Hermeneutics, 30; F.D.E. Schleiermacher, Hermeneutik und Kritik, ed. Manfred 
Frank (Frankfurt am Main:  Suhrkamp, 1977), 101. “The individual is determined in his thought by the 
(common) language and can think only the thoughts which already have their designation in his 
language. Another, new thought could not be communicated if it were not related to relationships 
[Beziehungen] which already exist in language .… For language is not just a complex of single 
representations, but also a system of the relatedness of representations.” Schleiermacher, 
Hermeneutics, 9. 
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sections in the work titled: “Deviations from the Norm.” 57 To catalogue additions and 
exceptions to theoretical norms is a way to bridge the gap between the grammatical 
and psychological tasks of hermeneutics by offering insights on specific styles, 
although these insights are necessarily bound to the norms they endorse. James 
Hepokoski and Warren Darcy also comprehensively describe the normative functions 
of sonata form and thematic behavior in Elements of Sonata Theory (2006), with 
appendixes and highly detailed chapter subsections. These efforts attempt to reconcile 
problematic or innovative compositions with a named exception to a compositional 
rule. Hepokoski and Darcy record the difficulties in modifying sonata theory in 
various instances, which is painstakingly revealed in their discussion of 
“deformation” in sonata theory.58  
 
We will address language area first through an example of Beethoven’s dolce 
in the first movement of Beethoven’s Sonata in F minor, Op. 57, “Appassionata.” We 
can determine a compositional language area by establishing a loose parameter of the 
years of Beethoven’s life (1770-1827), the years during which this sonata was 
composed (1805-1806), and the teachers Beethoven had (among other influences). 
Beethoven was very familiar with Classical and Baroque traditions, counterpoint 
(which he studied with Johann Georg Albrechtsberger [1735-1809]) and composition 
(by the time the “Appassionata” was composed, he had studied with Christian Gottlob 
Neefe [1746-98], Albrechtsberger, Franz Joseph Haydn [1732-1809], Antonio Salieri 
[1750-1825] and Emanuel Aloys Förster [1748-1823]).59 Further, we can consider 
studies on the similarities and imitation of other composers in Beethoven’s works.60 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 One example, of many throughout Caplin’s work, can be found in William E. Caplin, Classical 
Form: a Theory of Formal Functions for the Instrumental Music of Haydn, Mozart, and Beethoven 
(Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 54. 
58 See Hepokoski and Darcy’s account of the “Paradoxes of the ‘Normative’ and the ‘Non-Normative’; 
the Need for Nuance.” James Hepokoski and Warren Darcy, Elements of Sonata Theory: Norms, 
Types, Deformations in the Late-Eighteenth-Century Sonata (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 
Appendix I, 614-621. 
59 We can observe Beethoven’s understanding of root theory, composition theory, and his use of other 
composers’ works as examples for how to solve compositional problems and difficulties in Richard 
Kramer, “Notes to Beethoven’s Education,” Journal of the American Musicological Society, Vol. 28, 
No. 1 (Spring, 1975): 72-101, 84. Also discussed in Kramer’s article is Beethoven’s study of Johann 
Philipp Kirnberger (1721-1783), through evidence in Beethoven’s own works, viz. “Cantata on the 
Death of Emperor Joseph II” WoO 87 (1790), see Kramer, 74-6. See also Alfred Mann, “Beethoven’s 
Contrapuntal Studies with Haydn,” The Musical Quarterly, Vol. 56, No. 4 (Oct. 1970): 711-726, for a 
more detailed discussion of Beethoven’s teachers. 
60 See Jeremy Yudkin, “Beethoven’s ‘Mozart’ Quartet,” Journal of the American Musicological 
Society, Vol. 45, No. 1 (Spring 1992): 30-74. Many studies have documented Beethoven’s familiarity 
with particular works through their appearances as copied passages or fragments in Beethoven’s 
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In an essay on the similarities and differences between Beethoven’s String Quartet in 
A Major, Op. 18, no. 5, and Mozart’s String Quartet in A Major, K. 464, Jeremy 
Yudkin describes a notion of convention in the compositional style of the time that 
incorporates a similar concept of “language area.” He writes:  
 
Convention ruled everything in Classic music, from large-scale form and 
harmonic motion to close-range period structure to the tiniest rhythmic or 
melodic gesture. In this context of a prevailing lingua franca of music, it is 
not easy to distinguish those elements that suggest significant points of 
similarity between two works from those that belong to the prevailing 
language of the time and thus might be found in a large number of works 
from the same genre (especially if they are written in the same key).61 
 
 
Yudkin goes on to point out moments in Beethoven’s string quartet that imitate 
Mozart’s K. 464, and this conclusion regarding imitation already presumes fluency in 
an implicit language area. Yudkin’s discussion of the “prevailing language of the 
time” and a lingua franca provides us with a language area. From this perspective, 
we consider the following: (1) if a composition was composed within the boundaries 
of convention; (2) if the composition is a direct imitation of another composer’s work; 
(3) if the composition contains an anomaly and the composer’s innovation has gone 
beyond the confines of the language area itself.  
 
 
 B.  The notion of whole and general image 
 
Schleiermacher’s hermeneutics moves beyond a general task of establishing 
language area and focuses on a particular work. Through the evaluation of a singular 
composition, we bring a composition into a pseudo-dialogue with itself in the 
evaluation of a dichotomy between part and whole, and the integration of a part into 
the whole of a work. However, the concept of whole that one adopts, which is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
sketchbooks, see Douglas Porter Johnson, Alan Tyson, and Robert Winter, The Beethoven 
Sketchbooks: History, Reconstruction, Inventory, California Studies in 19th-Century Music 4 (Berkeley 
and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1985), 598. This study cites a number of works that 
Beethoven was familiar with, including: C. P. E. Bach’s Zwei Litaneyen W. 204; J. S. Bach The Art of 
Fugue, Contrapunctus 4, Chromatic Fantasy, Well Tempered Clavier, Book I, Fugue in B minor, 
Fugue in B-flat minor; G.F. Handel Messiah, Solomon overture; F.J. Haydn, Schöpfungsmesse; W. A. 
Mozart Don Giovanni, String Quartet in G, K. 387; D.G. Türk Kurze Anweisung zum 
Generalbasspielen; additionally the Boldrini sketchbook shows Beethoven copied excepts from F.W. 
Marpurg’s theoretical text Abhandlung von der Fuge, see The Beethoven Sketchbooks, 350. 
61 Yudkin, 33. 
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decidedly the basis of an interpretation, should remain flexible. The reasoning behind 
maintaining this flexibility is twofold. The first element is what is detailed in our 
initial conception of a work as a whole. The second addresses a feeling of strangeness 
we may experience with respect to a particular composition, which will inspire us to 
challenge our initial conception of whole. We will describe the first by stating we 
begin with a general notion of whole in order to build an elementary foundation that 
can be used in any evaluation of the work. Schleiermacher describes this as follows: 
“A correct overall view must always be the basis if the individual aspect is to be 
understood correctly.”62 Notice that “correct” as an adjective and adverb is present 
with reference to an “overall view,” as well as with reference to the understanding of 
a particular. The insistence on “correctness” in both cases suggests a balanced 
viewpoint where understanding the whole is just as important as understanding a 
particular. This conviction combats the inclination to assume that the most complex 
particular of a work is what grants meaning to the whole;63 rather, all parts should be 
understood to function with each other to create this “overall view” of the whole. 
 Schleiermacher presents this notion with relation to language, and with 
relation to the works that pertain to that language, which further expands the notion of 
whole. Thereby the whole pertains to a manifold perspective, including but not 
limited to: (1) conclusions about a language and particular word, or genre, as these 
conclusions normally reside in the background of the explication of a work; (2) 
understanding the individual parts of a work and the whole of the work (this is the 
generally utilized view of the hermeneutic circle, where parts are integrated into the 
whole); (3) determining how the work in question integrates into the whole of the 
author, composer, or artist’s complete oeuvre; and (4) judgments about how the 
author, composer or artist’s work(s) compare to contemporary works of the time. In 
all cases, we relate a part to a larger context and then return to the localized vision of 
the part in order to modify and improve our understanding of the work at hand. 
Schleiermacher describes this movement from a localized view of the particular to the 
global view of the whole, which is demonstrated in the hermeneutic circle, with the 
following example: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 Schleiermacher, Hermeneutics, 33. 
63 It is often the case that once one has unlocked the meaning of one (or several) difficult particular(s), 
the meaning of the whole seems to disproportionally reflect the meaning of the difficult passage(s). 
However, it would be fallacious to build an interpretation of the whole of a work on the evidence of 
one particular passage or aspect. 
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The vocabulary and the history of the era of an author relate as the whole 
from which his writings must be understood as the part, and the whole must, 
in turn, be understood from the part. Complete knowledge is always in this 
apparent circle, that each particular can only be understood via the general, of 
which it is a part, and vice versa.64 
 
 
In the end, this “apparent circle” will be present at the different steps and 
stages of interpretation; it is also an exercise that will enable us to defend our 
understanding of a work. In other words, a work’s meaning should not follow from an 
apparently isolated unit; the intelligibility of a particular – or of a single passage –
utilizes understanding drawn from the whole, and conclusions related to the various 
wholes are necessary for understanding a particular word and its context. 
 Once we have established this initial, flexible, overall view of whole, we 
should then address the very aspect in a work that subsequently challenges this 
notion: a feeling of strangeness that a work inspires in us, which challenges our 
understanding of a work and serves as the second element of reasoning behind a 
flexible view of whole. This intuition arises when we are unable to reconcile one 
aspect of a work with an earlier notion we once believed to be fundamental to our 
understanding of a tradition, work, or particular. Our initial thought or prediction 
about the meaning of the whole is generally the backdrop for an intuition of 
strangeness. Schleiermacher designates this initial thought or prediction about the 
whole as a general image of the whole. A particular part is compared to, or against, 
this general image in such a way that our interpretation evolves: 
 
After the general overview explication can often quietly proceed for a long 
time without actually being free of art, because everything is oriented to the 
general image. But as soon as a particular difficulty arises the doubt arises as 
to whether the fault lies with the author or with us. The former can only be 
presupposed in terms of how much he already showed himself in the 
overview to be careless and imprecise or also talentless and confused.65 
 
 
Schleiermacher’s insight speaks primarily to the malleability of the notion of whole, 
as our understanding of the whole should be able to change when new material 
presents a new direction for interpretation. When Schleiermacher describes the 
“general overview explication” is “free of art” in the moments before a particular 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 Schleiermacher, Hermeneutics, 24. 
65 Schleiermacher, Hermeneutics, 33. 
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difficulty makes itself known, we understand hermeneutic interpretation (or the 
hermeneutic method) is a kind of “art” where one has a skill and perfects that skill 
through the act of interpretation; one practices the art of hermeneutics by way of 
following a specific method.66 From this argument, we understand that the general 
image is a notion or inchoate idea present in our mind at the outset of investigation. 
The first attempts to understand a work and to analyze the whole thereby follow along 
the coherency of the general image. When we come across a difficulty that challenges 
our general image, we are forced to make a decision about whether the author has 
made a mistake in the composition, or whether we must find fault in our own general 
image because it no longer aligns with the meaning of the whole.  
 We will explore this idea with relation to Beethoven’s dolce in the first 
movement of Beethoven’s “Appassionata” sonata. When we consider the following 
passage, we ask whether Beethoven is at fault for utilizing the indication of dolce in 














	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 Schleiermacher determines hermeneutics as “the art of understanding particularly the written 
discourse of another person correctly” (Schleiermacher, Hermeneutics, 3). Andrew Bowie elaborates 
on Schleiermacher’s notion of “art” where hermeneutics is the art of understanding [Kunst des 
Verstehens], “For Schleiermacher ‘art’ is any activity that relies on rules, for which there can be no 
rules for the applying of those rules. Schleiermacher uses ‘art’ (Kunst) both in the sense of the Greek 
‘techne’ meaning ability, capacity, and in a sense related to the new aesthetic notion, primarily 
associated with Kant, that something cannot be understood as art merely via the rules of the particular 
form of articulation” (Schleiermacher, Hermeneutics, “Translator’s note,” 3).  
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Figure 2.1 Ludwig van Beethoven, Sonata in F minor, Op. 57, “Appassionata,” 




This passage from the recapitulation inspires a feeling of strangeness specifically with 
respect to a normative understanding of dolce. Beethoven’s indication in this sonata, 
with its tessitura, the triad rocking back and forth to a low F1 in the accompaniment, 
and a low-lying melody played in octaves, challenge the normative interpretation of 
dolce in musical notation. The strangeness of the passage comes to the forefront when 
we compare it to a more standard use of dolce in Mozart’s keyboard sonata in F 
Major, K. 332 (Figure 2.2 and Plate 2). 
 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 Beethoven: The 35 Piano Sonatas. Edited by Barry Cooper with fingerings by David Ward. © 2007 
by the Associated Board of the Royal Schools of Music. Reproduced with kind permission of ABRSM. 
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Plate 2 Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart, Sonata in F major (K. 332), mvmt. III, Allegro 









	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 Quoted, with kind permission from the Scheide holdings, Scheide M134, K332-4r. Courtesy of 
William H. Scheide, Princeton, N.J. 
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Figure 2.2 Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart, Sonata in F major, K. 332, mvmt. III, 




For clarity of interpretation, Mozart has indicated dolce for both the melody 
and accompaniment (see in the first system of Plate 2; Figure 2.2, m. 15). Rather than 
compose a sweet, joyful melody over static, unmoved accompaniment, Mozart 
exemplifies a “dolce package” in this passage where the melody and accompaniment 
operate within the same expressive paradigm. (Beethoven’s dolce in the 
“Appassionata,” pictured in Figure 2.1, is less clear regarding what elements should 
be played dolce.) Mozart’s five-measure sequence suggests a smooth, unified front 
that cleanly defines itself before the fortepiano interruptions misplace the strong beats 
of the measure –this results in the dolce oasis being wiped away (Figures 2.2, mm. 
20-1). Also noteworthy about this passage is the “naturalness” with which we regard 
this dolce; it is as though the dolce were inherent, and wholly intuitive, to the 
performance of the accompaniment and the exquisite melodic and harmonic tensions 
delicately positioned above. Mozart’s dolce sequence, furthermore, exemplifies the 
intimacy expressed in Koch’s entry on dolce in the Lexikon [1802]; we find Mozart to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 Quoted from W. A. Mozart, Klaviersonaten, volume 2, Wiener Urtext Edition UT 50227, Vienna, 
2003 – with kind permission. The use of this example from Mozart is to say little about the complexity 
of expressive word cues in the staves of Mozart’s compositions. See, for example, Minuet in D Major, 
K. 576b and Mozart’s utilization of a dolce indication in the first measure and measure 29. Scott 
Burnham discusses the complexity in the dissonant sonority of this movement. Burnham, however, 
does not mention that the dolce indication poses potential difficulty, or complexity, for interpretation. 
See Scott Burnham, Mozart’s Grace (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013), 92-5.   
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be calling for (as well as compositionally illustrating) the “soft tone” (schwachen 
Ton) appropriate for saying something sweetly into the ear of another.70  
We consider Mozart’s passage (Figure 2.2) as an element that contributes to 
an inchoate general image of the whole with respect to how we understand dolce as 
an article of notation. (This is to say that Mozart’s dolce in Figure 2.2 fits nicely into a 
“catalogue” in our mind, a general image, of dolce indications.) Contrary to our 
Mozart example, Beethoven’s dolce in the “Appassionata” (Figure 2.1) strikes us as 
extraordinary and helps to point the direction of understanding toward how we form 
our interpretation. The strangeness of the dolce in Figure 2.1 is consistent throughout 
the first movement and is not altogether different from many other dolce passages in 
Beethoven’s music.71 We find that Beethoven’s dolce in the “Appassionata” is not 
part of a larger group of systematic tics in compositional practice. Beethoven’s use of 
dolce in many perplexing passages actually indicates innovation and builds on the 
compositional tradition he inherited.  
We look first to Muzio Clementi (1752-1832) for evidence to support this 
argument, as well as to show additional examples of expressive indications within the 
staves of a score that do not challenge a general image. Although Clementi’s 
keyboard works (which are more or less contemporary with Beethoven’s piano 
sonatas) are saturated with expressive word cues in the staff, these all follow an 
intuitive method of application; this is to say that Clementi’s dolce indications in the 
staff are generally systematic throughout his keyboard works. Due to the prevalence 
of dolce indications in Clementi’s works, almost any dolce we encounter will fuel an 
assumption about Clementi’s habits in composition. Sandra Rosenblum has 
commented on this, stating that oftentimes dolce actually indicates a particular piano 
dynamic in Clementi’s compositions.72 Although Clementi’s dolce indications do not 
offer as much depth of content as those in Beethoven’s compositions, Clementi’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 Koch describes dolce as follows: Süß, sanft, oder mit Zärtlichkeit. Es gilt bei diesem Kunstworte das 
nemliche, was bei amorevole bemerkt worden ist, und zeigt einen sanften und lieblichen Vortrag an. Es 
erfordert aber auch zugleich einen etwas schwachen Ton, weil, wenn man jemanden etwas süßes . . . 
sagt, man mit sanftem und gezogenem Tone der Stimme spricht. Heinrich Christoph Koch, 
Musikalisches Lexikon (Frankfurt am Main: August Hermann, 1802), f. 444. 
71 These cases include those we discussed in Part I: the first movement of the “Eroica” symphony (Op. 
55), and the Allegro assai of Op. 2, no. 3.  
72 She writes: “some dynamic marks of the Classic period may be unfamiliar…dolce and espressivo 
were sometimes used instead of p to indicate a particularly expressive soft execution. When Clementi 
published the first English edition of Op. 7 in the early 1790s, he substituted espressivo several times, 
and dolce once, where piano had been in the Viennese edition of 1782.” Sandra P. Rosenblum, 
Performance Practices in Classic Piano Music (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988), 60. 
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dolce indications are still useful for comparison. Clementi’s keyboard works provide 
us with an interesting balance between expression, a piano dynamic and contrast that 
is, in part, achieved through the performance of the dolce indications.  We can study 
this in Clementi’s Sonata in B-flat Major, Op. 24, no. 2,73 where we find four 
different instances of dolce throughout the composition.  
 
Figure 2.3 Muzio Clementi, Sonata in B-flat Major, Op. 24, no. 2, mvmt. I, Allegro 




Figure 2.4 Muzio Clementi, Sonata in B-flat Major, Op. 24, no. 2, mvmt. I, Allegro 




Figure 2.3 illustrates the secondary theme of the exposition, immediately after the 
medial caesura, entering at measure 26. The dolce most readily speaks to the pedal 
point on the new tonic exhibited in the melody, which is reminiscent of the first 
measures of the piece (it echoes a continuation of the principal theme).76 The dolce 
also provides an additional expressive dimension for the theme and the slurred 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 This sonata was composed prior to 1781, thus before the competition between Mozart and Clementi 
that was presided over by Emperor Joseph II in Vienna. 
74 Quoted from Muzio Clementi, Klaviersonaten, Auswahl, Band I, Urtext, Edited by Sonja Gerlach 
and Alan Tyson, Munich: G. Henle Verlag, [1978] – with kind permission. 
75 Quoted from Muzio Clementi, Klaviersonaten, Auswahl, Band I, Urtext, Edited by Sonja Gerlach 
and Alan Tyson, Munich: G. Henle Verlag, [1978] – with kind permission. 
76 The principal theme of the exposition bears a striking resemblance to the main theme of the Allegro 
from Mozart’s Die Zauberflöte overture. Leon Plantinga discusses this, and the infamous encounter 
between Mozart and Clementi at the competition Emperor Joseph II staged in Vienna. Tyson draws on 
epistolary accounts from both Mozart and Clementi. Clementi insisted on printing an inscription for the 
sonata, “a été jouée par l’Auteur devant S.M.I. L’Empereur Joseph II en 1781 Mozart étant présent” in 
1804 publications. See Leon Plantinga, Clementi: his Life and Music (London: Oxford University 
Press, 1977), 61-66.  
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accompaniment figure. Dolce often appears in this movement with repeated notes (see 
m. 4 with the continuation of the basic idea of the principal theme), and at other 
instances where we encounter the secondary theme.77 Dolce, however, is not 
exclusive to the secondary theme or the continuation of the principal theme; we find it 
also attached to one of the “accessory ideas”78 in the coda of the exposition, prior to 
the development (Figure 2.4). 
 
Figure 2.5 Muzio Clementi, Sonata in B-flat Major, Op. 24, no. 2, mvmt. III, Rondo, 






Figure 2.6 Muzio Clementi, Sonata in B-flat Major, Op. 24, no. 2, mvmt. III, Rondo, 
Allegro assai, mm. 70-78.80 
 
 
The first movement of Clementi’s Op. 24, no. 2 is not the only movement with 
prevalent expressive word cues in the staff.  In fact, we find dolce indications 
recurrent in all movements of the sonata. In the third movement, Rondo, Allegro 
assai, dolce is used less thematically than in the first movement. In the third 
movement, we consider the dolce indications as tools to sometimes introduce the 
main theme of the movement, as well the themes of subsidiary sections. In this way, 
dolce indications in the staff in the third movement offer expressive features in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 Dolce indications accompany the secondary theme at m. 37, m. 96, and m. 107. A dolce indication 
that relates to the continuation of the principal theme appears in the recapitulation at m. 82 (in the 
Henle edition [1978]). 
78 This is one of Hepokoski and Darcy’s designations, see Elements of Sonata Theory, 17. Dolce can 
also be found in m. 128 with this figure.  
79 Quoted from Muzio Clementi, Klaviersonaten, Auswahl, Band I, Urtext, Edited by Sonja Gerlach 
and Alan Tyson, Munich: G. Henle Verlag, [1978] – with kind permission. 
80 Quoted from Muzio Clementi, Klaviersonaten, Auswahl, Band I, Urtext, Edited by Sonja Gerlach 
and Alan Tyson, Munich: G. Henle Verlag, [1978] – with kind permission. 
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virtuosic passages that would be otherwise static (e.g., Figure 2.5) or alert the 
interpreter to a consideration of contrast in order to oppose the stiff, rapid figures that 
predominate the Rondo sections (Figure 2.6). 
Other examples of dolce indications in Clementi’s keyboard works can be 
found in the following: Op. 25, no. 5 [1790], Piùttosto allegro con espressione (first 
movement); Op. 34, no. 2 [1795], Largo e sostenuto (first movement); Op. 37, no. 2 
[1798], Allegro (all movements); Op. 40, no. 1 [1802], all movements, with the 
exception of Allegro: Canone Imo perpetuo; per moto retto.81 On the one hand, this list 
is by no means exhaustive. On the other hand, this list does not aim to prove that 
Clementi’s expressive word cues in the staff are restricted to pre-determined molds of 
application and practice. The examples from Clementi’s compositions serve to oppose 
unintuitive applications of dolce in contrast to Beethoven’s dolce indications that 
often challenge a general image or tradition in notation.  
As a final contextual element of the general image we associate with dolce 
indications in the staff, and which helps to sustain the argument for Beethoven’s 
innovation, we will examine a passage from the first movement of Franz Joseph 
Haydn’s keyboard sonata in C-sharp Minor, Hob. XVI: 36 (Figure 2.7). 
 
Figure 2.7 [Franz] Joseph Haydn, Sonata in C-sharp Minor, Hob. XVI: 36, mvmt. I, 
Moderato, exposition, mm. 18-24.82 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 First editions of Clementi’s sonatas appear in brackets, as stated by G. Henle Verlag. 
82 Quoted from Joseph Haydn, Sämtliche Klaviersonaten, Band 3, edited from the sources by Christa 
Landon, revised by Ulrich Leisinger, notes by Robert D. Levin, fingerings by Oswald Jonas, Wiener 
Urtext Edition, Schott / Universal Edition, UT 50258, Vienna, 2011 – with kind permission. 
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The dolce of interest is anticipated in the final figure of Figure 2.7, m. 21. The 
dolce indication in m. 22 highlights a warm and magnificent secondary theme motif 
that introduces the closing section of the exposition. It is not the primary secondary 
theme, but it is a lyrical theme that marks the beginning of the transition into the 
closing group of the exposition; it also momentarily holds the harmonic progression 
in the relative major before the darker piano passage at m. 24. The dolce of m. 22 
appears to extend through to the next measure and should also apply to the rests at m. 
23. The rests are infused with the dolce fragrance. The phrase is briefly interrupted by 
an exchange between the accompaniment and the melody; a short melodic tone rings 
out through the gaping rests in the accompaniment of m. 23. We contrast this effect to 
the sustained E4 in m. 22 – the tonic of the relative major in the tenor voice. The 
sustained E4 creates a sonorous soapbox wherefrom the lyrical dolce melody can 
speak its ideas and have them be heard. The chromaticism of the passage is not the 
most conducive to a cantabile direction and technique that is often associated with 
dolce indications. This dolce, moreover, grabs our attention; it seems counterintuitive 
that this theme is marked dolce in the first place, because this passage demands a 
thoughtful interpretation that takes into account the fact that the meaning of this 
theme is more opaque than that of the principal secondary theme. (Haydn may have 
wanted to call attention to this passage and for this reason added the dolce indication 
in m. 22.) 
We should also give some thought to the technique that is needed to play this 
passage: the outer voices should match up – where the bass voice provides a pleasant, 
but distant parallel harmony – and should not sound as though they were divided by 
the tenor voice. Furthermore, of the examples we have explored, this dolce passage 
finds itself at home with Beethoven’s more complex dolce passages; the depth of 
Haydn’s passage is counterintuitive in a unique way as this theme is a motif (thus not 
of great [normative] structural importance to the sonata) and seems to come out of 
nowhere – the smooth phrase and rich harmonization is not reminiscent of earlier 
themes (and the parallel movement of the accompaniment, modeled after the melody, 
is unique to this motif). Whereas our earlier examples highlight Koch’s sweet and soft 
tone (Mozart’s K. 332 and Clementi’s Op. 24, no. 2), Haydn’s dolce is a different 
breed. Not only are dolce indications in the staff rare in Haydn’s compositions, but 
this passage also calls for a depth of expression that juxtaposes a 
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brightness in the organization of the harmonized parts, with the memory of the dark 
first theme that looms large in our expectation for the resolution of the dolce figure. 
(The melancholic resolution of the dolce section is separated from the dolce passage 
by a piano indication [see Figure 2.7, m. 23]). Although it only applies to a short 
motif, Haydn’s dolce is more akin to Beethoven’s “Appassionata” dolce, even if 
Beethoven’s indication (Figure 2.1) calls attention to other kinds of considerations 
(e.g., tessitura and accompaniment figures) and questions our very understanding of 
dolce as an instruction for performance and interpretation. 
The general image, as associated with the understanding of a work as a whole, 
or the general image as understood as a vision of the “whole” of a compositional 
tradition, provides a springboard for interpretation. There is a strong subjective 
element involved in the construction of a general image, which is determined by 
contingencies (Gadamer suggests these contingencies are conditioned by individual 
prejudices). This information informs our perception of a composer, artist or author’s 
work and the tradition they pertain to. As our experience with particular works 
becomes more elaborate in virtue of continued study, we are able to correct and 
enhance our previous judgments with relation to context, language area, and the work 
as a whole.  
Particular aspects of a composition have the ability to change the way we 
evaluate certain composers, their works, and the rules of style that we may have 
thought to be stable or unchanging. According to Schleiermacher, rules of style 
pertain to the formal element of grammatical interpretation, which are rules about 
clauses, punctuation, and definitions. (In music we can determine these rules in a 
general way as notation and also syntax). To test this theory, Schleiermacher applies 
his hermeneutic theory to the New Testament. With reference to the New Testament, 
Schleiermacher argues that our difficulty in understanding a particular passage 
partially has to do with our general image of the whole. To complicate matters, if one 
of the fundamental formal elements of the text (e.g., punctuation) does not follow the 
rules of our general image, it will be difficult to reconcile one’s general image with 
the work itself. Schleiermacher writes: 
 
As the punctuation was not originally there among the ancients, we must 
imagine the texts of antiquity completely without it, otherwise one is greatly 
influenced by the person who put in the punctuation as an explicator, and one 
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becomes dependent on him and prejudiced. Systems of punctuation fluctuate 
anyway and are incomplete.83 
 
 The difficulty Schleiermacher describes refers to a problem directly related to 
textual interpretation (and not necessarily a problem for the interpretation of a musical 
score); nevertheless, the idea that a rule we take for granted (e.g., punctuation) has, in 
fact, changed over time reflects on how our interpretation of a passage may be 
erroneous. Many times our mistakes are a result of fluctuations of grammatical (or 
compositional) rules we previously thought to be static. This argument thereby 
presents a relevant aspect applicable to the idea of the whole: grammatical elements, 
or rules that seem insignificant to the overall notion of whole, can actually have a 
great deal of influence on the interpretation of the whole and a particular passage.  
 
 
C. Grammar on the whole: 
 Seeing where the grammatical task of hermeneutics resonates with musical analysis 
 
To make claims regarding the “grammar” of music presupposes that music is a 
language, and consequently a number of problematic debates follow this assertion. 
Notwithstanding, we argue that much of Schleiermacher’s grammatical task of 
hermeneutics has resonance with the way we interpret music: on the one hand, this 
connection has to do with the interpretation of passages based on the established rules 
of a tradition; on the other hand, it is related to our identification of a particularly 
difficult passage that challenges established rules of analysis. Gadamer rightly points 
out with respect to “interpretation” (which is one of Gadamer’s three defining 
elements of hermeneutics, along with “understanding” and “application”),84 that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 Schleiermacher, Hermeneutics, 49 (the editor notes this passage pertains to Schleiermacher’s lecture 
from 1826). 
84 Gadamer’s division of hermeneutics into understanding, interpretation, and application derives from 
the early subdivisions of hermeneutics previous to Schleiermacher’s conception of it, “subtilitas 
intelligendi (understanding) and subtilitas explicandi (interpretation); pietism added a third element, 
subtilitas applicandi (application), as in J.J. Rambach.” Gadamer, Truth and Method, 306. Gadamer 
continues: “The hermeneutic problem acquired systematic importance because the romantics 
recognized the inner unity of intelligere and explicare. Interpretation is not an occasional, post facto 
supplement to understanding; rather, understanding is always interpretation and hence interpretation is 
the explicit form of understanding. In accordance with this insight, interpretive language and concepts 
were recognized as belonging to the inner structure of understanding.” Gadamer, Truth and Method, 
306. According to Gadamer, the marrying of interpretation and understanding led to the exclusion of 
“application” from romantic hermeneutics because it did not fall into the unity of understanding and 
interpretation. The notion of “application” is reinstated in understanding and the general activity of 
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musical interpretation utilizes hermeneutics in much the same fashion as legal, 
theological, and philosophical interpretation: 
 
But even the kind of interpretation that seems furthest from the kinds we 
have been considering, namely performative interpretation, as in the cases of 
music and drama – and they acquire their real existence only in being played 
– is scarcely an independent mode of interpretation. In it too there is a split 
between the cognitive and the normative function. No one can stage a play, 
read a poem, or perform a piece of music without understanding the original 
meaning of the text and presenting it in his reproduction and interpretation. 
But, similarly, no one will be able to make a performative interpretation 
without taking account of that other normative element – the stylistic values 
of one’s own day – which, whenever a text is brought to sensory appearance, 
sets limits to the demand of a stylistically correct reproduction.85 
 
In this passage, Gadamer touches on an element of musical analysis that is crucial to 
our current investigation of expressive word cues like dolce: performance and 
sounding quality of music have a critical role in the elaboration of meaning in music, 
and is the basis of musical expression. It is apropos of the cognitive-normative 
function in musical interpretation that we make the greatest progress regarding our 
understanding of a musical work and locating the difficulties in the grammatical task 
of hermeneutics. 
 Gadamer’s division between cognitive and normative function in musical 
interpretation is one of the ways we are able to find similarity between musical 
interpretation and activities, such as reading, that also require interpretation. The 
“cognitive” element in Gadamer’s passage reflects on the meaning we grasp in a 
musical work that is not easily rendered into a normative description. This is namely a 
conclusion (or conclusions) that we draw from a more “sensory” appreciation of a 
work, and touches on deeper meaning beyond technical, normative, and analytical 
devices. Gadamer illustrates the complexity of the cognitive component in 
understanding art, which builds on a classical theory that determines that art is an 
imitation of the divine and involves the recognition of meaning. To facilitate this 
argument in the context of Truth and Method, Gadamer elaborates on an example that 
involves a child who plays dress-up and wears a disguise. This child certainly does 
not want to be recognized as the person they are, but rather the thing or person they 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
hermeneutics in Gadamer’s theory; it also has an active role in Gadamer’s thesis that performative 
interpretation (i.e., music and drama) also involves hermeneutic interpretation, see Truth and Method, 
307ff.  
85 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 309. 
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are portraying in a dress-up game. As Gadamer writes, the child intends to represent 
something that “should exist, and if something is to be guessed, then this is it. We are 
supposed to recognize what it ‘is.’”86 But what is crucial for our understanding of the 
cognitive element is what comes next in Gadamer’s argument. Gadamer continues:  
 
We have established that the cognitive import of imitation lies in 
recognition. But what is recognition? A more exact analysis of the 
phenomenon will make quite clear to us the ontological import of 
representation. . . . What we experience in a work of art and what invites our 
attention is how true it is – i.e. to what extent one knows and recognizes 
something and oneself. 
 But we do not understand what recognition is in its profoundest 
nature if we only regard it as knowing something again that we know already 
– i.e., what is familiar is recognized again. The joy of recognition is rather the 
joy of knowing more than is already familiar. In recognition what we know 
emerges as if illuminated from all contingent and variable circumstances that 
condition it; it is grasped in its essence. It is known as something.87 
 
In spite of the fact that Gadamer’s conclusion is rooted in Platonism, which seems far 
from musical interpretation as we have been treating it here, the central topic circles 
back to find meaning beyond contingencies. This is to say that the meaning of the 
musical work, when we hear it, may inspire us to feel and understand something 
beyond the contingencies of the performance itself. Furthermore, this meaning will 
most likely point us beyond analytical rules that steer our understanding of meaning 
in a specific direction. This “cognitive recognition,” in the case of music, comes from 
the feeling of strangeness that a certain passage inspires that cannot be answered or 
understood on the basis of normative rules or analysis. This feeling of strangeness 
may be the first step on the ladder of recognition of that passage and work’s truth as 
something (the child who plays dress-up wishes to illustrate something, much in the 
same way a musical passage imparts meaning – something – for us to discover).  
We certainly do not dismiss normative analysis in this context, which is 
constructed on a foundation of scholarship on analytical rules88 as well as “the 
stylistic values of one’s own day” (current scholarship on performance practice that 
elaborates on a general performance aesthetic or listener expectation). To exemplify 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 113. Gadamer is inferring this conclusion from Aristotle’s Poetics 4, 
1448b16; see Gadamer, Truth and Method, 113n18. 
87 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 113. 
88 This is seen most readily (and discussed earlier in this chapter) in the recent theoretical treatises on 
sonata form by Hepokoski and Darcy, and Caplin, respectively. Both works make space for discussions 
of innovations (and “deformations”) with respect to form, harmony and thematic progress. These, 
albeit relevant and helpful documentations are, nevertheless, normatively bound to the particular works 
analyzed. 
	   81	  
the dynamic between cognitive and normative interpretation, we shall reflect on how 
certain rules of composition dictate particular norms of interpretation and 
understanding, how to recognize that a particular work may challenge those norms, 
and how a performance or interpretation may be compromised due to a certain kind of 
blindness that often occurs in the study of a historical tradition.  
 The current aim is thereby not to equate music, or the “grammar” of music, 
with the grammar of language in order to find ways to apply Schleiermacher’s 
grammatical task of hermeneutics to music. Furthermore, in the present discussion, 
we do not equate linguistic syntax and other specifically linguistic principles to music 
(as in “musical syntax”) in order to assimilate musical syntax to linguistic syntax. Our 
aim is not to forge a theory on musical hermeneutics that requires an identification of 
parallel linguistic-like phenomena in music, which would implicitly defend that music 
is a language in a strict sense. The usefulness, however, of speaking of 
Schleiermacher’s theory with relation to music lies precisely in the similarities 
Schleiermacher’s theory has with methods and procedures musical analysis. When we 
refer to the concept of the grammar of music, this concept more or less single-
handedly prompts a particular vision of syntax and inspires the idea that music is “a 
defective language that somehow had only a syntactic dimension and not a semantic 
one.”89 Kofi Agawu, who has written extensively on semiotics and the linguistic 
dimensions of music, elucidates this position: “while words have a more or less fixed 
lexical meaning, music’s units… do not. Unlike verbal composition, therefore, 
musical composition cannot be translated.”90 We unearth the difficulty involved in 
determining the importance of musical syntax as a tool of theoretical analysis once we 
discover that musical syntax is, by and large, what much of musical analysis is built 
upon.91 Scott Burnham addresses this problem by describing what musical syntax 
does for musical analysis, and also where it falls short: 
 
It is difficult to deny that musical syntax is to a large degree musical 
significance. This is not the same as insinuating that music is entirely self-
referential and culturally isolated. It is rather to say that music’s potential for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89 Scott Burnham, “The Criticism of Analysis and the Analysis of Criticism” in 19th-Century Music, 
Vol. 16, No. 1 (Summer, 1992): 70-76, 71. 
90 Kofi Agawu, Music as Discourse: Semiotic Adventures in Romantic Music (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2009), 26. 
91 Scott Burnham writes: “the emphasis on underlying voice-leading as the sinew of musical coherence 
is by now an inbred part of the way we talk about tonal music; few beginning level theory textbooks 
remain innocent to this fundamental supposition,” Burnham, “The Criticism of Analysis,” 71. 
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signification is largely bound up with the space between a tacit, internalized 
sense of general style (what David Lewin has called the “sound universe”) 
and the claims of an individual work. Prior to speculation about extramusical 
meanings, we as listeners put into play any number of (often subliminal) 
assumptions about musical syntax without which interpretative claims could 
not be made, assumptions which allow us to read a piece’s “body language.” 
These include the nature of musical closure, articulation, and motivic 
coherence. . . . But almost any hearing also engages aspects that register so 
immediately and obviously as to be beneath the notice of many analysts – 
things like scoring, dynamics, and tessitura. Clearly analysis needs a broader 
definition of what constitutes musical significance.92  
 
Burnham’s juxtaposition of an “internalized sense of general style” and “the claims of 
an individual work” recalls the formulation of Schleiermacher’s general image of 
whole, language area, and the confrontation between language area and general 
image in the setting of a particular work. Burnham touches on meaning in music that 
is contingent upon certain rules of style versus Gadamer’s cognitive recognition of 
meaning. It is important to maintain that Burnham is not in the business of 
discrediting an oppressive sense of musical syntax, but rather Burnham calls our 
attention to what our “(often subliminal) assumptions” (arguably the foundations of 
interpretation) rely upon. As Burnham outlines, this kind of understanding speaks to 
even the simplest components of music, e.g.: “the nature of musical closure, 
articulation and motivic coherence … scoring, dynamics and tessitura.” 
Notwithstanding that some of these elements may lay outside the traditional 
parameters of musical analysis, our starting point is to look at what makes up the 
fundamental arguments of the “grammar” or “syntax” of music; we will then position 
these arguments before Schleiermacher’s thoughts on the fundamental components of 
the grammatical task of hermeneutics, which will inform and deepen our 
understanding of a “musical syntax.” 
 One of the most pertinent elements of Schleiermacher’s discussion of 
language is the notion of fundamental rules that can be worked with to determine 
elucidatory conclusions about language and meaning; we consider these conclusions, 
when we relate them to the interpretation of music, as the building blocks for the 
generation of a musical work (i.e., notation, the rules of composition that are imposed 
on a creative impulse). When we explore Schleiermacher’s discussion of definitions, 
cases, and other traditional elements of grammar, we find Schleiermacher generally 
strives to examine three avenues of thought: (1) what a rule or convention is about, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92 Burnham, “The Criticism of Analysis,” 72.  
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(2) how we can understand a specific issue in question by investigating the 
foundations of that rule, and (3) what a particular rule implies for understanding.  
From this outline, we observe that Schleiermacher attempts to determine how 
understanding is a composite of insights; we can cite the different insights that 
constitute this composite to structure our understanding of meaning in a work. At the 
same time, the rules that are implied in this composite exhibit a deficiency with 
respect to determining musical significance because theories or pedagogical methods 
often lose sight of other critical tools such as a composer’s style and unique use (or 
misuse) of compositional tools or conventions. (Scoring, dynamics, and tessitura 
contribute to the “immediate” and “obvious” perceptions and help form judgments 
about a work.)  
In the end, Schleiermacher is no different in procedure from theoretical or 
pedagogical “rule-books” when he outlines the grammatical task of hermeneutics; in 
Schleiermacher’s discussion of language, he limits most ideas to debates about rules 
that rely heavily on the relationships in language. He writes: “The language is a 
leading principle for every utterer, not only negatively, because he cannot get out of 
the domain of the thinking contained within it, but also positively, because it guides 
his combination via the relationships which lie in it.”93 The central idea behind 
Schleiermacher’s notion of language materializes in this passage: language, in 
Schleiermacher’s theory, reveals itself as a medium of expression for the individual 
who uses it, and draws intelligible combinations within that medium. Thus the “rules” 
in language are not only understood as definitions and delimiters of linguistic 
phenomena, but also address “the relationships which lie within [language].” The far-
reaching concept of rules in language can be understood in the same light as the 
“formal rules” of music, theoretical-pedagogical norms in music, and the relationships 
between elements of music that theory seeks to name and organize.   
In Schleiermacher’s consideration of language, rules play a fundamental role 
in grammar and language as a whole. Importantly, we recognize these rules fall short 
of a deeper understanding of a passage when they are used on their own to explicate 
meaning:  
 
Every single language could perhaps be learned via rules, and what can be 
learned in this way is mechanism. Art is that for which there admittedly are 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93 Schleiermacher, “General Hermeneutics,” in Hermeneutics, 227-268, 229, point 15.1. 
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rules, but the combinatory application of these rules cannot in turn be rule-
bound. This is how it is with this double construction [of grammatical and 
technical interpretation] and with the interpenetration of both tasks.94 
 
In this discussion, we recognize that Schleiermacher sets art against a general notion 
of language. This accentuates the position that art, and in our case music, has rules in 
the same sense as (spoken or written) language; only with art, its rules are unable to 
account for the way these rules are applied. In the juxtaposition of art and mechanism, 
we realize that works of art in any medium require reflection beyond the formal rules 
applied in their creation. Schleiermacher’s “mechanism” inspires us to imagine a 
machine that can analyze a musical wok, or a painting, or a poem, and single out 
meaning through comparisons to a programmed set of rules. Art demands a human 
factor, an individual who can create a work of music, following some rules and 
breaking others, in an effort to put forward a message. This message, or deeper 
content, may be a commentary on these formal rules, or express an idea beyond the 
confines of that medium. For this reason, an analysis of formal properties and rules is 
helpful to determine a basic vocabulary and style. But to reflect on the deeper 
questions of a composition, our consideration of the material should go beyond the 
formal attributes, and style, of that material. 
 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94 Schleiermacher, “General Hermeneutics,” Hermeneutics, 229, point 16. 
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Concluding remarks on the grammatical task of hermeneutics 
 
To conclude this discussion of Schleiermacher’s grammatical task of 
hermeneutics, we will consider the relation between rules in musical analysis and 
musical significance from the standpoint of limitation and consequence. This 
limitation is namely the restraint rule-based vocabulary in critical discourse about 
meaning imposes on thinking in a critical way “outside of the box.”  Scott Burnham 
describes this problem in the following way: 
 
Critical engagement with the materiality of music is mediated by a number of 
standard pedagogical generalizations about musical components and their 
behavior: dominants go to tonics, first themes go to second themes, etc. The 
names themselves of these components often suggest interpretive directions – 
think of the “half” cadence or the “deceptive” cadence.95 
 
 Burnham’s depiction of this problem of musical interpretation illustrates an 
affinity to Schleiermacher’s opinion that understanding of language must go beyond 
the study of rules (as is particularly evident in certain activities, e.g. philology).  In the 
case of musical analysis, relationships within a particular work of music are generally 
bound to vocabulary (e.g. deceptive cadence), and this vocabulary already implies a 
normative analytical apparatus (where the definitions of certain critical terms are 
more restrictive than others). There is a consequence to relying wholly on these terms 
(and structures) of composition to elucidate meaning: we are restricted, in our 
interpretation, to the “interpretative direction” that the terms themselves inherently 
dictate (e.g. the “deceptive” of “deceptive cadence”), which may not fully or correctly 
grasp the meaning of a passage.96 Importantly, the “obvious” or “immediate” 
elements that present themselves as fundamental to a work’s significance (e.g. 
tessitura, scoring) may fall by the wayside as the structure and interpretation implied 
by critical vocabulary often takes precedence. We find Burnham makes an appeal for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95 Burnham, “The Criticism of Analysis,” 75.  
96 This process recalls an example in Schleiermacher’s discussion of the New Testament regarding 
dictionaries and the translation of words, where a commentator may suggest a specific definition for a 
particular word when we encounter it in the context of a specific text. This is the case of figurative 
expressions as in Schleiermacher’s example of the word “swarm” [Schwarm]. In Greek, “swarm,” 
when used figuratively, also has additional implications related to bees [“the desire to attack and to 
sting”] (Schleiermacher, Hermeneutics, 252). Further, the understanding of a phrase must take into 
account literal and metaphorical meanings. Schleiermacher exemplifies this with the phrase “king of 
the beasts = lion.” He writes: “the lion does not rule, but ‘king’ does not therefore mean one who tears 
others apart according to the law of the stronger,” Hermeneutics, 34.  
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an understanding of musical meaning that refutes the precedence of critical and 
analytical interpretation. As Burnham states (cited at length above): “clearly analysis 
needs a broader definition of what constitutes musical significance.”97  
To combat the analytical directions, and flesh out the “broader definition” as 
Burnham suggests, we should look precisely at the elements considered “obvious” 
and “immediate” in the context of a larger notion of whole and language area. This 
task will attempt to reverse a process of interpretation that recognizes certain 
sonorous aspects, but catalogues them as insignificant details of larger analytical or 
historical claims. Our investigation, with the help of hermeneutics, aims to take these 
components out of the woodwork and show how they grant the possibility of 
understanding a composition as an object of art with deeper meaning. In our next step, 
we will reconcile these elements with an understanding of music as a medium through 
which a composer expresses ideas. This will lead to a discussion of the way in which 
particulars (e.g. a musical passage, or an article of notation), and a work as a whole, 
can contribute toward the expression of thoughts and ideas through lens of 
Schleiermacher’s psychological/technical task of hermeneutics. 
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Chapter 2: 
 
The psychological/technical task 
  
 
The psychological/technical task of Schleiermacher’s hermeneutics is 
designed to interact and inform the grammatical task. These two tasks are dependent 
upon one another, although each task has certain characteristic components. As the 
grammatical task is distinguished by rules and traditions in composition, the 
psychological/technical task focuses more heavily on the individual who created the 
work. In Chapter 2, we will address the psychological/technical task through a 
discussion of the following: (A) genius, individuality, and talent as the general focus 
of the psychological/technical task; (B) the methods Schleiermacher suggests for 
pinning down a description and finding evidence of genius and individuality – these 
are namely the divinatory method, comparative method, and intuition – which we will 
examine with relation to Beethoven’s Sonata in F Minor, Op. 57 (“Appassionata”) 
and the dolce indication for the exposition’s second group; (C) the consideration of a 
composition as a representation of a “life-moment,” which encompasses the 
composer’s decision to create, and we will describe this by way of external and 
internal reflections using Beethoven’s Sonata in E-flat Major, Op. 81a, “Das 
Lebewohl” or “Les Adieux” (The Farewell) as a case study; (D) the thoughts and 
ideas that a composition expresses as the principal goal of the psychological/technical 
task; (E) a more detailed consideration of secondary thoughts and ideas in a 
composition through an examination of Beethoven’s Sonata in C Minor, Op. 13, 
“Grande Sonata Pathétique.” These two final points, on the thoughts and ideas, 
elaborate on the way we can look beyond narrative descriptions as a source of 
meaning in music. We will defend Schleiermacher’s psychological/technical task of 
hermeneutics as a method to propel understanding a musical work toward universals 




The real philologists and connoisseurs of the art of discourse did not 
work on hermeneutics, but were satisfied with praxis. 
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They seek to reduce the area of hermeneutics via more precise 
determination of the use of language and by the production of historical 
apparatuses. What is left is genius, which is not helped by analysis.98 
 
With this statement, Schleiermacher defends his theory of hermeneutics 
against what he determines to be the method of philologists. He does not discredit 
philology altogether, but recognizes that it serves the part of the hermeneutics that 
does not treat “genius” and “talent.”99 The method of philology in question comes 
from a tradition of grammatical rules, structure, practical instruction, and historical 
study. The “praxis” of their method is one that reduces obscurities, complexities, or 
opaque passages to a pragmatic system of rules in grammar; this subsequently 
nullifies the originality and innovation of a work with the imposition of certain norms 
and catalogued exceptions. Schleiermacher believes that genius escapes this kind of 
“praxis.”100 The concept of genius in this case amalgamates different examples of 
originality and talent in a work of art. One example of this is the way an author or 
composer applies rules (and also breaks them) in order to create a work of art that 
exhibits a deeper level of meaning. 
The genius that escapes grammatical interpretation is one of the fundamental 
constituents of the psychological/technical task of hermeneutics: it is a driving force 
behind the elaboration and expression of thoughts in an artwork. A great musical 
work (or a complex passage) can inspire a sense of awe in the interpreter. This sense 
of awe can elicit an intuition101 that leads the interpreter to the element of genius. In 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98 Schleiermacher, “General Hermeneutics,” Hermeneutics, 228. Schleiermacher ends this sentence 
with a parenthetical remark, “(See Wolf),” referring to his predecessor Fr. August Wolf.  
99 Cf. Schleiermacher, “General Hermeneutics,” Hermeneutics, 228. 
100 It is presumed that Schleiermacher understands “genius” much in the same way as Immanuel Kant. 
See Kant’s determination of genius: “First, that it is a talent for art, not for science, in which rules that 
are distinctly cognized must come first and determine the procedure in it; second, that, as a talent for 
art, it presupposes a determinate concept of the product, as an end, hence understanding, but also 
representation (even if indeterminate) of the material, i.e., of the intuition, for the presentation of this 
concept, hence a relation of the imagination to the understanding; third, that it displays itself not so 
much in the execution of the proposed end in the presentation of a determinate concept as in the 
exposition or the expression of aesthetic ideas, which contain a rich material for that aim, hence the 
imagination, in its freedom from all guidance by rules, is nevertheless represented as purposive for the 
presentation of the given concept; finally, fourth, that the unsought and unintentional subjective 
purposiveness in the free correspondence of the imagination to the lawfulness of the understanding 
presupposes a proportion and disposition of this faculty that cannot be produced by any following of 
rules, whether of science or of mechanical imitation, but that only the nature of the subject can 
produce,” Immanuel Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, trans. Paul Guyer and Eric Matthews 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 195, cf. §46-49.  
101 Intuition in this context follows Schleiermacher’s conception of it, as outlined in On Religion: 
Speeches to Its Cultured Despisers [Über die Religion: reden an die Gebildeten unter ihren 
Verächtern], 1799. This concept will be explored in detail in Chapter 2, section B: Methods. 
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order to bridge the gap between genius and the stringency of philological praxis, 
Schleiermacher develops exercises and determinations within the 
psychological/technical task that have a specific aim: to determine thoughts in a 
composition or conversation.  
Schleiermacher’s psychological/technical task as such speaks to the way he 
finds thought and genius represented in different mediums. For example, 
Schleiermacher describes a conversation as a “free play of thoughts,” an exchange of 
ideas that are improvised in the moment of discussion. According to Schleiermacher’s 
theory, only a purely psychological task is required to understand the thoughts and 
ideas in a conversation. The purely psychological applies to this context because the 
interlocutors engaged in conversation put their respective thoughts forward without an 
explicit aim to satisfy the creation of an artistic object (e.g. a poem). In our current 
study of music, we are more interested in the technical component of the 
psychological/technical task. We apply Schleiermacher’s specifically technical task 
when we evaluate works that have a “completed structure of thoughts… a determinate 
aim to which everything relates, one thought determines the other with necessity… 
consciousness of a specific progress towards a goal predominates, the result is 
intentional, methodical, technical.”102 Our study of the methodology of the 
psychological/technical task of hermeneutics will be directed at what constitutes a 






B1. Divinatory versus comparative methods; intuition  
 
The divinatory method of the psychological task is characteristic of 
Schleiermacher’s philosophy; it is also one of the factors, however, that skeptics use 
to cast doubt on Schleiermacher’s hermeneutics as a whole. Schleiermacher presents 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
102 Schleiermacher, Hermeneutics 102, cf. 101-2. This text is from Schleiermacher’s lecture of 1832. 
This difference between “purely psychological” and “technical” activities will be addressed in more 
detail below, in the subsection D1 on meditation and composition. 
103 The psychological/technical task of hermeneutics will be shortened to “psychological task” for 
brevity, unless otherwise noted. 
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the divinatory method, alongside the comparative method, as complementary 
activities that are utilized to understand the individual whose work is being studied: 
 
The divinatory method is the one in which one, so to speak, transforms 
oneself into the other person and tries to understand the individual element 
directly. The comparative method first of all posits the person to be 
understood as something universal and then finds the individual aspect by 
comparison with other things included under the same universal. . . . Both 
may not be separated from each other. For divination only receives its 
certainty via confirmatory comparison, because without this it can always be 
incredible [fantastisch]. But the comparative method does not provide any 
unity. The universal and the particular must penetrate each other and this 
always only happens via divination.104 
 
 
The primary difficulty of the divinatory method is to understand what Schleiermacher 
means when he says that one should “transform oneself into the other person” (where 
the “other person” is the creator of the work in question). Schleiermacher held this 
notion close to his theory; we find that, despite our current reservations about such a 
practice, this method undoubtedly reflects a spirit of investigation and understanding 
characteristic of Schleiermacher’s time.105 In the philosophy of early Romanticism, 
there is a trend of self-reflection and congeniality with respect to how we understand 
what is outside ourselves, and the I that has an inclination toward mysticism and 
speculation.106 Friedrich Schlegel describes this in the “Athenaeum Fragments”: 
To transport oneself arbitrarily now into this, now into that sphere, as if into 
another world, not merely with one’s reason and imagination, but with one’s 
whole soul; to freely relinquish first one and then another part of one’s being, 
and confine oneself entirely to a third; to seek and find now in this, now in 
that individual the be-all and end-all of existence, and intentionally forget 
everyone else: of this only a mind is capable that contains within itself 
simultaneously a plurality of minds and a whole system of persons, and in 
whose inner being the universe which, as they say, should germinate in every 
monad, has grown to fullness and maturity.107  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
104 Schleiermacher, Hermeneutics, 92. 
105 Friedrich Daniel Ernst Schleiermacher [1768-1834]. 
106 Frederick Beiser discusses the romantic poets’ attempt to “revive” a “lost unity with ourselves, with 
nature and with others” that led to a remystification of the world and the early Romantics’ 
identification with mysticism. Beiser argues that this can be found in Novalis, Schleiermacher, 
Friedrich Schlegel, and Schelling. See Frederick C. Beiser, The Romantic Imperative: the Concept of 
Early German Romanticism (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 2003), 102. 
107 Friedrich Schlegel, “Athenaeum Fragments,” fragment 121, in Friedrich Schlegel’s Lucinde and the 
Fragments, trans. Peter Firchow (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1971), 161-240, 177. We 
observe a similar thought in Novalis and the notion of magical idealism. Novalis writes: “The principle 
of the I is, as it were, the genuine and communal principle, the liberal and universal principle––it is a 
unity that is without boundary or determination. On the contrary, it makes all determinations possible 
and fixed––and gives them absolute coherence and meaning. Selfhood, as the ground of constancy in 
change, is the ground of all cognition––also the principle of greatest multiplicity––(You). (Instead of 
Non-I–You.) Commonality and particularity. Everything can be I and is I or should be I” (The 
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This supreme function of an individual’s mind – to “travel” into the mind of another, 
to have the complexity of the universe within one’s own mind that is a “plurality of 
minds” – is specular to Schleiermacher’s divinatory method where one “transforms 
into the other person” without leaving one’s own body and mind. Schlegel also 
describes understanding from a basic standpoint as a highly reflective activity, where 
understanding, in the end, is a highly subjective activity: “the mind understands 
something only insofar as it absorbs it like a seed into itself, nurtures it, and lets it 
grow into blossom and fruit.”108 This fragment outlines how knowledge from the 
outside (of the Other) is translated into our mind, which we subsequently reflect on in 
a highly subjective way; we let ideas from the outside grow within our mind, as 
though the mind were the soil of the earth. 
Many scholars object to the highly subjective and speculative nature of the 
divinatory method in Schleiermacher’s theory. Hermeneutics since Schleiermacher 
has attempted to overcome the divination problem. In order to maintain many of 
Schleiermacher’s other hermeneutic principles, scholars (namely Wilhelm Dilthey 
and Gadamer109) refine general concepts that lay behind the divinatory method, e.g. 
empathy, congeniality, and what it is to understand something outside ourselves.110 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Universal Brouillon, §820). See Novalis, “The Universal Brouillon” in Theory as Practice: a Critical 
Anthology of Early German Romantic Writings, ed. and trans. Jochen Schulte-Sasse (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1997), 226-240, 238. 
108 “Ideas,” fragment 5, in Friedrich Schlegel’s Lucinde and the Fragments, trans. Peter Firchow 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1971), 241-256, 241. 
109 Gadamer brings to our attention what he believes to be certain limitations of Schleiermacher’s 
method. Gadamer describes how we understand the past and a historical individual via horizons where 
we enter into an exchange between ourselves, our understanding of the composer or author’s tradition, 
and back to ourselves again to substantiate meaning; we imagine the Other by comparison with our 
understanding of ourselves, our way of thinking, our beliefs, and education; however, the information 
we have regarding the period we are studying and the ideas present in culture at that time, as well as 
historical artifacts that have been left behind (journal entries, letters, etc.) inform our understanding of 
a specific tradition and help us to locate a general idea of the direction of thought in a composition. In 
this way we do not understand or create within ourselves an identical copy of the composer’s mind via 
mysticism, but in a methodical exercise of empathy, and congeniality, through our own perceptions and 
experiences we find what is of value within the context of tradition and historical knowledge in a 
practice of guesswork and speculation.  
110 In the evolution of hermeneutics, Wilhelm Dilthey [1833-1911] addresses the problem found in 
Schleiermacher’s divination method by describing what it is that we call “knowing” another person. 
Dilthey finds that our understanding of other people comes from our sense perception of isolated 
events, actions, and other outside happenings and the meaningful reconstruction [Nachbildung] of these 
based on “our own sense of life.” He writes that “the problem is: how can one quite individually 
structured consciousness bring an alien individuality of a completely different type to objective 
knowledge through such a construction?” Wilhelm Dilthey, “The Rise of Hermeneutics [1900],” trans. 
Frederic Jameson, New Literary History, Vol. 3, No. 2, On Interpretation: I (Winter, 1972): 229-244, 
231. This calls into question what we want to call “objective knowledge,” or knowing another person. 
Following Dilthey’s construct, “to know” a composer from a completely different historical era cannot 
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Schleiermacher recognized potential shortcomings of the divinatory method 
and stated early on that it could produce “incredible” or “fantastic” interpretations. 
Schleiermacher, in fact, makes it quite clear that statements solely founded on this 
method are not accurate.111 For Schleiermacher, interpretation must be built upon a 
synthesis of critical speculation and considerations of positive knowledge112 related to 
the work in question.  
We are able to grasp something fundamental about this process when we 
consider Schleiermacher’s notion of the “individuality of the composition.”113 The 
“individuality of the composition” is ambiguous in Schleiermacher’s text and seems 
to point to the individuality of the author as represented in the text. We see this 
“individuality” as a series of characteristics an artist brings to the object they created, 
which is something like thumbprints impressed on the fabric of the work.114 The study 
of “individuality” in this context imposes a slight dissimilarity between (1) the author 
as an individual and (2) the individuality of the composition where the composition 
exposes, reveals, and exemplifies the individuality of the author but does not address 
it as a whole. When we apply this idea to our study of the dolce passages in 
Beethoven’s Sonata in F Minor, Op. 57, “Appassionata,” we try to understand (1) the 
“individual element” or genius that defines Beethoven as an individual; (2) what of 
the “genius of Beethoven” can be found in Beethoven’s “Appassionata” sonata; and 
(3) what is “individual” of that work (that necessarily accentuates Beethoven’s 
individuality). 
Schleiermacher considers that the notion of intuition as a faculty is important 
for hermeneutics as a whole, specifically in the task of identifying individuality. 
Although presented in opposition to the comparative method, intuition is not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
be understood as objective knowledge, but as a hypothesis based on a hybrid of objective (historical) 
and subjective (e.g. personal experience) knowledge.   
111 See Schleiermacher, Hermeneutics, 92. An interpretation only based on the divinatory method 
would be seen as fantastich. 
112 Often times the evidence, or artifacts, which constitute positive knowledge also require hermeneutic 
interpretation. The kinds of material included are historical objects or contemporary commentaries 
about the author or composer’s life: e.g., diaries, memoirs, contemporary works by those in the author 
or composer’s circle, historical information about the time period, etc. 
113 The text we refer to is most likely derived from lecture notes of 1805, which the editor includes in 
Schleiermacher’s explanation of the psychological method. Schleiermacher, Hermeneutics, 100. 
114 The “individuality” is how the final products of two different artists, who create separate works 
based on the same idea or content, can exhibit wholly different individualities. This is decidedly based 
on the differences between the ways in which the content is represented – and these differences will 
hint at the artists’ individuality.  
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understood as having the same constitution as the divinatory method. Schleiermacher 
presents intuition, in this case immediate intuition, in the following way: 
 
Immediate intuition and comparison with others…immediate intuition does 
not get to what is mediated; comparison never gets to true individuality. One 
must unite them with each other via the relationship to the totality of the 
possible…seek this totality of the possible, which can only result from 
intelligent comparison of the particulars.115 
 
According to Schleiermacher’s instructions, we find that we need both intuition and 
comparison in order to accurately grasp the individuality of the author or individuality 
of the composition. In On Religion: Speeches to its Cultured Despisers (Über die 
Religion: reden an die Gebildeten unter ihren Verächtern [1799]), Schleiermacher 
describes the concept of intuition in more detail: “Intuition is and always remains 
something individual, set apart, the immediate perception.”116 Schleiermacher’s 
addition of the term “immediate” to “immediate intuition” in the discussion of 
accentuates the connection intuition has with “immediate perception” in On Religion. 
The immediate is one of the integral features of intuition, which detaches intuition 
from reflection; the immediate is thus the cornerstone of the identity of intuition as a 
faculty. And the common denominator for intuition and divination is subjectivity. 
Divination works from a position within the individual and operates with reference to 
the individual. (This sets it apart from comparison, which operates in our reflection on 
positive knowledge such as objects, events, and facts that are “outside” the 
individual.) For the purpose of hermeneutics, divination also draws on content from 
“outside” the individual to understand the individual who created a particular work. 
Schleiermacher resolves the paradoxical notion of understanding another person, what 
is “outside,” with an internal comparison characteristic of divination that calls 
comparison and reflection into play. Schleiermacher contends that each person “has a 
receptivity for all other people. But this itself seems only to rest on the fact that 
everyone carries a minimum of everyone else within themselves, and divination is 
consequently excited by comparison with oneself.”117 The comparison that occurs 
within the divinatory method is what sets it apart from intuition. This divinatory 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
115 Schleiermacher, Hermeneutics, 100. 
116  Schleiermacher, On Religion: Speeches to Its Cultural Despisers, trans. Richard Crouter 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 105; also, by way of highlighting a division between 
reflection and intuition, Schleiermacher states: “Religion’s essence is neither thinking nor acting, but 
intuition and feeling,” On Religion, 102. 
117  Schleiermacher, Hermeneutics, 93. We locate a similar idea in F. Schlegel, “Athenaeum 
Fragments,” fragment 121, and Novalis, The Universal Brouillon, §820. 
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comparison balances the seemingly endless possibilities within interpretation of this 
kind, as any ground gained via the divinatory method must be recognized as derived 
from an imprecise science akin to empathy. What we grasp by this method is not void 
of value, but rather suggests directions for interpretation. On the one hand, divination 
occupies a unique position of hierarchy with respect to intuition and perception; it 
incorporates a complex undertaking that involves empathy and comparison. On the 
other hand, intuition, elemental for one to identify what is strange or unique in a 
work, serves a foundational purpose in hermeneutic activity; it is a brute, unmediated 
feeling that suggests a direction for interpretation.  Intuition sets the divinatory and 
comparative methods in motion. 
 
 
B2.  Intuition and similarity that leads to approximation 
 
Much like intuition, another crucial element of the psychological task (and 
hermeneutics as a whole) is approximation. When describing both grammatical and 
technical interpretation,118 Schleiermacher writes:  
 
Grammatically, one cannot summarise individuality in a concept, it wants 
rather to be intuited. In the same way technically. There can be no concept of 
style. Grammatically, the complete understanding of the language would only 
be the understanding of the centre. Technically the style is, in the same way, 
only understood by the most complete understanding of the character. But in 
both cases this is inaccessible and can only be reached by approximation.119 
 
In this sense we see how the grammatical and technical tasks of hermeneutics 
are very similar in their methods; they assist each other. In the passage cited above, 
Schleiermacher reflects on intuition in the elaboration of the grammatical task of 
hermeneutics – individuality should become apparent through the way a work is 
constructed and presented (through an artistic application of rules of composition), 
and this appearance should become known to us by our intuition. Schleiermacher 
depicts this in more detail: 
 
There are more simple isolated expressions (more simple, i.e., for which one 
does not first need a technical interpretation, but which are just 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
118 In this context, Schleiermacher explores the technical component of the psychological/technical task 
of hermeneutics and differentiates it from the grammatical task. 
119 Schleiermacher, Hermeneutics, 96. 
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grammatically comprehensible), via these one obtains the first general 
intuition of individuality. This makes more difficult expressions 
comprehensible which in turn complete the intuition.120  
 
Schleiermacher describes two different kinds of expressions (that we can also 
understand as musical passages, phrases, etc.): (1) simple, isolated expressions and (2) 
more difficult expressions. According to Schleiermacher, even simple, isolated 
expressions will exhibit some degree of individuality irrespective of its simplicity 
(because we understand the passage almost entirely through the grammatical task and 
our general image of the whole). These simple passages will offer our “first general 
intuition of individuality.” The “first general intuition of individuality” will be a 
useful for understanding more difficult passages because the more difficult passage 
will confirm, or “complete,” this intuition.121  
We will examine the dichotomy between simple, isolated passages and more 
difficult passages with reference to Beethoven’s “Appassionata” sonata. Like most 
musical compositions, there are elements in this sonata that are readily accessible and 
create no apparent problems for interpretation. One example of this is in the first 
measures of the main theme (Figure 2.8). We will call this a “simple, isolated 
passage,” in Schleiermacher’s vocabulary. The difficulty to understanding (and 
determine the meaning of) the dolce passages in the first movement can be felt when 
we compare one dolce passage to a “simple” isolated passage in the first bars of the 
ascending main theme. We appreciate the slur that expands over main theme that 
presents it as a unit; we grasp the pianissimo dynamic, which proposes a subtle 
ascending triad in the minor mode.122 A deep, calculated rhythmic pulse gives this 
theme the impression of a balanced phrase.123 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
120 Schleiermacher, Hermeneutics, 96. 
121 See also where Schleiermacher describes the circumstances where grammatical interpretation 
requires technical interpretation: “if one says: grammatical interpretation itself needs technical 
interpretation, this is only for the first temporary grasping of the context in the mind, which precedes 
all understanding of something individual and particular as such,” Schleiermacher, Hermeneutics, 96. 
122 Czerny notes the difficulty involved in performing this theme because Beethoven, it would seem, 
neglected to write in an E-natural (in the third full measure), which establishes the shift in tonality to C 
major; the theme’s initial ascension (mm. 0-2), nevertheless, is what is of interest to us. See Barry 
Cooper, “Commentaries,” in Ludwig van Beethoven: The 35 Piano Sonatas Edited by Barry Cooper 
with fingerings by David Ward, Volume III (London: The Associated Board of the Royal Schools of 
Music, 2007), 6; and Czerny, On the Proper Performance of all Beethoven’s Works for the Piano, ed. 
Paul Badura-Skoda ([Vienna]: Universal Edition, 1970), 14. 
123 András Schiff speaks about how he counts the rhythmic parts of this passage by acknowledging the 
divisions of each beat, which grants the theme a structured sound. The kind of counting Schiff suggests 
restrains the theme from becoming a freely moving gesture with tempo rubato. Schiff addresses this 
	   96	  
 
 
Figure 2.8 Ludwig van Beethoven, Sonata in F minor, Op. 57, “Appassionata,” 






Figure 2.9 Ludwig van Beethoven, Sonata in F minor, Op. 57, “Appassionata,” 




When we follow Schleiermacher’s method, we compare this “simple, isolated 
passage” (Figure 2.8) to a more difficult passage (Figure 2.9) in the recapitulation of 
the “Appassionata.” These two passages have a sonorous similarity, between the first 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
sonata from the perspective of a performer, in his lecture on the same, see “Part Six: from 
‘Appassionata’ and ‘Les Adieux’ / Part 2. Sonata in F minor, opus 57, no. 23 (‘Appassionata’).”  
http://audio.theguardian.tv/sys-audio/Arts/Culture/2006/12/05/02_23fminop57.mp3 (accessed February 
19, 2016). 
124 Ludwig van Beethoven, The 35 Piano Sonatas Edited by Barry Cooper with fingerings by David 
Ward © 2007 by The Associated Board of the Royal Schools of Music, reproduced by permission of 
ABRSM. 
125 Beethoven, The 35 Piano Sonatas Edited by Barry Cooper with fingerings by David Ward © 2007 
by The Associated Board of the Royal Schools of Music Reproduced by permission of ABRSM. 
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theme and the second theme that comes especially to the fore in the recapitulation. 
This similarity is most prominently displayed in the sounding quality (principally the 
low register), rhythmic organization, and melodic contour. The uniqueness of the 
dolce passage (Figure 2.9) stands out in comparison with its relatively transparent 
neighbor (Figure 2.8), as the strangeness of the dolce second theme does not fade 
when we make the comparison. The similarity between these themes suggests their 
affinity with one another, even when one has a problematic dolce applied to it.  
 
Figure 2.10 Ludwig van Beethoven, Sonata in F minor, Op. 57, “Appassionata,” 




In this part of the recapitulation (Figure 2.10), the passage combines the main theme 
(Figure 2.8) with the least problematic aspect of the second theme – a pedal point (see 
Figure 2.9). Although the pedal point does not serve a melodic purpose, it remains an 
integral aspect of the second theme; the pedal point is the device that introduces the 
content of the second group. Importantly, this passage (Figure 2.10) leaves out the 
dolce indication, or the characteristic triad figure of the second group accompaniment. 
This passage in the recapitulation demonstrates a consonance between elements of the 
first group (the main theme) and the second group (the pedal point), but is avoids the 
most complex element of the second group – its accompaniment. The tri-fold 
comparison of a simple isolated passage (Figure 2.8), a complex passage (Figure 2.9), 
and a passage that combines elements of the two (Figure 2.10) highlights the 
difficulty of one (Figure 2.9), and the transparency of the other (Figure 2.8). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
126 Beethoven, The 35 Piano Sonatas Edited by Barry Cooper with fingerings by David Ward © 2007 
by The Associated Board of the Royal Schools of Music Reproduced by permission of ABRSM. 
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This exercise of determining similarities built on intuition is an effort of 
approximation. We systematically follow intuition, and similarities between passages, 
to crystallize certain aspects of our intuition about a work. The merit of the exercise is 
that it leads to intelligible interpretation and insight by drawing on what is both 
familiar and unfamiliar. We find it is in this direction that we determine individuality 
via approximation. In this case, we have briefly described the unique dolce of the 
second group accompaniment and the similarity between the first and second themes 
of the “Appassionata.” Our intuition that this dolce is difficult to understand, versus 
the simplicity of the lucid first theme, is strengthened through comparison and 
approximation of content from one passage to another. 
 
 B3. Necessity and the identification of individuality 
 
To say whether a certain hermeneutic exercise is relevant for understanding a 
particular artwork is a subjective decision; for this reason we see hermeneutics not as 
a science, but as an art (as Schleiermacher himself asserts).  
The art of hermeneutics comes into play when we consider that the key to 
understanding lies in the cognitive import of recognition.127 There is no rule that says 
why a certain aspect of a composition shows individuality; there is no rule about the 
necessity of this very individuality. We have to recognize these conditions on our 
own. Schleiermacher describes an aspect of identifying necessity in the following 
manner: “One might say that what can be understood grammatically could not be 
good at also making individuality visible. But it [individuality] can be understood 
grammatically, though its necessity cannot be comprehended.”128 In this way, we see 
the importance of psychological interpretation for hermeneutic interpretation and how 
content, which speaks to individuality, does not have specific rules that govern how 
we understand it. When we refer to Figure 2.9 from the “Appassionata” sonata, we 
recognize the individuality that is contained in the strangeness of the second theme 
and accompaniment marked dolce. However, to determine what this passage means as 
part of Beethoven’s creation, as something that illustrates Beethoven’s individuality 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
127 This is a variation of one of Gadamer’s points (discussed in Part II, Chapter 1 of this thesis). See 
Gadamer, Truth and Method, 113. 
128 Schleiermacher, Hermeneutics, 96. 
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as a composer, and the product of a decision or thought, we should speak of the 
necessity of these aspects for understanding the work as a whole. 
 
 
C. External circumstances, experience, and a composer’s life-moment as 
expressed in compositions  
 
Biography often goes hand-in-hand with the study of an artist’s work as an 
authoritative source of meaning. Schleiermacher’s hermeneutics took into account the 
idea of biography with the notion that a work of art represents a decision or life-
moment. In order to understand a particular life-moment, Schleiermacher contended 
that we should consider both “external circumstances” and “internal 
circumstances.”129 In the following section, we will argue for a modified version of 
the concept of life-moment through the lens of Hans-Georg Gadamer’s concept of 
experience [Erlebnis]. From this platform, we will investigate how Ludwig van 
Beethoven’s Sonata in E-flat Major, Op. 81a, “Lebewohl” or “Les Adieux” [The 
Farewell], exemplifies both “external” and “internal” aspects of experience. We will 
conclude this section by outlining four distinct points related to meaning in the sonata, 
and how this meaning can offer insight into current experiences of alienation, 
expectation, and the expression of thought through music.  
 
 
C1. Hermeneutics – Life-moment and Experience [Erlebnis] 
 
According to Schleiermacher’s theory, a work will reflect ideas and thoughts 
that are relevant to a life-moment. Schleiermacher asks: “In what circumstances did 
the author come to their decision, from the question what does this decision mean in 
them, or what particular value does it have in relation to the totality of their life?”130 
From this statement, we should be able to observe the material representation of the 
composer’s internalization of circumstances and the decisions behind a particular 
work. Knowledge of a composer’s biography, where a particular work is placed in a 
biographical continuum, is part of what enables us to articulate “external 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
129 Schleiermacher, Hermeneutics, 108.  
130 Schleiermacher, Hermeneutics, 108. Translation slightly modified. 
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circumstances.” The internalization of “external circumstances” is at the heart of 
experience; it will lead interpretation toward uncovering meaning that is less 
transparent and will articulate Gadamer’s concept of experience [Erlebnis]. 
The musical example we will be commenting on specifically in this section is 
Beethoven’s Sonata in E-flat Major, Op. 81a, “Lebewohl” or “Les Adieux” [The 
Farewell]. The “external circumstances” behind this sonata are infamous through 
anecdotes compiled in biographies about Beethoven. These accounts relate that 
Beethoven was inspired to compose the sonata upon being informed that his close 
friend, the Archduke Rudolph [1788-1831], would be leaving Vienna due to the fact 
that the French invaded Austria in April 1809. Barry Cooper recounts: “Beethoven 
was deeply affected by Rudolph’s imminent departure, and to mark the occasion he 
quickly wrote a personal farewell in the form of a sonata movement, towards the end 
of April.”131 These sketches, found in the Landsberg 5 sketchbook,132 soon became 
what we now know as the Lebewohl sonata. The “external circumstances” of the 
French invasion and the Archduke’s departure are extremely insightful for certain 
aspects of the sonata, such as the movement headings: Das Lebe Wohl [The 
Farewell]: Vienna, 4 May 1809 on the departure of His Imperial Highness the 
esteemed Archduke Rudolph; Abwesenheit [Absence]; Das Wiedersehn [The Return]: 
The arrival of His Imperial Highness the esteemed Archduke Rudolph, 30 January 
1810). These are uncommonly descriptive for Beethoven’s finished compositions and 
provide a first step for interpretation as they support what biographers have written 
regarding events surrounding Beethoven’s life, as well as the departure and return of 
the Archduke Rudolph. To move beyond “external circumstances” as the only 
indicators of meaning, we should consider the internalization of these circumstances 
and how Beethoven expressed his understanding of these experiences in the sonata. 
Gadamer provides a steppingstone to this goal by articulating the concept of Erlebnis 
[experience] in the context of hermeneutics. 
 When considering aesthetics in the context of hermeneutic theory, Gadamer 
writes how the concept of Erlebnis – that incorporates the importance of biography 
from Schleiermacher’s hermeneutic theory – only became common in discourse about 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
131 Barry Cooper, “Commentaries,” in Ludwig van Beethoven: The 35 Piano Sonatas Edited by Barry 
Cooper with fingerings by David Ward, Volume III (London: The Associated Board of the Royal 
Schools of Music, 2007), 19. 
132 See Douglas Johnson, Alan Tyson, and Robert Winter, The Beethoven Sketchbooks: History, 
Reconstruction, Inventory (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 188-93. 
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meaning in the 1870’s.133 Erlebnis fuses both the notion of external circumstances and 
the internalization of those circumstances into one concept. As Gadamer describes, 
Erlebnis is derived from the verb erleben, which means “to be alive while something 
happens. Thus the word suggests the immediacy with which something real is 
grasped.”134 This verb capitalizes on the immediacy of one’s personal experiences: 
“what is experienced is always what one has experienced oneself.”135 This also 
resonates with Schleiermacher’s concept of a life-moment, where an artist makes a 
decision to create in the space of the immediate. The second meaning that we find 
behind the word Erlebnis is when we consider erleben in the form “das Erlebte,” 
which means “the permanent content of what is experienced.”136 This notion 
expresses how what is experienced has an effect on the person who experiences it, 
and this permanent content in the mind can be the source for future works of art. For 
Gadamer, biography is where these two meanings collide to form the term Erlebnis:  
 
The essence of biography, especially nineteenth-century biographies of artists 
and poets, is to understand the works from the life. Their achievement 
consists precisely in mediating between the two meanings that we have 
distinguished in the word “Erlebnis” and in seeing these meanings as a 
productive union: something becomes an “experience” not only insofar as it 
is experienced, but insofar as its being experienced makes a special 
impression that gives it lasting importance. An “experience” of this kind 
acquires a wholly new status when it is expressed in art.137 
 
From Gadamer’s perspective on the essence of biography, we can find meaning in 
works of music that can be traced back to a composer’s experience: external 
circumstances that are felt in an immediate way (e.g. the French invasion of Austria), 
and the composer’s reflection on the “special impression” of those external 
circumstances through their internalization in the composer’s memory. At this point, 
it would appear that musical meaning follows a narrative derived from historical fact 
and psychological conjecture. Gadamer’s theory of hermeneutics, however, restricts 
such a limited view of meaning; the essence of meaning in art is the way in which it 
represents something absolute and infinite: “every act, as an element of life, remains 
connected with the infinity of life that manifests itself in it. Everything finite is an 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
133 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, 2nd revised edition, trans. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald 
G. Marshall (London and New York: Continuum, 2004), 53. 
134 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 53. 
135 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 53. 
136 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 53. 
137 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 53. 
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expression, a representation of the infinite.”138 From this perspective, we will address 
the way Beethoven’s Lebewohl sonata expresses not only the composer’s experience, 
but also a universal meaning that captures elements of our current experience.  
 
C2. Das Lebewohl 
 
Beethoven’s Lebewohl sonata is often at the center of debates on musical 
meaning, e.g. whether the meaning of the sonata can be derived from a narrative of 
extramusical information, or whether meaning in the sonata is only accurate if drawn 
from structural and analytical conclusions. Carl Dahlhaus argues the sonata’s meaning 
should be determined through the score itself and avoid “social-cum-psychological 
descriptions” as these are unable to find evidence for their conclusions in the material 
of the score.139 In our investigation, we will show a depth of meaning in the Lebewohl 
by overcoming the restrictions of formal analysis, and consider the meaning of the 
work through the score and Gadamer’s concept of Erlebnis. We will examine how the 
sonata not only delves into Beethoven’s own experience, but also how aspects of the 
composition – as a product of experience – resonate with our own experience. 
 We will first consider the movement headings Beethoven provides for this 
sonata. It seems that Beethoven wishes to express an aspect of meaning that goes 
beneath the surface of the work. These headings and word cues highlight the 
importance of performance interpretation, as Beethoven explicitly hints that within 
this sonata there is content that cannot be expressed solely through material means: 
the score is unable to express the entirety of meaning because comprehension resides 
in performance interpretation. To achieve this, Beethoven writes both Italian tempo 
indications and lengthier descriptions in German. The fact that these descriptions are 
written in German suggests a language barrier or linguistic conflict. When Beethoven 
puts forward ideas about the movement’s tempo and expression in his native tongue, 
this gives the impression that these descriptions are closer to Beethoven’s inspiration 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
138 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 55. 
139 Carl Dahlhaus, Ludwig van Beethoven: Approaches to his Music, trans. Mary Whittall (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1991), 35. In this section, we indirectly challenge Dahlhaus’s disparaging comments 
about what he considers to be Erlebnismusik. Dahlhaus questions “whether, and to what extent, real 
emotions form part of the conditions for the composition and interpretation of a piece of music.” 
Dahlhaus, Beethoven, 33. Erlebnis in the context of this section relates to Gadamer’s concept in the 
ambit of hermeneutic interpretation, and does not attempt to exhibit evidence beyond what the material 
of the score can present. 
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and feelings about the work.140 In this unique mash-up of languages, Beethoven 
writes for the second movement: Abwesenheit: Andante espressivo, the heading: “In 
gehender Bewegung, doch mit viel Ausdruck” [“In a walking motion, but with much 
expression”].141 For the final movement, Das Wiedersehn: Vivacissimamente, 
Beethoven writes the heading: “Im lebhaftesten Zeitmasse” [“in the liveliest 
tempo”].142 These descriptions are deceptively simple, but offer insight into the 
question of translation of musical terms and expressive word cues into different 
languages. With these headings, Beethoven offers both listeners and performers food 
for thought. As a result, we begin each movement of the sonata immersed in 
reflection – we imagine how to interpret this information within the movement. This 
meditation consequently spills into the way we play (and experience) the work as a 
whole. 
 The first movement, Das Lebe Wohl (“The Farewell”), begins with an Adagio 
introduction. It presents us with instructions for performance interpretation, much like 
the later movements described above. In the case of the first movement, there are 
additional indications within the staff (see Figure 2.11). These instructions do not 
form a heading for the movement, but have another dimension of meaning: they are 
directly applicable to a specific passage in the score and not necessarily the movement 
as a whole. Beethoven writes piano and espressivo within the staff of the first 
measure, and the word “Lebewohl” appears above the first three notes of the piece 
(see Figure 2.11). Each syllable of the word corresponds to one note in the sequence. 
Although the movement title is also “Das Lebe wohl” (“The Farewell”), when we see 
the word “Lebewohl,” written directly above the staff, several different possibilities 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
140 William Kinderman elaborates on the importance of German headings and German descriptions for 
Beethoven, writing that Beethoven was “irritated by the use, in the first edition, of French instead of 
German titles, probably not only because of the difference in meaning between ‘Les adieux’ and ‘Das 
Lebewohl,’ but also because of the relationship between the falling horn motif (G–F–E-flat), with E-
flat–B-flat–G in the lower voice) at the outset of the slow introduction and the syllables ‘Le-be-wohl,’ 
which are written above these chords,” William Kinderman, Beethoven, 2nd edition (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2009), 160.  
141 Barry Cooper argues this is a description of “Andante espressivo” in different words. See Cooper, 
Commentaries, Volume III, 21. As mentioned above, Abwesenheit is generally translated into English 
as: “Absence.” 
142 Barry Cooper suggests this should not mean “the fastest possible.” See Cooper, Commentaries, 
Volume III, 22. According to the Harvard Dictionary of Music, “Vivace” means “lively, brisk. In 
isolation, the term may indicate a tempo equivalent to allegro or faster. It has also been used to modify 
various terms (e.g. allegro vivace), usually, but not always, implying a faster tempo than the term 
modified. The intensifiers vivacissimo and vivacissimamente are also used.” Harvard Dictionary of 
Music, 4th edition, ed. Don Michael Randel (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University 
Press, 2003), 962. The movement title Das Wiedersehn, is generally rendered into English as: “The 
Return.” 
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for interpretation arise: this three-note motto is the namesake of the movement; the 
key to understanding the movement as a whole can be derived from these three notes; 
the word “Lebewohl” is the remainder of the lyrics of a song that was never finished 
or merely dissolves; the three-note motto seems to be the representation of Beethoven 
saying “farewell” to his friend the Archduke Rudolph.  
 
Figure 2.11 Ludwig van Beethoven, Sonata in E-flat major, Op. 81a, 
“Lebewohl” or “Les Adieux” [The Farewell], mvmt. I, Adagio–Allegro, 




The “Lebewohl” tag transforms this motto into a calling card with an added depth of 
meaning – when this theme appears in different incarnations it is still the “Lebewohl” 
theme.  
Through our heightened awareness of this motto, it becomes one of the most 
recognizable components of this sonata – and Beethoven hints that this will be the 
case when he displays the motto in this clean, unadulterated setting (much like the 
first announcement of the subject of a fugue). We should distinguish the motto, 
nevertheless, from the role of a first theme in sonata form. Barry Cooper calls it a 
“motivic argument,”144 which is essentially a musical statement that we find 
throughout the exposition with melodic content that defines the work. Many 
Beethoven scholars, including William Kinderman,145 Charles Rosen,146 and Elaine 
Sisman,147 identify this motto with a horn call (notably because the alto harmony in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
143 Beethoven: The 35 Piano Sonatas Edited by Barry Cooper with fingerings by David Ward © 2007 
by The Associated Board of the Royal Schools of Music Reproduced by permission of ABRSM. 
144 Cooper, Commentaries, Volume III, 20. 
145 Kinderman, Beethoven, 159-160. 
146 The idea that this motto is a horn call determines much of what Rosen writes about this sonata with 
respect to its expression. See Charles Rosen, Beethoven’s Piano Sonatas: A Short Companion (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 2002), 202. 
147 Elaine Sisman defends that “only the original version of the Lebewohl-motive in whole notes retains 
the force of its verbal meaning.” Elaine B. Sisman, “After the Heroic Style: Fantasia and the 
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Figure 2.11, m. 1, outlines “horn fifths”).148 In fact, Rosen initiates a treatment on the 
proper performance of the Lebewohl sonata with a mention that the sonata begins 
“with a horn call, a symbol in poetry well established by 1810 of distance, isolation, 
and memory.”149 One of the difficulties we find when we associate this motto with a 
horn call is the following: if we grant superiority to the symbol of a horn call in 
critical interpretation, then the symbol closes the door on understanding the sonata 
from a hermeneutic perspective related to experience. This is the result of a thorny 
problem of coherence of meaning because one must reconcile a stagnant historical 
trope with current sensibilities.150 A horn call as an independent symbol, or as an 
allegory for the departure of the Archduke Rudolph, implicitly or explicitly affects 
how we perceive the Lebewohl motto because we construct an allegorical relation 
between the motto and a symbolic horn call. To reach a depth of meaning beyond this 
symbol, we advocate a position of understanding via aesthetic experience. More 
specifically, we will explore the first movement of the sonata as an artwork that is a 
product of experience. We understand the sonata as an aesthetic object that produces 
an aesthetic experience where meaning “belongs not only to this particular content or 
object but rather stands for the meaningful whole of life.”151 From this perspective we 
will investigate the Lebewohl sonata, and specifically the “Lebewohl” motto. 
 
1.  The first announcement of the “Lebewohl” motto has a disjointed aspect 
because it has no slurs (see Figure 2.11, m. 1). The motto does not look very song-
like, although it invites us to sing this word as we play the first three notes of the 
sonata. It offers us, instead, a picture of someone learning how to drive a car with a 
manual transmission, coming around the bend in a road, and shifting from third gear, 
to second gear, to first gear. We start the motto in a rough third gear because the first 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
‘Characteristic’ Sonata of 1809” in Beethoven Forum, volume 6 (Lincoln and London: University of 
Nebraska Press), 1998, 67-96, 87. 
148 See Sisman, After the Heroic Style, 87-8. 
149 Rosen, Beethoven’s Piano Sonatas, 202. 
150 A similar problem arises when current audiences listen to Joseph Haydn’s Symphony No. 31 in D 
major “Hornsignal.” The historical connotations of the horn signal in the first movement of Haydn’s 
symphony are difficult for us to understand from our own experience because of our distance from the 
historical time period when horns were used for purposes such as the delivery of the mail and in war. 
We imagine certain ideas relative to meaning in the symphony, such as feelings of excitement, joy, and 
expectation, when we read the title of the work. From a hermeneutic sense of Erlebnis, we remain at a 
distance from the horn signal itself because we can fathom this meaning but have not experienced it in 
an authentic way. 
151 This notion follows Gadamer’s concept of Erlebniskunst (art based on experience), see Truth and 
Method, 61. 
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note of the motto sounds as though it is arriving from someplace else. The word 
“Lebewohl” contributes to the impression that we begin the piece in medias res, and 
already engaged in reflection. Our meditation, moreover, seems to stop or even stall 
on the “wohl” in C minor because the C octave in the bass is somewhat surprising (it 
has a comparatively low register and is telling of the unexpected minor key), and the 
third note of the sequence is held for a longer value than the other notes of the motto.  
When we associate the motto with a horn call, it is difficult to appreciate the 
“Lebewohl” as part of a train of thought that is in progress. Notice the difference 
when we compare the Lebewohl sonata introduction to Figure 2.12, the second 
movement from Mozart’s Sonata in B-flat Major, K. 281, Andante amoroso: both 
Beethoven and Mozart’s themes move in a descending, step-wise motion but m. 1 in 
Mozart’s composition clearly gives the impression that he is starting a thought from 
the beginning:  
 
Figure 2.12 Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart, Sonata in B-flat Major, K. 281, 




Mozart commences the second movement of K. 281 with a forte E-flat played in an 
octave (Figure 2.12, m. 1), which confidently confirms the tonality of the movement. 
The “Lebewohl” motto floats into Beethoven’s musical space (Figure 2.11, m. 1) 
without any introduction and only a vague suggestion of key. Beethoven does not 
start his movement with a chord that stabilizes the key of the movement, or even offer 
an octave tone that would sway the tonality in a specific direction until m. 2 (see 
Figure 2.11). Much like how a farewell [Lebewohl] is said to someone or something, 
when encounter this word here we necessarily meditate on its meaning. A “farewell” 
is loaded with thoughts about places, people, and material things; it seems difficult for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
152 Quoted from W. A. Mozart, Klaviersonaten, volume 1, Wiener Urtext Edition UT 50226, Vienna, 
2004 – with kind permission. 
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one to say (or play) “farewell” without reflecting on what one is saying “farewell” 
to.153 For this reason the Lebewohl motto begins within a space of reflection, a space 
that is not yet decidedly happy or sad (at least until m. 2). 
 
 2.   The Lebewohl motto challenges all other themes in the first movement, as 
this three-note gesture is extremely memorable and catches our eye in the score like 
someone dressed inappropriately for the season. It strikes us that it turns up 
fragmented, or in other variations, throughout the first movement. Furthermore, as 
Elaine Sisman defends, the first theme of the Allegro section of first movement 
blends together different elements of the Lebewohl motto section, such as the 
chromatic bass theme (Figure 2.11, mm. 2-4), and the short, uneven motifs in the 
soprano voice (Figure 2.11, mm. 2-4); the second theme of the Allegro is also based 
on the Le-be-wohl motto. Sisman continues this argument by saying at times it is 
difficult to distinguish between the Lebewohl motto and the first and second themes 
because “transitional or developmental passages may change the rhythm of the three-









	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
153 Elaine Sisman remarks: “Beethoven changed the name of the Sonata from ‘Der Abschied’ – 
farewell in the sense of departure, leave-taking, an observed phenomenon – to ‘Das Lebewohl’ – the 
actual word of farewell spoken to the departing person, a participatory phenomenon,” Sisman, “After 
the Heroic Style,” 88. This is notable because Sisman claims the “Lebewohl-motive embodies a 
striking image . . . . The speaker or composer uses an image to make an absent thing appear to be 
present, to call an experience vividly to mind, to bring the audience along into the world of the speaker 
or composer in order to sway them, move their passions, feel the desired feelings. . . . It serves as an 
image of the composer’s experience for his or her own use, it becomes a locator in memory, helping to 
retrieve both this and other experiences for use as thematic material,” Sisman, “After the Heroic Style,” 
88.  
154 Sisman, “After the Heroic Style,” 87. 
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Figure 2.13 Ludwig van Beethoven, Sonata in E-flat major, Op. 81a, “Lebewohl” or 




Nevertheless, when we encounter the Lebewohl motto intact in the Allegro section of 
the first movement, or even when we find it fragmented in pieces, there is something 
about the motto that brings to mind the original sentiment of the first two measures of 
the sonata. In the coda of the first movement, the Lebewohl motto (in the right hand) 
is sufficiently hidden behind a lyrical, dolce cello-like theme in the left hand (see 
Figure 2.13, mm. 197-200). The dolce word cue suggests that it applies to the figure 
in the left hand as its elegant endurance takes it far through the sounding range of a 
cello. Dolce indications in the staff of Beethoven’s compositions often apply to 
melodic content that returns later in the composition, which consequently invokes a 
feeling of nostalgia. In this case, with this particular dolce, Beethoven calls our 
attention to the importance of a melodic fragment that embodies the content of the 
“Lebewohl” motto and contrasts this with the beauty of a cello figuration written for 
the keyboard.  In this passage of the coda, we experience both the lightness of the 
dolce accompaniment and the complex expression of the “Lebewohl” motto. 
 
3. Despite its simplicity, the motto harbors a dark and almost sinister feeling 
of regret and sorrow. This is enhanced by the piano and espressivo indications in the 
staff (Figure 2.11, m. 1). The motto is also exceedingly easy to play, although the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
155 Ludwig van Beethoven: The 35 Piano Sonatas Edited by Barry Cooper with fingerings by David 
Ward © 2007 by The Associated Board of the Royal Schools of Music Reproduced by permission of 
ABRSM. 
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intervals feel a little awkward in the right hand.156 The odd combination of piano and 
espressivo descending intervals that are as calm as they are eerie, and a deceptive C 
octave in the bass in m. 2 (Figure 2.11), trickles into our perception of the Lebewohl 
motto. When we examine the motto from a listener’s aesthetic perspective, it is 
difficult to place the motto within a structural framework of major or minor modes. 
The fundamental difference between major and minor necessarily influences how we 
experience a work from an immediate perspective, and also our expectation for the 
movement as a whole. The C minor chord, which concludes the motto, is a structural 
indicator that casts a shadow over the motto. But the ear, and our experience with 
intervals, makes it difficult to hear the first interval played in the sonata as minor 
because it is a major third (E-flat–G). It is less difficult to hear the second interval of 
the motto as minor (a perfect fifth: B-flat–F), but it has an uncertain quality about it 
because the consonance of a perfect fifth recalls the major mode. The third chord of 
the motto is clearly in minor – it is difficult to hear it as anything else but a big, and 
rather empty, C minor triad (the C is reflected twice, C2–C3 and this provides an 
ominous feature to the chord). 
Through a consideration of the sounding quality of these intervals of the 
motto, Beethoven surprises us by calling our attention to the fact that we set store by 
the first few tones of a piece to determine the rest of the movement. The Lebewohl 
motto challenges how we hear a major third and the stability of a perfect fifth. There 
are many works in the canon of Western classical music that are difficult to place 
within a major – minor structure because they may be written in the major mode but 
sound undoubtedly minor, and vice versa. This is also common in many works of 
popular music. From this perspective, the Lebewohl motto in the brief moments of 
measure 1 shares a similarity with the Beatles’ “In My Life” (1965). Although the 
lyrics of the Beatles’ song do not refer to saying “good-bye” to anything in particular, 
they speak of a time past that has been left behind. “In My Life” is composed in A 
major, but the pathos of the melody, and the whole of the song, has something weepy 
about it in the same vein as the Lebewohl motto. This suggests that there is more 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
156 I find a fingering of 3-5 – 2-4 – 1-3 gives a smooth effect. Schnabel’s edition suggests 3-5 – 2-5 – 1-
4, Schnabel, 217. See Beethoven: Complete Piano Sonatas in Two Volumes: Historic Edition with 
Preface in English, Spanish, Italian, German, and French, ed. Artur Schnabel, Volume II (Milan: 
Edizioni Curci, S.R.L., 1949, reprinted by Alfred USA – Van Nuys: Alfred Publishing Co, n.d. USA), 
217. 
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going on in the song than the lyrics let on. The Lebewohl motto thus shares a depth of 
meaning that is beyond a major-minor framework – namely, it is meaning found in 
our aesthetic experience of the object and not in the analytical suggestion of key. 
 
4. The motto seems alienated from the rest of the sonata because it does not 
serve a hallowed role in sonata form. The motto may be the basis of the first and 
second themes of the Allegro section of the first movement, but when the motto itself 
appears in the first movement it portrays thematic alienation. This initial feeling of 
alienation is derived from the fact that we first hear the motto in a solo setting. And 
the motto is remarkably different from the measures that follow (see Figure 2.11, mm. 
2-4). Beethoven obliquely asks us to consider this tragic figure, the “Lebewohl,” at 
the same time as appear to be saying “farewell” in a fashion where the motto becomes 
an individual and aesthetic object. The composition lures us to recognize this 
individual, and take pride in recognizing its appearances, throughout the first 
movement (e.g. Figure 2.13, mm. 197-9).157 On the one hand, Beethoven gives the 
impression that he uses the Lebewohl motto as a model to construct the first and 
second themes of the exposition. The motto appears to show up everywhere, in the 
guise of a structural function in sonata form. On the other hand, the Lebewohl motto is 
comprised of intervals and rhythms that are common and fundamental to diatonic 
music (its intervals: major third, perfect fifth, major sixth [in the context of a minor 
triad]; its rhythms: two quarter-notes and one dotted quarter-note). To a certain extent, 
it is the prevalence of these elements that make it difficult to discern the motto from 
fragments of the first and second theme, or from other thematic material. Not only is 
the identity of the motto in the exposition somewhat confused from this perspective, 
but it also offers a glimpse into a feeling of alienation where individuals can find 
themselves in the middle of a crowd but feel alone at the same time; the motto, as 
thematic material, desires to belong to a greater whole, but an aspect of its expression 
alienates it or separates it from the rest. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
157 Although not nearly as complex as a fugue, Beethoven seems to challenge analysis and listeners in a 
similar way to find the subject (in this case it is a motto that is neither the first nor second theme of the 
exposition). Analysis frequently points to the instances of the motto as a significant source of meaning. 
See, for example, how Charles Rosen describes where to find the motto in Beethoven’s Piano Sonatas, 
202-204. The other side of this argument, championed by Carl Dahlhaus, is that the motto is so 
intimately related to the first and second themes of the exposition that identifying precise instances of 
the motto has little effect on the overall meaning. See Dahlhaus, Beethoven, 36-40.  
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The alienation we recognize in the Lebewohl motto reflects a phenomenon 
present in studies of sociology. For example, David Riesman, whose comments are 
telling of the prejudices of society and the feeling of alienation due to one’s culture 
and values, describes a similar phenomenon. The principle Riesman outlines is when 
an individual is either forced to conform to a certain social group’s expectations or 
else remain alienated from society: “[inner-directed types in the urban American 
environment] may refuse to adapt because of moral disapproval of what signals 
convey, or they may be discouraged by the fact that the signals, though inviting 
enough, do not seem meant for them.”158 The notion of alienation in society, and a 
parallel phenomenon of thematic alienation or dislocation, is an interesting one and 
Beethoven’s Lebewohl motto touches on a fundamental aspect of it. This particular 
passage from The Lonely Crowd [1961] describes the dichotomy between inner-
directed and other-directed types, where individuals feel alienated in society because 
they are unwilling to conform or are unable to relate to their environment. The 
“signals” that confront them are external stimuli, which draw attention to this feeling, 
e.g. events, communication, and conflict. These lead us to respond and act, in 
accordance with expectations of society or our own character (if these are at a 
variance with one another). One of the parallels we find with the Lebewohl motto is 
that we have difficulty when naming the structural significance of the motto; scholars 
call it a “motive,” “motto,” or “motivic argument,” but the formal labels that are 
applied to the motto do not grasp its two-fold significance as the inspiration of the 
first and second themes of the exposition, and importantly that it has a strong identity 
of its own. The feeling of alienation in the Lebewohl motto is taken even further when 
we reflect on its first announcement (Figure 2.11): Beethoven dictates the key of C 
minor in the second measure, but this key does not seem to fit the tone of the motto – 
it does not feel like the motto’s home key. The motto sounds unsettled in C minor, 
and gives the impression that even here, in its first announcement, it is not desired or 
where it is supposed to be. In this case, even the structure of the work dictates that the 
motto is an extraordinary exception: it echoes a sentiment of alienation in current 
society and of Beethoven’s own “farewell” to a friend who gave him a sense of 
belonging and financial security. The motto, in this way, foreshadows conflict and 
distress.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
158 David Riesman, with Nathan Glazer and Reuel Denny, The Lonely Crowd [1961] (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 2001), 33.  
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C3. Concluding remarks on external circumstances, experience, a life-moment, 
and the Lebewohl 
 
 Beethoven’s Lebewohl sonata is a work often used to discuss the relevance of 
biographical information with respect to meaning in a musical work. Through 
“external circumstances,” internalization, and experience [Erlebnis], we have outlined 
that these aspects from the composer’s perspective are important for an initial step in 
interpretation and understanding meaning in the sonata. First, we grasp this from the 
notion that Beethoven composed the sonata under the pretext that he was going to bid 
farewell to a friend, the Archduke Rudolph. Second, we turn interpretation toward an 
expression of experience that not only reflects aspects of Beethoven’s experience but 
also elements of meaningful content that we can perceive through reflection on our 
own experience. The Lebewohl sonata, and specifically the Lebewohl motto in the 
first movement, is meaningful for current audiences because it treats ideas that we can 
identify with; the sonata does not only represent meaning that is restricted to the 
historical time period when Beethoven composed the sonata and when the French 
army invaded Austria.  
 Through the notion of experience, we have outlined four distinct components 
of meaning in the first movement of the Lebewohl: (1) the sonata begins as though we 
were already immersed in thought; the sonata starts in medias res; (2) the Lebewohl 
motto expresses individuality through its ability to challenge the authority of 
traditionally “stronger” themes (such as the first and second themes of the 
exposition); (3) the confused and eerie characteristic of the Lebewohl motto sheds 
light on our expectation of specific musical material that follows our identification of 
music composed in a major or minor mode; (4) the Lebewohl motto expresses 
thematic alienation or dislocation because the motto appears to be alienated from the 
rest of the composition. This is due to its determined identity as a theme, its lack of an 
association with a major or minor key and thus seems not to have a home key. 
Furthermore, it is a theme that carries with it a history of reflection on the word 
“Lebewohl” and its significance for the performer as well as the listener. When we 
take into account Beethoven’s life-moment, the internalization of external 
circumstances, and experience, we find a greater relevance of meaning in the 
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Lebewohl sonata for current critical and performance interpretation as a vision of 
discord and alienation.    
* 
 
After considering these four points that are internal to the first movement of 
the Lebewohl sonata, we argue that the feeling of the Le-be-wohl motto permeates the 
work as a whole. Even in the final movement Das Wiedersehn: Vivacissimamente, 
although in E-flat major, the main theme recalls the triad that is voiced in the 
Lebewohl theme (in the alto accompanying voice see Figure 2.11, mm. 1–2). It is 
precisely because of the sound of a major third and a triad chord (both major and 
minor), in inversions, is characteristic of the motto. Further, the Le-be-wohl motto is 
by no means bound to a minor tonality (although the odd minor-sounding character, 
instigated by the C octave in m. 2, haunts the motto throughout) as we hear it voiced 
in B-flat major in the second group of the exposition. It is, in part, because the Le-be-
wohl motto is composed of certain building blocks of Western diatonic music 
(discussed in point 3 above) that we can even hear it (as though in variations) in the 
final movement of the sonata. The main theme of the final movement, which sounds 
at a vivacissimamente tempo, is understood to be in major from the start (see Figure 
2.14), even if it is clothed in a cautious piano dynamic. 
Figure 2.14 Ludwig van Beethoven, Sonata in E-flat Major, Op. 81a, “Lebewohl” or 
“Les Adieux” [The Farewell], mvmt. III, Vivacissimamente, [main theme], mm. 11-
20.159 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
159 Beethoven, The 35 Piano Sonatas Edited by Barry Cooper with fingerings by David Ward © 2007 
by The Associated Board of the Royal Schools of Music Reproduced by permission of ABRSM. 
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 The initial triad of the motif is the focal point of the vivacissimamente theme 
(Figure 2.14, m. 11). The only literal similarity between this theme and the Le-be-
wohl motto is the piano dynamic. But the vibrant intonation of the major triad in the 
last movement (Figure 2.14, m. 11) echoes the major third, perfect fifth, and major 
sixth intervals of the Le-be-wohl motto (Figure 2.11, mm. 1-2). The left hand behaves 
almost autonomously in the opening of the sonata’s introduction, coming across as 
though it arbitrarily chooses C minor (Figure 2.11, m. 2, beat 1) and moving 
chromatically thereafter (Figure 2.11, mm. 2-4); thus one of the strange moments of 
affinity between the last movement theme and the Le-be-wohl motto can be attributed 
to the “desired” key of the motto itself – the motto sounds as though it should be in 
major. 
 When we reach the coda of the final movement (Figure 2.15, mm. 176-7) 
marked Poco Andante, we are reminded again of the Le-be-wohl motto when 
Beethoven recalls the vivacissimamente theme. But this time the theme sounds even 
more like the Le-be-wohl motto because the theme is played poco andante and piano 
(in the first movement introduction the Le-be-wohl motto is played adagio, piano, and 
espressivo). It seems that here the coda taps into the fundamentally major sounding 
tonality of the Le-be-wohl motto. In the Poco Andante section, the theme is able to 
settle into a firm, and stable, major mode as a resting place; it gives the impression of 
being ultimately optimistic without the ambiguity of not knowing its home key or 
feeling alienated from the other musical parts. This is not a literal transportation of the 
Le-be-wohl motto into the coda, as the theme in Figure 2.14 and Figure 2.15 is not the 
same nor does it have identical rhythmic values or intervals. But it is a general 
similarity in the tonal gesture that pulls the languid and forlorn Le-be-wohl motto out 
of a haze of isolation and into the spotlight of the final movement’s coda. The doubt 
the Le-be-wohl motto inspires, with respect to the unknown (e.g. we do not really 
know if the theme is correctly heard as major or minor), is dissolved in the stability of 
E-flat major in the final movement (even if played at poco andante). 
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Figure 2.15 Ludwig van Beethoven, Sonata in E-flat Major, Op. 81a, “Lebewohl” or 




The Le-be-wohl motto, as an entity that expresses a deeper meaning within the 
sonata, is a characteristic tool in Beethoven’s compositional style. Yet the depth in 
Beethoven’s compositions is not consistently marked with explicit notation (i.e. the 
word “Lebewohl”) nor is deeper meaning found in accordance with analytical, 
thematic, and harmonic norms. When we reflect on our present example, on the 
surface what is most memorable is the simple Le-be-wohl motto that introduces itself 
with a humble and common word: Lebewohl [Farewell]. We find that this word, as a 
description of something, does not get at the deeper meaning, and for this reason we 
shift our interpretation toward what Schleiermacher identifies as internal 
circumstances. We recognize a myriad of characteristics in Beethoven’s Le-be-wohl 
motto: such as the melancholy that pervades the theme and the unstable harmonic 
progression when it is first introduced (Figure 2.11, mm. 1-2); the tender and intimate 
expression that emerges on one occasion when the motto ventures out, lonely at the 
top of the staff while the accompaniment slides through a soothing cello register161 
(see Figure 2.12); and the bittersweet Poco Andante theme that suggests the Le-be-
wohl motto’s initial anguish in such a deliberate way that it demands reflection on a 
synthesis of alienation and joyfulness while it throws off the chains of hyperactivity 
that is characteristic of a vivacissimamente tempo (Figure 2.14).  
These particular considerations do not render the determination of external 
circumstances fruitless. In fact, it is in the consideration of the departure of Archduke 
Rudolph that we recognize certain traits of Beethoven’s “inner being” in the 
composition. Individuality becomes apparent through the process of thinking and the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
160 Beethoven, The 35 Piano Sonatas Edited by Barry Cooper with fingerings by David Ward © 2007 
by The Associated Board of the Royal Schools of Music Reproduced by permission of ABRSM. 
161 In Figure 2.12, the final note of the second measure – B-flat1 – is one tone lower than the cello 
compositional register. The warmness of the theme’s register is so pronounced that it provides a 
successful illusion of a cello, despite this irregularity. 
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execution of ideas in the material medium of the score. This subsequently gives us the 
ability to discuss the “internal” component through our consideration of passages in 
the sonata. 
Schleiermacher offers another perspective for understanding “internal 
considerations,” which comes from a position of interpretation. We may know the 
“external circumstances” related to a specific event (e.g. the Archduke’s departure 
from Vienna), but we should try to understand the composer or author’s reflection on 
those events – or their interpretation of those events – in what we observe in the work.  
Schleiermacher depicts individuality through an example of two authors who write on 
the same subject (e.g., a journey taken together). These authors will necessarily 
represent the topic of the journey in different ways; the variances will depend on their 
individuality and “inner being,” their personal outlook, and other less tangible 
qualities that cannot be explained through the identification of external events or 
circumstances.162 From Schleiermacher’s example, we imagine that the evidence in a 
composition will range from more obvious aspects (e.g. a composition is written in a 
minor key, and so the composer is most likely portraying content that is sorrowful) to 
nuances in the details (e.g. Beethoven’s idiosyncrasies in notation). Czerny writes 
about a similar kind of phenomenon as Schleiermacher, but this time it is 
individuality in performance. Czerny’s example is an anecdote about interpretation, 
where Czerny compares the interpretation of a dramatic role to the interpretation of 
one of Beethoven’s sonatas. He writes: 
 
If several good actors had to represent the same character (as, for instance, 
Hamlet) each would differ from another in his conception of it, in many of 
the details. Thus, one would chiefly characterize melancholy, another irony, a 
third dissembled madness… and yet each of these representations may be 
perfectly satisfactory in its way, provided the general view be correct. So, in 
the performance of classical compositions, and especially in those of 
Beethoven, much depends on the individuality of the player; (who is 
presupposed to possess a certain degree of virtuosity; for, a stumbler cannot 
think of intellectual conception.) – Hence, one may principally cause humor 
to predominate, another earnestness, a third feeling, a fourth bravura, and so 
on; but he who is able to unite all these, is evidently the most talented.163 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
162 See Schleiermacher, Hermeneutics, 102 and 108 for a more detailed account. In this case I have 
fused two of Schleiermacher’s examples into one for the sake of clarity.  
163 Czerny, 118. This appears in a section within Czerny’s treatise on the proper performance of 
Beethoven’s sonatas entitled: “Concluding remarks: on the intellectual conception of Beethoven’s 
works.” 
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In the kind of interpretation Czerny describes, different pianists bring out divergent 
aspects of the composer’s individuality (as well as the performer’s own individuality) 
in performance. Czerny’s commentary alludes to the fact that a composition will 
contain a variety of musical gestures because a performance would be 
incomprehensible if a performer brought out humor, for instance, and there were no 
elements of humor in the composition. The performer then chooses what aspects to 
highlight in performance, or chooses not to highlight one aspect over another and thus 
present a balanced performance as a unified expression of disparate ideas (humor, 
earnestness, feeling, etc.). 
Within the framework of a composer’s internal and external circumstances, 
Schleiermacher asks: “What does the true, inner seed of the work, the decision in the 
life of the author mean?”164 With the Lebewohl sonata, we recognize that the external 
circumstances have a great deal of importance for the interpretation of the sonata as a 
whole165 as well as for theoretical and analytical considerations of the sonata. Even in 
Beethoven’s sketch of the sonata, where he clearly identifies the Archduke leaving 
Vienna,166 we deem the Lebewohl sonata illustrates a specific farewell, directed to one 
of the composer’s very close friends. The complexity of expression in the sonata 
(with detailed movement names, subtitles, and the Le-be-wohl motto) points to 
conceptual ideas contained in the music. These ideas do not necessarily need the 
identification of external circumstances (such as the departure of Beethoven’s friend 
Archduke Rudolph) for intelligibility. Knowledge of the external circumstances, 
however, does stabilize a direction in the expression and meaning of the whole. 
Unlike a song (e.g., the An die ferne Geliebte cycle, Op. 98), where the voice (with 
lyrics) usually has the role of articulating meaning in music, the Lebewohl sonata 
must convey meaning on its own (without additional lyrics). The Lebewohl sonata 
presents us with a case where external circumstances were clearly important to the 
composer; they occupy an uncommon presence in the sonata because of the 
movement titles and descriptions of those circumstances at the top of the page. 
Beethoven’s aesthetic decision to include descriptions of external circumstances for 
the movements’ headings injects an explicit notion of friendship throughout the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
164 Schleiermacher, Hermeneutics, 108. 
165 One example is to consider how to integrate the subtitles for each movement into performance.  
166 See Susan Kagen, Archduke Rudolph, Beethoven’s Patron, Pupil and Friend: His Life and Music 
(Stuyvesant: Pendragon Press, 1988), 15 and Cooper, Commentaries, Volume III, 9. 
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sonata. The headings do not fully convey what is meaningful in the music,167 and thus 
the listener and performer should contemplate additional dimensions of meaning in 
the work. Beethoven’s Lebewohl sonata becomes a reflection on a main idea of the 
Le-be-wohl motto – on isolation and alienation. The sonata expresses a secondary idea 
about Platonic friendship. It is with this method of interpretation of meaning that the 
work can speak beyond the confines of a narrative structure bound to Vienna, April 
1809, related to an event between Beethoven and the Archduke, and illustrate 




D. Introduction to the notion that a composition contains thoughts 
 
To grasp Schleiermacher’s understanding of thoughts, as found in a 
composition, we return to the dichotomy between Schleiermacher’s psychological and 
technical tasks of hermeneutics. Upon considering a free play of thoughts (as we find 
in conversation), which characterizes Schleiermacher’s “purely psychological” 
interpretation, versus the methodical and intentional approach that characterizes 
“technical” interpretation, Schleiermacher states:  
 
The relative opposition of the purely psychological and the technical can be 
grasped more distinctly in terms of the first being more concerned with the 
emergence of thoughts from the totality of the life-moments of the individual, 
the second being more a leading-back to a determinate wish to think and 
present, from which sequences develop.168 
  
Schleiermacher presents, on the one side, the “purely psychological,” which as 
interpretation that has an affiliation with the immediate, and thought arises almost 
spontaneously as a result of external circumstances or feelings. On the other side, the 
“technical,” Schleiermacher describes “a leading-back to a determinate wish to think 
and present.” With the “technical” kind of interpretation, we consider reflection or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
167 As Tovey writes of this sonata: “In the lower orders of sentimental journalism persons may be found 
to whom the true circumstances of this sonata are not romantic enough. But sane and manly friendships 
formed in schooldays and in the full of stress of life are fine subjects for Beethoven’s music,” Donald 
Francis Tovey, A Companion to Beethoven’s Pianoforte Sonatas (Bar-by-bar Analysis), revised edition 
(London: The Associated Board of the Royal Schools of Music, 1998), 188. 
168 Schleiermacher, Hermeneutics, 104. 
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thoughts that have developed through time. Schleiermacher clarifies this in the 
following way: 
 
The difference lies in the fact that the technical is the understanding of the 
meditation and of the composition, the psychological is the understanding of 
the ideas [Einfälle], among which the basic thoughts are also to be included, 
from which whole sequences develop, and is the understanding of secondary 
thoughts.169  
 
As is the case with many of Schleiermacher’s notions, we find that one definition 
often interferes with, or spills into, what is considered its complement. In the end, 
ideas [Einfälle] and basic thoughts are associated with the spontaneous and 
immediate. These “ideas” [Einfälle] are less formulated and consist of generalized 
notions that point to a thought, or multiple thoughts. We find that Schleiermacher 
aims at describing a process in the “psychological” task with a goal to find the 
genesis, the source, and the beginning of an idea and its general outline. This way of 
thinking incorporates a vision of the creative process where rough, fragmentary, and 
cursory thoughts are seen as content; this content is then worked out and put on 
display in a finished work. The end result is (previously disparate) content in the form 
of a determined thought that we render intelligible linguistically in our description of 
a work and its meaning.  
 
 
 D1. Meditation – Composition; Boundness  
 
The creative process – exemplified through the working out of ideas (or 
“meditation”) on the one hand, and the composition as the end result on the other – is 
at the heart of the “technical” component within the psychological task of 
hermeneutics. Schleiermacher discusses the moment that precedes the transition from 
meditation to a “final” composition in the following way:  
 
As soon as someone wants to bring something to consciousness with a free 
decision, a free deed, which are here the same then he is immediately 
compelled to follow a method. But this will differ depending on whether the 
person asks himself in his self-determination: how can I manage thoroughly 
to research the object, or asks: how do I move what I have thought through in 
a certain direction and how do I represent it for certain people?170 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
169 Schleiermacher, Hermeneutics, 104. 
170 Schleiermacher, Hermeneutics, 105. 
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The artist’s thought process, as imagined by Schleiermacher, might be an inaccurate 
picture of an individual’s creative process. Schleiermacher, nevertheless, manages to 
portray a principle of that is often present in current aesthetic theories: in great art 
there is generally a higher idea that fuels the creation and imagination behind that 
artwork. According to Schleiermacher, the artist (author or composer) knows to 
follow a method in order to intelligibly represent thought. The artist also considers an 
audience for whom the object is made for. (From the perspective of Schleiermacher’s 
grammatical task, we assume “certain people” is an audience comprised of the artist’s 
contemporaries and, importantly, these individuals should be able to understand the 
work.) If we examine the artist’s process, as described by Schleiermacher, meditation 
and reflection is only the beginning of the method. Meditation and reflection give way 
to a composition; meditation thereby “can only from time to time hold onto the 
decision in a passive manner, so that it is only occasionally effective, and then the 
composition, the linking of the particulars into a whole, is postulated as a second 
act.”171 On the one hand, the creative process has a particular shape for 
Schleiermacher – the creative process includes stages that incorporate artists’ answers 
to questions they may pose before their artwork at different moments during the 
composition of a given work. (This might be evident in a physical form, if there are 
drafts of the work in question, and/or other documentation related to the creation of a 
work, for example, letters or diary entries that treat aspects of that unfinished work.) 
These stages reflect a sequence in meditation, with the fine-tuning of an idea, concept, 
or thought that should arise172 from the finished work.173 On the other hand, 
Schleiermacher defines meditation as an “invisible territory” where “it is difficult to 
say what and how the author thought about this or that object for every object can be 
pursued in differing ways. Here we are in the invisible territory of meditation, where 
it is also a question of knowing what the writer also rejected even though it emerged 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
171 Schleiermacher, Hermeneutics, 105. 
172 The notion that a thought should “arise” from a work means to say that an idea or thought may not 
be immediately understood, or obvious. Through time and study, the thought or idea will become 
perceptible as though arising from the work with clarity. This is related to the concept of intuition, 
where we may sense strangeness in a work, however we may not necessarily understand the work’s 
meaning immediately. The thought that arises should answer, at least in part, some of the timeless 
questions of hermeneutics: What is the meaning of the work? What does the work “say?” 
173 Schleiermacher writes: “it is true that the task of understanding the meditation is dependent on the 
understanding of the composition. But we have put the former first for a good reason, because we only 
understand the composition genetically via the knowledge of the whole meditation. The opposite only 
occurs in relation to the secondary thoughts, for these only emerge in the composition.”  
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from the basic thought.”174 The notion behind Schleiermacher’s determination of an 
“invisible territory” stands on the premise that all of the author’s thoughts about a 
topic, or a series of thoughts that gave rise to the finalized thought found in a work, 
have importance for interpretation. The thoughts are invisible in the sense that one 
might not be able to locate them within the work in its final state, nor in the drafts or 
other supplementary material used to understand a work from a genetic approach.  
The “invisible territory” is only perceptible in sketches and drafts, where we 
can locate traces of thoughts contemporary with the principal thought of the work. 
The fundamental constraints of form on the creative impulse can be understood as a 
force; Schleiermacher determines that constraints of form, and how these constraints 
inspire an artist’s creativity, is the origin of an individual artist’s creative “boundness” 
[Gebundenheit] to the form they utilize for their composition. Boundness presents 
certain limits and normative expectations for content. According to this idea, an 
individual must trim away excesses of thought in order to accommodate form. As 
Schleiermacher determines, each form has “its own laws” that restrict a free flow of 
thought and creation to a particular shape and presentation. In the case of music, these 
are “laws” such as the characteristics of sonata form, definitions of an instrument’s 
capabilities, and other rules of composition that fit more appropriately in a 
“grammatical” interpretation.175 Bu with respect to the psychological task of 
hermeneutics, Schleiermacher finds that form can give rise to specific determinations 
of content: 
 
The more firmly and vividly the form is imprinted in the original impulse, the 
less those elements will develop which admittedly belong to the content. The 
content is determined by the form in its unity and fullness. . . . If the form is 
imprinted with a certain vividness in the impulse, then inappropriate thoughts 
cannot occur at all to the writer either. If they occur to him, so that he has to 
eliminate them, then he has not reached the highest degree of completion.176  
 
 
Schleiermacher’s position inspires us to imagine that a finished work actually 
reflects truncated content. This presupposes that inappropriate thoughts (that are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
174 Schleiermacher, Hermeneutics, 132. 
175 It is in moments like this that we understand that the “grammatical” and “psychological” tasks of 
hermeneutic explication are not divorced from one another, but wholly relate and aid in the activities of 
the other. For the sake of clarity, I have outlined specific activities that pertain more to one task than 
the other, as certain directions in interpretation speak more to one task than the other. 
176 Schleiermacher, Hermeneutics, 140. 
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misleading or irrelevant to the subject) are important to set a work’s “highest degree 
of completion.” In appropriate thoughts are necessary for the formulation of one 
coherent thought, which is expressed in the final composition. The notion of 
“inappropriate thoughts,” or thoughts that stray from the overall meaning of the work, 
is a way to name the thoughts that were put into a composition in the process of 
composing it. These “inappropriate” thoughts contribute to an organic “fullness” in 
the finished content; the “inappropriate” or superfluous thoughts, apparently 
contradictory to the dominant tenor of the whole, actually contribute to a unique 
vision and may even offer insight into perplexing passages.  
When we consider a great work of art, its form often looks effortless; the form 
will give the impression that it functions seamlessly with the content. Thereby the 
boundness of form on thought, and creativity, should not necessarily be considered an 
imposition or hindrance that restricts a composition. The form of a work may actually 
reveal the genius or individuality of the composer because of the way the composer 
defies form, or composes within the confines of form in such a skillful way that the 
form does not call attention to itself as what inhibits a creative angle. In the case of 
Beethoven, we recognize innovations with respect to form like the elongation of 
classical-era sonata form. One assumes that the new shape Beethoven gives to form is 
able to express more fully the entire content and ideas of a work.177 The challenges 
Beethoven imposed on the “rules” of form contributed to many ideas and thoughts 
that are illustrated in his music and notation. We can observe this most readily in 
works that present great difficulty for interpreters (e.g. Sonata in B-flat Major, Op. 
106, “Hammerklavier,” and the Große Fuge, Op. 133). From the perspective of a 
flexible form in art, which yields to the fancy of the creative impulse, we now turn to 





 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
177 The “Hammerklavier” sonata, Op. 106, is only one example of many where Beethoven altered a 
relatively standard compositional form. Beethoven also looked to expand the compositional range of 
the instruments he composed for. Notice, for example in the Sonata in A Major, Op. 101, where 
Beethoven has written a low E (E1) in the last movement of the piano sonata, and marks it by writing 
“contra E” in the score. 
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E. Thoughts and Ideas 
 
As mentioned above, when we consider the final version of a composition, we 
should also reflect on the meditation that gave rise to the work. Schleiermacher’s 
concept of meditation in hermeneutics inevitably points to the “psychological,” or 
thoughts and ideas, as a point of departure. Schleiermacher reveals this when he states 
two crucial components of the “psychological” task:  
 
The one aspect is the understanding of the whole basic thought of the work, 
the other is the comprehension of the individual parts of the work via the life 
of the author. . . . The first task is therefore the unity of the work as a fact in 
the life of its author. The question is how the author arrived at the thought 
from which the whole developed.178  
 
Schleiermacher’s “whole basic thought” outwardly determines a direction in 
understanding and explication, while its definition is partially a result of external and 
internal circumstances. Schleiermacher’s hermeneutics proposes an investigation into 
how these circumstances operate together, and how these circumstances form the 
pieces of a coherent background picture that is complementary to the main thought or 
principal meaning of a given work. We can imagine this with relation to our earlier 
example of the Lebewohl sonata, where the meaning or “main thought” of the sonata 
can be easily traced to events that took place in Beethoven’s life. (This is, for 
example, what provides support for interpretations like Charles Rosen’s “horn call” – 
the three-note Le-be-wohl motto – in the introduction and its presence in the 
movement; Rosen describes this in the following way: “The motto is present 
throughout the exposition in all forms and all rhythms: it is the tissue out of which the 
cloth is woven. The nervous rhythm, the growing dissonance, and the constantly 
changing texture represent the agitation of the departure and the anxiety of the coming 
absence.”179)  
Meditation in Schleiermacher’s hermeneutics provides another crucial 
perspective in the genesis and crystallization of thoughts; and it alternatively sheds 
light on how we can understand thoughts in a composition. We return again to the 
“invisible territory of meditation”: 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
178 Schleiermacher, Hermeneutics, 107. 
179 Charles Rosen, Beethoven’s Piano Sonatas: A Short Companion (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 2002), 203.  
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It is difficult to say what and how the author thought about this or that object, 
for every object can be pursued in differing ways. Here we are in the 
invisible territory of meditation, where it is also a question of knowing what 
the writer also rejected even though it emerged from the basic thought. Each 
text has its particular genetic sequence and what is original in it is the order 
in which the individual thoughts are thought. But the order can perhaps be a 
different one when they are communicated. 
 
In most cases, even with extant drafts of works, it is difficult to determine a 
development in thought; furthermore, to recover “rejected” thoughts also seems like 
an unrealistic goal. Not only does Schleiermacher’s hermeneutics want us to locate 
one basic thought that unites a composition, but it also instructs us to find the process 
of thought. To do this, we should piece together of what clues the author or composer 
has left behind; this task inherently involves a certain degree of one’s own speculation 
regarding the original sequence of thought behind a particular work. We recognize the 
fragility of this task, as we begin to question how faithful our speculation is to the 
actual work.  
By the same token, a great deal of supplementary information might exist 
around a particular composition that we can use for a discussion of meditation. There 
may even be cases where the meditation is explicit in the final work. A case in point 
of an explicit rejection of a thought, and a genetic sequence of thought, is located on 
the title of page of Beethoven’s Symphony No. 3 in E-flat Major, Op. 55 (“Eroica”). 
Barry Cooper relates the infamous story of the idea, or concept, behind the symphony. 
(In Schleiermacher’s vocabulary, this is a re-telling of external and internal 
circumstances around Beethoven’s decision to compose the symphony):  
 
From an early stage Beethoven intended to dedicate the work to Napoleon 
Bonaparte, whom he perceived as a champion of freedom, supreme leader, 
and latter-day hero – perhaps even a modern Prometheus. The work may 
even have been inspired by Napoleon from the outset. . . . Beethoven’s pupil 
Ferdinand Ries, however, was a generally reliable witness, and his account of 
Beethoven’s early intentions for the symphony rings true. He reports seeing a 
score of the symphony (probably the autograph score, now lost), in which the 
title page had the name Buonaparte (the Italian form of Bonaparte’s name) at 
the very top and “Luigi van Beethoven” at the foot, with a huge blank space 
between. Ries himself then brought Beethoven the news that Napoleon had 
proclaimed himself emperor, at which Beethoven flew into a rage and 
shouted: “Is he then, too, nothing more than an ordinary human being? Now 
he, too, will trample on all human rights and indulge only his ambition. He 
will exalt himself above all others, become a tyrant!”. . . . Beethoven then 
tore up the title page of the symphony and flung it to the floor. Although this 
score does not survive, a manuscript copy supervised by Beethoven and with 
his annotations is preserved in Vienna; originally it bore the heading “Grand 
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Symphony entitled Buonaparte,” but the name “Buonaparte” has been so 
vigorously deleted that there is a hole in the paper.180 
   
The crossing out of Napoleon’s name shows, in a visual way, a progression in 
Beethoven’s thought with respect to the meaning of the symphony. By removing 
“Buonaparte,” the symphony is no longer restricted to an interpretation that would 
inevitably mention Napoleon. Instead, the symphony is opened up to wide-ranging 
explanations related to its description “Eroica.” The symphony is able to illustrate 
characteristics of a hero, or heroic virtue; the symphony can represent an appeal an 
ideal, rather than only illustrate a specific moment in history. Beethoven’s previous 
belief about Napoleon, that he was a “champion of freedom, supreme leader and 
latter-day hero,” helps to qualify some of the content of the work. When we encounter 
perplexing passages in the symphony, Beethoven’s previously held belief about 
Napoleon might offer an explanation. Despite the evidence that the idea of Napoleon 
is present in an initial way (as “original” to the sequence of thought), the decision 
Beethoven made to eliminate one specific element of the original thought, and replace 
it with a less-specified notion of “hero,” grants the work a seminal quality. The work 
is thereby not necessarily bound to the age it was created in, but stands on its own as 
the expression of an ideal. 
The argument that Napoleon was the “original” main thought in Beethoven’s 
“Eroica” symphony leads us to contemplate the characteristics of the main thought: 
freedom, a hero, and the myth of Prometheus.181 When we investigate the “Eroica” 
symphony in depth, nevertheless, we notice additional elements that suggest another 
thought or aim toward a particular expression. These elements are ones such as those 
discussed in Part I of this thesis, where Beethoven uses dolce indications in a curious 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
180 Ludwig van Beethoven, Symphonie Nr. 3 in Es / Symphony No. 3 in E-flat major “Eroica,” Op. 55, 
Urtext edited by Jonathan Del Mar (Kassel: Bärenreiter, 1999), iii. Cooper continues to tell the story, 
“When [Beethoven] offered the symphony to Breitkopf & Härtel in August 1804, he stated that its title 
was really Bonaparte, adding with masterly understatement, ‘I think it will interest the musical 
public’.… Eventually, however, Beethoven’s misgivings about Napoleon’s ambitions led him to call 
the work simply ‘Sinfonia eroica,’” iv. Embedded citations are from Elliot Forbes, Thayer’s Life of 
Beethoven [1967], 349 and Emily Anderson, The Letters of Beethoven [1961], no. 96, respectively. 
181 This corresponds with Barry Cooper’s reading, and is supported by the fact that the “Eroica” 
symphony was composed during the same period as Beethoven’s Creatures of Prometheus, Op. 43 
(composed 1801), and the presence of the Prometheus theme in the “Eroica.” Kinderman writes of the 
“Eroica” Finale (Fourth movement), Allegro molto: “In the finale, the association with Prometheus 
becomes clear through the reuse of the theme from the ballet” Kinderman, Beethoven,102. Scholars 
also argue that there is other symbolism that supports connections with the Prometheus myth in the 
symphony, see Kinderman, 101-106. 
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way in the exposition at the beginning of the second group of the “Eroica.”182 These 
elements, as expressed in the notation and sounding quality, give rise to an intuition 
that within those passages there is meaning, and thought, beyond an original main 
thought related to Napoleon. 
 
E1. Secondary ideas  
 
Schleiermacher’s secondary ideas come into play when we identify different 
kinds of thoughts within the same work. Secondary ideas facilitate understanding 
when we have the intuition that a passage contains meaning, but that meaning is 
incongruous with the main idea or thought of the work. To identify secondary ideas is 
just as vigorous a task as recognizing a main idea. This is the case all the more so 
because we cannot automatically assume that a work contains secondary aims or 
ideas: 
 
Purely artistic production is altered by every other kind of direction, the task 
arises of finding it if it is present. In general the question is: how does one 
find the subjective secondary aims in the various genres and areas of 
composition? One may never directly presuppose such a secondary aim, for a 
hint of it would have already to arise from the text itself.183 
 
Schleiermacher’s uses of the word “altered” with respect to “purely artistic 
production,” as though a work becomes damaged and compromised when faced with 
additional (potentially superfluous) thoughts and influences. The “direction” 
secondary ideas provide for a composition is one of depth and complexity, and it is 
not one of incoherence and detour. Secondary ideas show another side of the author or 
composer in the sense that a composition will present multiple ideas, and contain a lot 
of information, which will offer more insight into meaning. There is one characteristic 
difficulty involved with secondary ideas, which is simply to figure out whether two 
ideas function independently in a work or whether one idea is subordinate and 
dependent on the other. (This is the case when a secondary idea is a refraction of the 
main idea and does not present an entirely different kind of thought.) Schleiermacher 
writes that “the main thoughts are connected in a precise manner to the penetration of 
material and form, the secondary thoughts are not. . . . The determinacy of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
182 One of the secondary themes of the movement, as discussed by Hepokoski and Darcy, Elements of 
Sonata Theory, 143-145. 
183 Schleiermacher, Hermeneutics, 115. 
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relationship [between main and secondary thoughts] essentially belongs to the unity 
of the work and determines its character.”184 From Schleiermacher’s statements, we 
can conclude that a main thought will appear as though its message is intimately 
bound up with the medium, form, and content. Secondary ideas are not as closely 
related to the creative impulse and the imposition of form – they reside in the details 
and development of a work’s content.  Secondary thoughts may even “take up 
relatively equal space”185 in a work as a main thought. 
When we examine this dichotomy in Schleiermacher’s theory, we notice, on 
the one hand, that a main thought imprints a certain identity on a work and represents 
a concrete moment or thought. On the other hand, secondary ideas have a greater 
freedom to appear in a series of works without exhausting their meaning. This is 
partially a result of their meaning, which may not being wholly formed in the first 
place. Consequently we can consider a series of works, which have a similar thread of 
meaning that stays in the background, as continuity in thought.  
When we analyze different passages where Schleiermacher discusses 
secondary ideas, we are able to conclude the following arguments: (1) secondary 
ideas are not more prominent in a work than a main idea or thought; (2) secondary 
ideas are generally intelligible from the perspective that an author or composer is not 
trying to trick or deceive their audience, but rather present secondary ideas intelligibly 
by utilizing a common ground of experience or knowledge to do so;186 (3) secondary 
ideas or thoughts are seen principally to pertain to the meditation and not the 
composition of a work – these ideas may have occurred to the composer but were 
deemed not to pertain to the principal reason or thought behind the work, where “the 
real value of secondary thoughts must be recognized from the characteristic by which 
they are also distinguished from what resulted from the act of will” (we understand 
“the act of will” to refer namely to the main thought and the composer’s decision to 
compose the work in question);187 (4) secondary thoughts or ideas arise from the 
author’s life (which is to say from within a progression) and generally occur 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
184 Schleiermacher, Hermeneutics, 116. 
185 Schleiermacher, Hermeneutics, 116. 
186 This notion is taken primarily from Schleiermacher’s discussion of conversation and secondary 
thoughts that arise in conversation and rhapsodic-like texts. For Schleiermacher, in this context, 
secondary thoughts should not appear “puzzling” to readers: “secondary thoughts are only ever taken 
from an area shared by the writer and the readers, from an area where the writer can presuppose that it 
can be made just as easily present to his readers as it is to him.” Schleiermacher, Hermeneutics, 129.  
187 Schleiermacher, Hermeneutics, 131. 
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throughout the individual’s life as a continuous meditation on topics, themes, or 
concepts of interest (they have a continual influence on the author and appear 
consistently in multiple works).188   
From these arguments, the most salient point we take away is that secondary 
thoughts do not necessarily refer to a concrete concept, but suggest something that the 
author or composer was thinking about. The influence of secondary thoughts must be 
great enough for a composer to include certain gestures or components in a work, 
even if the content remains less pronounced than the principal idea. Due to an 
economy of thought, and the boundness of form, the elements of a composition that 
suggest a secondary thought or idea should support the claim that secondary ideas do 
not try to “trick” or “deceive” an audience. The influence of a secondary thought or 
idea should come through a composition in a specific light, graspable by an audience 
through the recognition that its meaning is not the principal expression of the work 
but, nonetheless, it is important for the fabric of the composition.  
We can examine this in a parallel phenomenon within sonata form, namely 
when a composer presents a cantabile second theme in the exposition; the audience 
recognizes this theme not as a foreign entity that threatens the balance of the first 
theme-second theme dichotomy associated with classical sonata form. A second 
theme usually presents a new and complementary direction of expression for the 
sonata as a whole. We can even experience the play between main ideas and 
secondary ideas within the same musical passage. Let us examine an example from 
















 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
188 See citation above, Schleiermacher, Hermeneutics, 106. 
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Figure 2.16 Ludwig van Beethoven, Sonata in C Minor, Op. 13 (“Grande Sonate 




The Adagio cantabile of the “Pathétique,” is set within a pleasant A-flat major 
tonality. From this major mode haven, we recognize a characteristic dichotomy 
between the left hand and the right hand (see Figure 2.16, mm. 1-8), and this 
dichotomy makes itself heard throughout the entire movement. Beethoven has written 
a very “singing” or “song-like” melody (especially Figure 2.16, mm. 1-3 and the 
downbeat of m. 4) that is smooth, simple, and comforting after the final fortissimo 
punches of the sonata’s exposition. The reserved joy in these first measures of the 
Adagio cantabile constitutes a main idea in the movement. The uplifting quality of 
this theme is expressed literally when Beethoven transposes it one octave higher (see 
Figure 2.16, mm. 9-10, and this theme continues until m. 16 [not pictured]). The 
secondary idea of this movement is perceptible to the performer the moment they 
attempt to play the first measures of the Adagio cantabile – Beethoven has presented 
us with a strong bass theme that runs the entire length of the soprano voice melody, 
and it is arguably more beautiful than the soprano melody. (Although it may appear 
counterintuitive, the bass theme illustrates the beauty of harmony, which is often 
overlooked and is rarely heard on its own; the performers who play and sing harmony 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
189 Beethoven, The 35 Piano Sonatas Edited by Barry Cooper with fingerings by David Ward © 2007 
by The Associated Board of the Royal Schools of Music Reproduced by permission of ABRSM. 
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voices recognize the startling and understated elegance of certain harmony parts that 
usually go unnoticed by a general audience.)  
There are two arguments that come readily to the forefront when we consider 
this passage – the former scratches the surface with respect to the complexity of the 
passage, and the latter digs deeper into the significance of the voices: (1) it is 
undeniably a difficult task to achieve a lyrical balance when performing these 
opposing themes in the soprano and bass voices – not only must the performer strike a 
balance between these two outer voices, but the sixteenth-note accompaniment figures 
are played by the thumbs in both hands (this naturally causes the tenor and alto voices 
to sound louder unless the performer uses a skilled technique to give more weight to 
the weakest fingers in both hands [see Figure 2.16, mm. 9-10]); (2) the outer voices 
are exemplary of graceful cantabile themes and yet Beethoven clouds our perception 
of these voices with the metronome-like pounding of the thumbs of both hands. 
Although the alto voice is sometimes absent from the accompaniment, the tenor voice 
in this passage is consistent and reliable (see Figure 2.16, mm. 1-8). The tenor voice 
insists in a way that mirrors the voice in our mind that reminds us of a menial task we 
must do while we are in the midst of something important (e.g. when we are giving a 
lecture on a particularly thorny subject and the thought “I have to do laundry” keeps 
popping into our mind).  
The indomitable bass theme challenges the beauty and authority of the 
soprano melody, which is charming in its own right; for this reason the bass theme 
expresses the secondary idea of this movement. It proves itself as a secondary idea in 
accordance with Schleiermacher’s theory, as it crops up again in many of Beethoven’s 
works. This is not to say that the actual bass theme from the Adagio cantabile, as a 
leitmotif of sorts, shows up in other compositions as though making a guest 
appearance. Instead, this passage serves as a model of a compositional effect where 
Beethoven introduces two opposing and stunning themes concurrently that seem to 
challenge the importance of one another. Outside of the “Pathétique,” we also find 
this effect in Beethoven’s Sonata in C-sharp Minor “Quasi una fantasia,” Op. 27, no. 
2 (“Moonlight”) in the first movement where the bass voice has as much influence on 
the meaning of the sonata as the soprano melody (see Figure 2.17, m. 5). 
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Figure 2.17 Ludwig van Beethoven, Sonata in C-sharp Minor, Quasi una fantasia, 




The meaning of thoughts and ideas, according to Schleiermacher’s theory, is 
not meant to “deceive.” It is unintuitive for a composer to wish the meaning of their 
composition to be muddled in its very expression. Secondary thoughts or ideas are 
tools for judging coherence in a composer’s oeuvre by way of tracing the presence of 
a secondary thought through one or several works. It is in this way that a work of 
music is able to attain a depth of meaning that transcends normative structure and 
traditional analysis. The meaning and significance of these ideas is found in each 
composition respectively. Recourse to biographical information asserts the presence 
of certain events that had an impact on a composer’s life and compositions (as in the 
cases of the Lebewohl sonata and the “Eroica” symphony). We find deeper meaning 
and significance when we go beyond what a composition may wear on its sleeve or 
what may be most evident in biographical content. As we explored in the 
“Pathétique” sonata, depth of expression, seen through the lens of Schleiermacher’s 
secondary ideas, is most profound in our examination of the material of the 
composition and what the composition says in its own vocabulary. Our ability to 
interpret that vocabulary can be articulated in Schleiermacher’s method of the 
grammatical and psychological tasks of hermeneutics. Schleiermacher’s hermeneutics 
helps us determine the way Beethoven’s compositions have meaning for us, and thus 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
190 Beethoven, The 35 Piano Sonatas Edited by Barry Cooper with fingerings by David Ward © 2007 
by The Associated Board of the Royal Schools of Music Reproduced by permission of ABRSM. 
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have significance beyond Beethoven’s original audience. By the same token, the 
meaning in Beethoven’s compositions is not limited to a specific period or analytical 
structure, but can speak to us in terms of the recognition of content that has a timeless 
quality and touches on certain universal experiences.    
  




After we determine that a thought or idea is present in any number of 
Beethoven’s complex passages, we can go on to form an understanding of what a 
particular musical work may be about. In this case we may refer to Schleiermacher’s 
one higher concept, a notion that offers coherence to all main ideas and subsidiary or 
secondary ideas.191 One higher concept can guide the grammatical and psychological 
tasks of hermeneutics, and grant intelligibility to complex as well as more transparent 
ideas in a work. In Beethoven’s case, the one higher concept of a work, in addition to 
methodical, critical activity required to attain this level of understanding, resonates 
with A. B. Marx’s musical Idee (A. B. Marx’s Idee will be discussed in more detail in 
Part III of this dissertation). 
The kind of understanding that deviates from a normative, theoretical structure 
– an understanding of music that focuses on expression and the expression of ideas 
through notation, performance, and critical activity – is present throughout Czerny’s 
discussions of Beethoven’s works (in On the Proper Performance of All Beethoven’s 
Works for Piano) and also in Schnabel’s edition of Beethoven’s sonatas for piano.192 
We observe this in Czerny and Schnabel’s respective descriptions of the expression 
needed to perform a particular passage: Czerny describes the second theme of the 
“Appassionata,” saying that “the theme may appear as legato and cantabile, as if … 
performed by two hands”193 and Schnabel adds additional expressive word cues for 
the entrance of the second theme – pp dolce non espress;194 Beethoven, nevertheless, 
made no mention in the score specifically in the direction these authors have 
described. Czerny and Schnabel provide performance instructions that reflect an 
interpretative activity that accounts for both the grammatical and psychological tasks 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
191 “One higher concept” appears in Schleiermacher, Hermeneutics, 69. 
192 Schnabel’s edition from Edizioni Curci, S.R.L., Milan, 1949 and reprinted by Alfred. 
193 Czerny, 59. Czerny introduces this sonata as a composition that should be “regarded as the most 
complete development of a powerful and colossal idea. The same physical and mental powers which 
the player has had to develop in the performance of most of the Sonatas … must be here displayed in a 
two-fold degree,” Czerny, 58. 
194 See Schnabel, Beethoven: Complete Piano Sonatas in Two Volumes: Historic Edition with Preface 
in English, Spanish, Italian, German, and French, Artur Schnabel, ed., Milan: Edizioni Curci, S.R.L., 
1949 [reprinted by Alfred USA – Van Nuys: Alfred Publishing Co, n.d.], volume II, 137. It is curious 
that in Schnabel’s edition, Schnabel does not include the heading “Appassionata” for this work. 
Although Beethoven did not originally give this title to the work, it is most familiar to audiences by 
this name. 
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of Schleiermacher’s hermeneutics. It is important to note with respect to Czerny and 
Schnabel’s suggestions for performance, they do not advocate that the performer 
should re-tell an extra-musical narrative in their performance. Their instructional 
comments suggest a thought that should be recognized within the musical 
construction of a passage and consequently how the passage should be played. 
When we use the notion of thought, rather than narrative, we find that a work 
can be understood on a conceptual level, as exemplified by the “Eroica” symphony. 
The sequence of a thought and the expression of this thought equally contribute to the 
work’s meaning and its universal or timeless aspect. When we find a work aims to 
express truth or ideas,195 which can be understood beyond a historical period, this 
renders a sphere of meanings intelligible that can include narrative devices. The truth 
or idea that the “Eroica” symphony puts forward eventually becomes something that 
is not particular to Beethoven (although it is represented in his work). But Beethoven 
touched on something timeless in the process of bringing the symphony into being (in 
the creative process and especially in Beethoven’s decision about the final subtitle of 
the symphony). 
We can turn this same vision toward secondary ideas in the context of 
Beethoven’s expressive notation, e.g. Beethoven’s use of the term dolce in a number 
of passages. The thought behind these passages is not only Beethoven’s innovation to 
expand the definition of the term dolce in musical notation, but these passages also 
reveal deeper meaning that is contained in their sonorous representations. 
Beethoven’s utilization of expressive word cues in a unique way strives toward 
illustrating an ideal, and challenges our previous understanding of a set of terms from 
musical notation and our assumptions about the sonorous quality of expressive 
passages.   
At the same time there is a need for critical discretion with respect to the 
explication and determination of ideas when we follow Schleiermacher’s theory of 
hermeneutics. In this sense, we return to the notion of the “art” of hermeneutics. The 
“art” of hermeneutics dictates when too much biographical information is at the heart 
of our understanding of a particular work, or if one is projecting an overwhelming 
degree of speculation, which can render the truth of the object mute. We can see this 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
195 This is a notion of truth, of content that does not have historical limits imposed on its ability to be 
understood; it is something we understand only by displacing ourselves from a “historical standpoint” 
or from a historical reading of a work. See Gadamer, Truth and Method, 302-3, and understanding 
from a perspective of an unclosed horizon. 
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occur in the Lebewohl sonata: Beethoven may have written that sonata about 
Archduke Rudolph, but the truth and meaning of the work is often quieted, or 
becomes secondary, to a narrative explanation. The elements that contribute to the 
work’s timeless quality are then welded unrecognizably into a narrative structure in 
order to support a claim about “Beethoven’s genuine sense of loss”196 rather than 
constitute a more independent meaning of isolation and alienation that is specific to 
the composition. In this chapter, we have defended various illustrations in the sonata 
of a “timeless” feeling of alienation rather than try to describe Beethoven’s feeling of 
alienation after the Archduke departed from Vienna in 1809.  
When we attempt to understand a composer’s thought, and the language or 
medium used to present that thought (in order to create a level of empathy between 
ourselves and the work at hand), it is helpful to have an “insider’s” understanding of 
how works in that genre are composed. From this “insider’s” perspective, it is 
generally easier to recognize why certain rules of composition are necessary 
(understood from practical experience) and when breaking of certain rules determines 
genius rather than error. The similarities between Schleiermacher and A. B. Marx in 
this respect are strong. A. B. Marx’s didactic approach to composition suggests that a 
good composer is an individual who knows basic rules, but also understands how 
music has an ability to express ideas and speak in elevated terms with respect to the 
spirit. It is in this direction that we shall explore A. B. Marx’s Idee from a background 





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
196 See Kagan, Archduke Rudolph, 15. 
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A. B. Marx’s Idee: Ideal Content and the Material of Music 
 
 
 In Ludwig van Beethoven: Life and Works (1859), Marx undertakes a lengthy 
discussion of Beethoven’s “Eroica” Symphony (Op. 55) and ideal music. Marx 
unexpectedly shifts the focus of his study and questions his own theory of musical 
expression. A pessimistic interlocutor comes to the podium and poses arguments held 
by many disparagers of musical aesthetics. The interlocutor is clearly exasperated, 
voicing two objections one after the other: 
 
Setting aside the program and all peripheral verbiage, where finally are the 
music’s means for determinate expression? Leaving the authority of the artist 
out of the picture, how should we others understand their expression? 197 
 
 Marx readily dispels these remarks. As though defending the foundation of his 
texts against incomprehension and future condemnation, the theorist offers an olive 
branch for critics by telling them how they can uncover musical meaning on their 
own: 
 
We must respond: direct your search to art—to its material, the sounds, 
chords, tonal relations…, rhythms! Take to this task all the aids of simile, 
symbolism, psychological coherence, all these spiritual guidelines that no 
artist and no person can do without!198 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
197 Adolf Bernhard Marx, Musical Form in the Age of Beethoven: Selected Writings on Theory and 
Method, ed. and trans. Scott Burnham (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 178. Original: 
Ludwig van Beethoven: Leben und Schaffen, Erster Band (Berlin: Otto Janke, 1859), 286.  
198 Adolf Bernhard Marx, Musical Form in the Age of Beethoven: Selected Writings on Theory and 
Method, 178-179, italics mine, translation slightly modified. The original reads: 
 “Wo sind aber endlich, das Programm und alle Nebenreden bei Seite gesetzt, die Mittel der Musik für 
bestimmten Ausdruck? Wie sollen wir Andern, die Autorität der Künstler einmal aus dem Spiel 
gelassen, ihren Ausdruck verstehn? – 
 Wir müssen antworten: Forschet in der Kunst! In ihrem Material. den Schallen, Klängen, 
Tonverhältnissen (ein Paar Buchstaben aus ihrer Sprache sind hier schon zum Vorschein gekommen). 
Rhythmen! Nehmt dazu die Hülfsmittel des Gleichnisses, der Symbolik, des psychologischen 
Zusammenhangs, all’ die geistigen Lenkfäden, deren kein Künstler, kein Mensch entrathen kann!” 
Ludwig van Beethoven: Leben und Schaffen, Erster Band (Berlin: Otto Janke, 1859), 286. Although, 
“psychological coherence” [des psychologischen Zusammenhangs] in the original appears in the 
genitive case, it seems Marx is making a list of skills or critical exercises one should undertake. As 
simile [des Gleichnisses] is also written in the genitive, we view psychological coherence also in this 
same sequence as one of Marx’s “aids.” The modifications I have made to Burnham’s translation are: 
(1) to use the word “symbolism” instead of “symbol,” as this seems to be a more adequate rendering of 
“Symbolik;” (2) I write psychological coherence in italics and this term will appear in italics throughout 
Part III of this dissertation. As this concept is somewhat foreign to current methods of musical 
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 We, the critics and readers, along with Marx, are commanded to interpret 
musical meaning through this enumeration of critical skills. The activity Marx has 
elaborated constitutes a sine qua non for critical assessments of musical expression 
and meaning. By the same token, Marx nevertheless refrains from showing exactly 
how one should apply these tools in a critical exercise. When we make a closer 
examination of Marx’s rebuttal, we are faced with two opposing camps: material 
explication (which involves normative theories and rules) and psychological, 
“spiritual guidelines.” Following the general argument put forward, we grasp meaning 
in music through a process of examination and reflection from two different 
perspectives. Despite divergences, the material component will influence and 
enlighten the conclusions of the psychological component (and vice versa) in a 
hermeneutic fashion (akin to a similar process in Schleiermacher’s hermeneutics). 
The ultimate meaning we reach for is captured in Marx’s concept of Idee—ideal 
content that appeals both to material and psychological content of music and resolves 
the conflicts we encounter within a work as contributive to a coherent universal notion. 
In the following, we will explore these “spiritual guidelines” in depth: firstly, we will 
address simile and symbolism; secondly, we will discuss psychological coherence. 
Through a thorough investigation into the philosophical dimensions of the spiritual 
guidelines, we will develop a better picture of how spiritual guidelines inform Marx’s 
concept of an Idee.  
 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
interpretation, I feel it is necessary to use italics. Furthermore, psychological coherence is a concept 
that has an elaborate philosophical meaning. See Part III, chapter 2 of this dissertation for more on this 
theme. 
 




 Simile and symbolism 
 
 
Let us reflect once more on the position Marx puts forward for determining meaning 
in music: 
 
Setting aside the program and all peripheral verbiage, where finally are the 
music’s means for determinate expression? Leaving the authority of the artist 
out of the picture, how should we others understand their expression? 
 
Direct your search to art – to its material, the sounds, chords, tonal relations 
…, rhythms! Take to this task all the aids of simile, symbol, psychological 
coherence, all these spiritual guidelines that no artist and no person can do 
without!199  
 
In this passage, Marx presents two sides of interpretation. In a very loose way, we can 
say it resembles Schleiermacher’s hermeneutics where the material of music is 
described through grammatical interpretation and reflection on this material demands 
psychological interpretation. The material of music will not be evaluated alone, nor 
will simile, symbolism, or psychological coherence be seen as operating alone without 
reference to the material of music. Similes and symbolism are familiar in discourse 
about art and literature, but in music the content of similes and the purpose of 
symbolism are not as clear-cut. To understand the context of Marx’s “spiritual 
guidelines” we will look to Hegel’s determination of similes and symbols as a source 
for meaning behind “the aids of simile” and symbolism in music. Hegel’s Aesthetics 
will help to illuminate Marx’s terminology and the applicability of these ideas to 
musical meaning. We will first explore simile / comparisons in Marx’s writing on the 
second movement of the “Eroica” symphony. This will open the discussion to more 
complex notions of symbols in music; we will then evaluate the “Moonlight” sonata 
(Op. 27, no. 2) and the “Hammerklavier” sonata (Op. 106) in order to shed light on 
the usefulness of symbols in descriptions of music. We will also determine a more 
integrated relation between symbolism and Marx’s concept of a musical Idee.  
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
199 A. B. Marx, Musical Form in the Age of Beethoven: Selected Writings on Theory and Method, ed. 
and trans. Scott Burnham (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 178-179. 
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A. Simile – symbolism  
 
 It is easier to speak about symbols and signs in linguistic and pictorial arts – 
and these are where Hegel’s initial examples came from in his treatment of symbols 
in the Aesthetics. Hegel describes animals, such as lions, foxes, and eagles, which 
often have symbolic meaning attached to their image.200 For example, when we see a 
fox in a picture we may say the animal represents cunningness. But a fox also has 
more than one symbolic meaning – it can symbolize wisdom and cleverness. Thus 
when we see a painting of a fox, we must make a critical decision about whether this 
is not just a painting of a mammal (as representative of that biological creature), but if 
a deeper meaning resides in the fox’s presence. If we find that it has symbolic 
meaning (through critical intuition, and the very context of the fox image may push 
meaning in a symbolic direction), then it follows that we must decide which meaning, 
among many, does this particular fox picture appeal to.201 (When Hegel describes a 
picture of a lion, he does not state that it is a particular picture of a lion such as 
George Stubbs’s “Horse Attacked by a Lion” [1769], or Rembrandt’s “Lion Resting, 
Turned to Left” [1650-52]. This is not to say that Hegel has overlooked the visual 
import of color, depiction, and style at this point in his treatment of symbols with 
relation to aesthetic judgment. But Hegel does not mention these aspects from the get-
go. Consequently what happens in Hegel’s treatise is that the importance of context is 
distanced from our understanding of the basic principles of symbols and similes.) 
 Hegel sets out the concept of similes after discussing a basic symbolic picture 
of an animal.  This strategy, in a discussion of symbolic meaning, addresses first what 
is less ambiguous and builds toward what is more ambiguous. In Hegel’s examination 
of similes, he describes how an image and meaning are presented before our mind in 
an immediate fashion. To illustrate a simile, as a form of comparison, Hegel chooses 
an example from Schiller’s The Robbers [1781]: “For example, Karl Moor cries out at 
the sight of the setting sun: ‘So dies a hero.’ Here the meaning is annexed to what is 
seen.”202 This comparison seems to exploit something Hegel has remembered from 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
200 See G. W. F. Hegel, Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art, trans. T. M. Knox, vol. I (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1975), 305-6. 
201 See Hegel, Aesthetics, 306. 
202 Hegel, Aesthetics, 307, translation modified. In Schiller’s play, this character is also addressed as 
“Robber Moor,” see Friedrich Schiller, “The Robbers,” The Robbers; Wallenstein, trans. F. J. Lamport 
(London: Penguin Books, 1979), 20-160. Lewis Lockwood, in his chapter on Beethoven’s First 
Symphony, writes about the early performances of The Robbers in Germany, which includes a mention 
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Schiller, but it is not the whole story behind what Schiller is saying or what the sunset 
means in the play. Hegel’s reader comes away with understanding from the example 
that a sun is setting and it is symbolic of a hero dying – thus a clean and effective 
comparison. In a longer passage on similes, still in the Aesthetics, Hegel states: 
 
In simile . . . both sides, image and meaning are completely severed – if 
indeed with greater or lesser completeness, now of the image, now of the 
meaning; each is presented by itself, and only then, in this separation, are 
they related to one another on account of the similarities in their content. . . . 
[T]he simile may be called (a) a merely idle repetition, in that one and the 
same matter comes into the representation in a double form… and (b) an 
often wearisome superfluity, since the meaning is explicitly present 
already.203 
 
In this formulation, Hegel shows us how similes are not always the happy pairing of 
images and meanings – each somehow suffers under the pressure of the other in virtue 
of their connection. By being connected, through a deeper meaning, each will lose 
something of their identity when the meaning, or the image, is seen singularly; the 
connection will render both sides into one entity, and this entity will either be like a 
repetition or superfluity. Both parts, the individual things, will annihilate their 
respective, singular meanings in virtue of a deeper meaning (or at least a different 
meaning) where image and meaning are roped together.   
 Let us refer again to Hegel’s The Robbers example. The sunset and the hero 
are separate, singular entities. Karl Moor, by voicing the comparison, calls upon their 
“similarity in content.” On one level, the sunset example illustrates a simile, an “idle 
repetition.” The reader does not sense the symbolic meaning in the sunset when it is 
presented in Hegel’s formulation. But on a deeper level, the sunset is also symbolic in 
a more complex way and proves to be crucial for Schiller’s play; Hegel merely paints 
the image with its legs cut off – there are more things in the scene than just Karl Moor 
and a sunset.  
 This leads us to face one of the greatest problems in Hegel’s theory: ambiguity 
as an inherent characteristic of symbols. (“Symbols” here includes symbolic meaning 
in a global sense: similes, comparisons, and symbols proper.) As Hegel describes, a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
of the performance that took place in Bonn in 1792. As Beethoven had connections with persons 
involved with this performance, Lockwood speculates that Beethoven’s “lifelong admiration for 
Schiller took root during this time and in this context,” see Lewis Lockwood, Beethoven’s Symphonies: 
An Artistic Vision (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2015), 21. Our reference to The Robbers in 
this chapter, and Lockwood’s speculation, is a coincidence. The Robbers in our case is integral for our 
understanding of Hegel’s symbolism. 
203 Hegel, Aesthetics, 411. 
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symbol would be a conventional sign if all ambiguity of meaning were removed.204 
This ambiguity, nevertheless, can lead us into trouble.205 This same ambiguity spills 
into comparisons and similes just the same despite repetition or superfluity; in virtue 
of their connection with narrative and context, similes and comparisons are simply not 
as debilitated from the ambiguity argument.206 
 Let us examine this ambiguity head-on. When we consider how devoid 
Hegel’s sunset example is of dramatic context, the example becomes flimsy and self-
serving; it stands to illustrate that our understanding of the death of a hero is attached 
to Hegel’s rendering of the setting sun, as though the sun were the hero, and not much 
more. We encounter ambiguity in this example because the meaning is not entirely 
explicit – we can see a sunset in our mind but there are many kinds of sunsets 
depending on the season, which can have different symbolic meanings (a winter 
sunset can symbolize age, like a natural death from old age). As a reader of the 
Aesthetics, and not of The Robbers, we do not necessarily know that Karl Moor is 
looking at a radiant, “glorious,” late-summer sunset in the context of the narrative.  
 With relation to music, similes are extremely useful for illustrating musical 
phenomena in words by borrowing descriptions that are immediately apprehensible; 
similes are also useful for pedagogical activities, e.g. to explain to a student how to 
play in a certain way when one particular description does not suffice. The simile or 
comparison, the “idle repetition,” we find in prose about music seeks to replicate a 
musical expression in language. The repetition, as different in kind, somehow gives 
new life to the original musical expression one wishes to address.  Beethoven 
famously uses the device in a letter to Carl Czerny in order to describe how to play 
long strings of descending or ascending sixteenth notes. Beethoven writes:  
 
I should like [my nephew] also to use all his fingers now and then, and in 
such passages … so that he may slip one finger over another. Admittedly 
such passages sound, so to speak, as if they were ‘played like pearls (i.e. with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
204 Hegel, Aesthetics, 305-306. 
205 Paul de Man highlights this point in his critique of Hegel’s symbolism, see “Sign and symbol in 
Hegel’s Aesthetics” in Aesthetic Ideology (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), 91-104, 
and in de Man’s subsequent “Reply to Raymond Geuss” in Aesthetic Ideology (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1996), 185-192, see especially 188. 
206 “In other cases, indeed, this separation and relation [between image and meaning] is not so clearly 
emphasized in similes; on the contrary, the connection remains more immediate; but in that event it 
must already be clear from the further connection of the narrative, from the context and other 
circumstances, that the image is not supposed to suffice on its own account but that there is meant by it 
this or that specific significance which cannot remain uncertain.” Hegel, Aesthetics, 307. 
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only a few fingers) or like a pearl’ – but occasionally we like to have a 
different kind of jewelry.207  
 
The execution of this technique, nevertheless, is difficult to master as one must first 
pin down the relation between this description and a non-legato technique. In this 
case, the playing of the musical phrase is to replicate or repeat the image. 
 In music we can hear and see (in notation) phenomena that can be described 
with similes. In spite of this, music is heard and thus does not offer the clarity to our 
perception as a picture of a sunset, nor does musical-meaning seem as clear as a 
sentence spoken in our mother tongue by a native speaker. We encounter another 
dimension of complexity with respect to similes in Beethoven’s description of 
performance technique because the way we touch a keyboard to create musical tones 
is not like seeing or feeling pearls on a necklace. The relation between music and 
meaning in similes is ambiguous and cannot avoid being so. As we see in 
Beethoven’s letter, the relation between music and similes bears a greater 
resemblance to Hegel’s The Robbers sunset comparison (which is loaded with more 
information than it lets on) than to traditional similes widely used in literature.  
 
 B. Nearing symbolism in music 
 
 We can find a deeper symbolic meaning within certain comparisons, but this 
requires that the context points meaning in a symbolic direction.  Let us recover 
Hegel’s example – the band of robbers and Karl Moor see the setting sun. The robber 
Schwarz declares upon seeing this sight: “How glorious the sun goes down.” Moor 
loses himself in the vision of the sunset and exclaims: “So dies a hero!”208 Soon after 
saying this, Moor foreshadows his own demise by commenting that he wished, as a 
child, to live and die like the setting sun.209 He is granted that wish when he destroys 
all that he holds dear at the end of the play. When he offers himself up to the law in a 
selfless act of humility, to help a poor family so that he may be “admired for” the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
207 L. 878, To Carl Czerny, Vienna 1817, 742-742. The Letters of Beethoven: collected, translated, and 
edited with an introduction, appendixes, notes and indexes by Emily Anderson, volume II (London: 
Macmillan & Co Ltd, 1961). 
208  Hegel, 307; Schiller The Robbers, act III, scene ii.  
 Schwarz: Wie herrlich die Sonne dort untergeht! 
Karl Moor: (in den Anblick verschwimmt): so stirbt ein Held!  
Friedrich Schiller. Die Räuber. Ein Schauspiel (Frankfurt: [n.p.], 1781). 
209 Karl Moor: Da ich noch ein Bube war – war’s mein Lieblingsgedanke, wie sie zu leben, zu sterben 
wie sie – (mit verbissenem Schmerz.) Es war ein Bubengedanke! [Die Räuber, III, ii]. 
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act,210 we experience a conclusion that is as spectacular as a roaring late-summer 
sunset. It is in cases such as these that a linguistic phrase, “Thus dies a hero,” lacks 
expressive depth and requires the lengthy description of anguish from Robber Moor 
about what he wishes he could retain from boyhood dreams.  
 After the sunset reference, Karl Moor descends into a spiral of remorse on his 
own poor choices in life. In the presence of something that is profoundly beautiful 
that even a robber takes notice of its glory (this robber has an ironic name for this 
purpose: Schwarz [black]), Moor becomes introspective and melancholy. For Moor 
the sunset reminds him of his better self in his childhood. It reminds him of the hope 
he felt in sunsets he saw in his past; for his robber companions, the sunset is much 
like the objects they seek to steal: a sight overflowing with life and vitality. In light of 
this dual structure (Moor/Robbers), we realize the depth of symbols when we ask: 
what does the sunset mean, and why is it important to maintain in the narrative even if 
symbols are inherently ambiguous and can mean just about anything? What does this 
sunset symbolize in The Robbers, and how deep does it go? One way that symbolism 
works in descriptions of music is that it takes us out of a narrative and issues a 
timeless character, much like The Robbers sunset has relation to a narrative structure 
and also to meaning beyond the story that Schiller tells. Arguably we understand the 
symbol of a sunset as much as a reader in Schiller’s time – and this is how the symbol 
escapes the limitations of a historical narrative that is relevant to only one moment in 
history. 
 Hegel’s simple illustration from The Robbers clearly proves a point about 
comparisons and serves as a stepping-stone to more complex similes and symbols. 
With Hegel’s similes and comparisons in the background, we will examine some of 
A. B. Marx’s prose where he uses similes and comparisons in his writings on music. 
For instance, we can find these devices in the narrative Marx devises to describe the 
second movement (Marcia funebre, Adagio assai) of Beethoven’s Symphony No. 3 in 
E-flat Major, Op. 55, “Eroica.” He defends that the Marcia funebre is representative 
of death on the battlefield and is a natural consequence of the victory of battle 
portrayed in the first movement. In Marx’s opinion, a funeral march does not 
dominate the meaning of the movement: “the superscript is only an indication, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
210 See The Robbers, act V, scene 2. 
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offering a first clue as to the interpretation.”211 When Marx speaks of the trio 
“Maggiore” section of the Marcia funebre, we suddenly leave the hero narrative (that 
is normally imposed on the interpretation of the symphony) behind and we set our 
sights on deeper meaning; the entrance of the trio in a major mode, within a sequence 
of a funeral march, inspires us to look for meaning beyond funerals, marches, and 
mourning.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
211 Marx, Musical Form, 171. 
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Figure 3.1 Ludwig van Beethoven, Symphony No. 3 in E-flat major, Op. 55 (“Eroica”), 




Marx describes the trio (Figure 3.1) at mm. 69-105:  
The gentle C major song enters in oboes, then flute, then bassoon, over 
strings that are now drawing deep breaths of relief and stirring with fresh life 
– an alternating dialogue is already perceptible in their lower voices. There is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
212 Urtext edited by Jonathan Del Mar, Kassel: ©1999, Bärenreiter-Verlag. Reproduced with kind 
permission of Bärenreiter. 
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no doubt but that the sweetness of dying for the fatherland and for freedom is 
being praised here, for the entire army of the orchestra answers with the 
brightest cry of triumph, bringing on trumpet fanfares for the first time, along 
with thundering tympani.213 
  
The trio, the “C major song,” is strange for a number of reasons. First and foremost, 
our sense of time shifts as the shape of the melody makes the initials bars of the trio 
(mm. 69-74) until the fortissimo sound as though they were in triple meter, like a 
waltz with a lilt of lightness. Beethoven writes a dolce for the flute melody only, 
which softens the shrill range of the melodic notes and dulls the abrupt shift in mood. 
Second, the fanfare Marx describes (Figure 3.1, m. 75) brings the trio back into a 
clear duple meter feel and grants seriousness to the section, as the “C major song” had 
virtually eliminated the gravity of the earlier section of the Marcia funebre. The 
fanfare roars in, with the crescendos of the strings and woodwinds, peacocking in a 
fashion more typical of the first movement of the “Eroica.”  
 When we examine Marx’s description of the trio, we find several examples of 
comparisons. For example: “strings that are now drawing deep breaths of relief and 
stirring with fresh life – an alternating dialogue is already perceptible in their lower 
voices.” This comparison can be drawn between the major triad arpeggios in the 
violins, and the exchange between the cellos and basses in concert with the violas. 
This variation between parts with respect to shape, rhythms, and figures, which 
counter the melody as though following the lead of a different instrument, does not 
correspond to anything previous in the movement. To this extent, Marx’s comparisons 
do not contain much ambiguity.  
 We encounter a more complex image, one with greater symbolic meaning, 
when Marx writes: “there is no doubt that the sweetness of dying for the fatherland 
and for freedom is being praised here.” He quotes as evidence that the orchestra 
“answers with the brightest cry of triumph, bringing on trumpet fanfares,” and we 
clearly hear this in (Figure 3.1) m. 76 onward at least in part because fanfares are 
often used to illustrate triumph. But what part of the music inspires Marx to deduce 
that the trio section contains a symbolic meaning of a sweetness of dying for the 
fatherland and for freedom? To answer this, it is important to consider the depth of 
the music and the symbol he describes. Consequently, it is the context of the trio (and 
a reflection on the “Eroica” symphony as a whole) that will inform the meaning of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
213 Marx, Musical Form, 171. 
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this section. The trio can inspire other kinds of thoughts, images, and symbols; thus, 
in light of the unexpected major section, we can imagine the trio is like an individual 
who attends the funeral of a great hero but is dressed in attire more appropriate for a 
night on the town than mourning. We view a thought of this kind as an immediate 
response to the trio and its context within the movement. The depth of Beethoven’s 
expression in this section, however, forbids that our conclusions be so shallow and 
immediate. Marx finds an elegant solution to the cheerful start of the trio, by saying it 
is praise for the sweetness of dying for the fatherland and for freedom. “Sweetness” 
describes not only the dolce in the flutes (and the waltz-sounding melody in Figure 
3.1, mm. 69-75), but is a noun whose definition casts light on the idea of death for a 
greater purpose. Suddenly the dolce has taken on a much deeper level of meaning and 
drives home the seriousness of the fortissimo fanfare in m. 76.  
 Although embedded in Beethoven’s funeral march, the trio C major section is 
undoubtedly uplifting in its stark contrast to the earlier measures of the movement. 
We encounter an ambiguity of meaning with relation to this section when we question 
how the “C major song” fits into a greater aesthetic scheme. Marx finds this section to 
be symbolic of the sweetness of dying for one’s fatherland and freedom. With the 
juxtaposition of lethargic mourning depicted earlier in the movement and the uplifting 
melodic strains in the trio (not to mention the arpeggiated major chord in the strings), 
the trio section does not leave much room for ambiguity regarding the major 
transition in the movement’s demeanor. The shift is drastic and abrupt, but graciously 
ushered in with the ascending cellos and basses that play a truncated scale leading up 
to the new tonic. The greater aesthetic scheme, nevertheless, is nothing other than 
Marx’s musical Idee. This trio forms one detail of a greater meaning that we find in 
the symphony. The way musical symbolism can inform a musical Idee will be 
discussed in the following section. 
 
 
 C. More abstract symbols in music 
 
 Hegel puts forward a simplified and elegant way to understand symbols by 
describing the meaning of the Eucharist in Catholic versus Protestant (Calvinist) 
traditions. He writes:  
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In Catholic doctrine, for example, the consecrated bread is the actual flesh, 
the wine the actual blood of God, and Christ is immediately present in them. . 
. . In this mystical identity there is nothing purely symbolical; the latter only 
arises in the Reformed [i.e. Calvinist] doctrine, because here the spiritual is 
explicitly severed from the sensuous, and the external object is taken in that 
case as a mere pointing to a meaning differentiated therefrom. In the miracle-
working images of the Madonna too the power of the Divine operates by 
immediate presence in them and is not, as might be thought, only hinted at 
symbolically through the images.214 
 
Hegel puts forward the Reformed doctrine’s interpretation of the bread and wine in 
Communion as examples of symbols. What we take away from this is that, in 
symbols, deeper meaning is “severed from the sensuous;” an object (consecrated 
bread) points to a spiritual meaning (more immediately the flesh of Christ and then, 
through reflection, the recognition of Christ’s sacrifice) that is different from the 
object itself. The object points to this other meaning that does not look like the object 
itself. We are reminded here of Marx’s musical Idee: it might not be immediately 
perceptible in the music, but it comes forward in a subtle way as though the music 
itself were pointing to this meaning. The kind of critical intuition involved in divining 
this kind of meaning mimics how we arrive at spiritual meaning in Hegel’s example 
(that is through reflection on Communion). Marx’s symbolism [Symbolik] comes into 
play when we identify symbols in music. We can imagine these symbols as localized 
versions of Marx’s musical Idee; when we discover a symbol in music, we presume 
that its meaning will reflect an aspect of the Idee (thereby disclosing elements of the 
meaning of the whole). Marx offers an example of this when Marx identifies 
symbolic meaning (e.g. “praise of dying for the fatherland”) in the trio of the Marcia 
funebre in the “Eroica.” This symbolic meaning, nevertheless, does not capture the 
totality of the Idee of the symphony.   
 To look more closely at symbols in music, and their relation to the whole of a 
work, we will consider an example from the first movement of Beethoven’s Sonata 
Quasi una Fantasia in C-sharp minor (“Moonlight”), Op. 27, No. 2 (composed 1801): 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
214 Hegel, Aesthetics, 325. 
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Figure 3.2 Ludwig van Beethoven, Sonata in C-sharp minor, Quasi una fantasia, Op. 




Beethoven provides a lengthy description about the use of pedals in the first 
movement, and that a specific touch is needed: “Si deve suonare tutto questo pezzo 
delicatissimamente e senza sordino.” These instructions outshine the pianissimo 
indication within the staff of m. 1 (Figure 3.2). Sandra Rosenblum goes on to translate 
the instructional heading and to describe the complexity of this indication for 
performance. She writes:  
 
‘This whole piece ought to be played with utmost delicacy and without 
damper[s]’. . . . This double instruction to play the entire Adagio sostenuto 
without dampers is often considered the most puzzling of Beethoven’s 
unusual damper indications. Was it meant to be observed literally or only to 
indicate that the dampers should be in operation throughout, with deft 
articulation of the mechanism wherever too much blurring of the harmonies 
occurred? In 1801, when Op. 27/2 was composed, the damper-raising 
mechanism on Beethoven’s piano was still the knee lever, and his terms for 
its use were in the Italian words whose bulk may have discouraged frequent 
repetition. We also know that certain kinds of mixed harmonies were sought-
after pianistic effects.216  
 
From Rosenblum’s descriptions of pedaling, it seems the “mixed harmonies,” without 
too much blurring, is the movement’s principal means of expression. Even so, after a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
215 Beethoven, The 35 Piano Sonatas Edited by Barry Cooper with fingerings by David Ward © 2007 
by The Associated Board of the Royal Schools of Music. Reproduced by permission of ABRSM. 
216 See Sandra P. Rosenblum, Performance Practices in Classic Piano Music (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1988), 136. 
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discussion of historical instruments (including some of Beethoven’s own), Rosenblum 
does not reach a satisfactory explanation of Beethoven’s indications for dampers. In 
the context of the “Moonlight” sonata, she writes instead that: “by far the most 
important interpretative elements are the balancing of the indicated forte and piano 
sounds and the occasional adding of discretionary quiet dynamics.”217 Rosenblum’s 
comment suggests that Beethoven’s indications about dampers are actually in service 
of the dynamics (explicit forte indications cannot be found in the first movement, so it 
is difficult to understand which measures she may be referring to). In Beethoven’s 
earlier keyboard sonatas, we do not encounter such detailed instructions in the 
heading. The instructions at the start of the first movement of the “Moonlight” sonata 
are curious, moreover, because the piece looks relatively simple on the surface 
(pictured in Figure 3.2). The information contained in the double description within 
the staves, “sempre pianissimo e senza sordino” appears superfluous because “senza 
sordino” is repeated in the descriptive heading and within the staff of m. 1 (see Figure 
3.2). We also associate the word “delicatissimamente” with a piano dynamic, as it 
would be difficult to play forte in a delicate way. In any event, the Italian instructions 
in the heading, and within the staff at m. 1, are our first hint that the movement is after 
a deeper meaning; Beethoven does not leave the performer to their own devices and 
intuition for playing the work, thus the deeper meaning in the composition will only 
be grasped through a special execution of the music.  
 Czerny describes the deeper meaning in this movement when he writes that it 
“is highly poetical, and therefore perfectly comprehensible to any one. It is a night 
scene, in which the voice of a complaining spirit is heard at a distance.”218 When 
Czerny argues that the first movement is “perfectly comprehensible to anyone,” we 
might assume that this is a hyperbolic statement and reflects on the prevalence of this 
sonata in the repertoire of young piano students across the globe. “Comprehensible to 
anyone,” nevertheless, suggests another level of meaning in the music. This meaning 
should touch on something fundamental to human experience and it should reside 
within the expression of the piece. By the same token if the piece is played well, then 
its meaning should be apprehensible to even those who are uninitiated in musical 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
217 Rosenblum,137. 
218 Carl Czerny, On the Proper Performance of All Beethoven’s Works for the Piano. CZERNY’S 
“Reminiscences of Beethoven” and chapters II and III from volume IV of the “Complete Theoretical 
and Practical Piano Forte School Op. 500” ed. Paul Badura–Skoda ([Vienna]: Universal edition, 
1970), 49. 
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studies. The complex senza sordino indications and si deve suonare tutto questo pezzo 
delicatissimamente address the performer not only with the intent that the piece 
should sound delicate in virtue of the touch needed to play delicatissimamente. In 
fact, the blending of sonorities will provide a backdrop for the expression to a larger 
problem of meaning. Consequently, the meaning of the work should be simple 
enough for everyone to grasp it. We touch on this larger problem in the first 
movement of the “Moonlight” sonata when we ask questions directed at some of the 
fundamental aspects of the music, e.g. “what lies within the division between piano 
and forte?” and “what does it mean for the movement to be dominated by a piano 
dynamic?” It is in our answers to these questions that we find place for Czerny’s 
description of the “voice of a complaining spirit is heard at a distance” in the deeper 
space of symbolic meaning.  
 Let us look at the sempre pianissimo indication in Figure 3.2, measure 1, and 
the pianissimo indication listed beside the melody note in the right hand in measure 5. 
The repetition of indications as to loudness and effect enforces the notion that this 
movement is to be played very, very quietly. And although commentary generally 
avoids mentioning this,219 it is exceedingly difficult to play this movement at a 
pianissimo dynamic – all voices should sound in balance with each other and the 
slurred melody should be able to glisten in an articulate and graceful way. Although 
the movement shifts between piano and pianissimo through crescendos and 
decrescendos, the variations in volume and touch are so slight that a crescendo in the 
score threatens to overthrow the delicate footing of the expression. 
 One particular passage seems to drive home the sense of symbolic meaning in 
the “Moonlight” sonata (see Figure 3.3, m. 42). This passage is very similar to Figure 
3.2, m. 5, although it lacks indications of slurs in the triplet figures. (There are also no 
rests in the treble staff, which we can locate in m. 5. This most likely has to do with 
the fact that the melody has reached very low depths in mm. 40-41, and the earlier 
rests apply more to the accompaniment triplet figure of the right hand that 
characteristically begins the movement in mm. 1-4.)  Importantly, there are two 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
219 Rosenblum’s highly informed commentary on the use of pedals in this movement, specifically 
through her own experiments with various keyboard instruments, avoids addressing the difficulty of the 
varied piano / pianissimo touch (a fundamental technique required for performing the piece). In 
defense of her commentary, her excellent description of the complexity of pedaling in the “Moonlight” 
 sonata is only relative to pedaling and not the varying techniques that are needed for practice of the 
movement as a whole.   
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pianissimo indications in m. 42 (see Figure 3.3). The two pianissimo indications hint 
that the deep, chordal foundation in the left hand and the melody in the right hand are 
distinct in their aesthetic roles; what is played by the left and right hands, 
respectively, should sound at the same volume and touch: pianissimo. 
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Plate 3. Ludwig van Beethoven, Sonata in C-sharp Minor, Quasi una fantasia, Op. 27, no. 2 
(“Moonlight,” [1801]), mvmt. I, Adagio sostenuto, Autograph, BH 60, fol. 3r, with kind 
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Figure 3.3 Ludwig van Beethoven, Sonata in C-sharp minor, Quasi una fantasia, Op. 
27, no. 2 (“Moonlight,” [1801]), mvmt. I, Adagio sostenuto, mm. 40-3.220  
 
 
These pianissimo indications are as innovative and inspiring as the passage is almost 
impossible to execute. It is also rare to find this kind of offset pairing of dynamics in 
the same measure, as though the pianissimo indications explicitly point to a 
harmonious interchange between the right and left hands. When we consult Plate 3, in 
the third system, Beethoven has added the second pianissimo indication for the treble 
staff in a different ink color. It seems that it may be a correction or addition to the 
original, but it highlights the dichotomy between the triplet figure in the 
accompaniment and the melody. Although these two entities are marked with 
pianissimo indications, they are differentiated from each other in virtue of the 
respective locations of the indications in the passage.221   
 To complicate matters, both voices sound as though they are expressing a 
similar idea that is intimate (this is achieved with a gentle touch, which we remember 
from the delicatissimamente heading at the start of the movement) and distant (as the 
melodic voice is almost lost in the cavernous chord played by the left hand). First, the 
performer must restrain their technique unnaturally in this triplet sequence to 
successfully capture the mirrored pianissimo indications. Second, the lack of variety 
with respect to dynamics alludes to early keyboard instruments that had little to no 
control over dynamics. One must strain to hear the progression of the melody through 
the arpeggios. The figurative intimacy this calls for, a listener to be on the edge of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
220 Beethoven, The 35 Piano Sonatas Edited by Barry Cooper with fingerings by David Ward © 2007 
by The Associated Board of the Royal Schools of Music. Reproduced by permission of ABRSM. 
221 The double pianissimo indications, as shown in the autograph, are present in the first edition. See 
Ludwig van Beethoven, Piano Sonata in C-sharp minor, op. 27, no. 2, “Moonlight Sonata”, Part 2: 
Facsimile of Original Edition with Sketch Transcriptions and a Commentary by Michael Ladenburger, 
Series III, Selected Manuscripts in Facsimile, eds. Sieghard Brandenburg and Michael Ladenburger 
(Bonn: Verlag Beethoven-Haus Bonn, 2003). This publication reproduces the first edition in facsimile: 
Ludwig van Beethoven, Sonata quasi una Fantasia per il Clavicembalo o Piano = forte, composta, e 
dedicate alla Damiagella Contessa Guilietta Guicciarda… Opera 27, no. 2 (Vienna: Giovanni Cappi, 
1802). 
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their seat as though physically approximating their body to the instrument to hear 
better, and makes this distance perceptible both physically and mentally. We may 
hear every note in the sequence, but we are unable make the meaning out. On the one 
hand, we have a spectator who hears these muffled arpeggios and weak sustained 
tones with great difficulty and is desperate to figure out if they heard everything there 
was to hear; on the other hand, we have a performer who makes a great effort not to 
overcome the pianissimo barrier and puts heart-felt expression into a melody that 
looks more like a pedal tone or a supporting voice in an orchestra. To the performer’s 
disadvantage, they must execute a balance between the luxuriously veiled left hand 
chord and the hollow pedal-like melody with a nagging triplet accompaniment rhythm 
that pounds away. The sandwiched accompaniment tightens expression to a strict line, 
like the ticking of a clock; any tempo rubato (that supports expressive depth), when 
applied to the accompaniment and/or melody, gives the impression that the musical 
material limps profoundly toward cadential resolution. 
 Within this sequence, performers find distance between themselves and what 
they play, as the dynamics hardly allow performers to even hear the expression of the 
music. We recognize a physical notion of distance (the sensuous of Hegel’s example) 
but also a symbol of distance when we reflect on a performance of the “Moonlight” 
sonata. Throughout the first movement, the spectator struggles to feel that they 
understand what is being played. The music, despite this, is performed at a volume as 
though the pianist were practicing alone and not necessarily trying to be understood 
on a grand, public scale. The pianist, moreover, performs the movement – for its 
expression to be comprehended by all listeners – in a counterintuitive way by playing 
muted and fragile tones. In the passage cited above (Figure 3.3, m. 42; Plate 3, third 
system), the listener grabs on to the sustained melodic notes, which are pinned against 
a backdrop cast by the chord in the bass. The listener intuits the deeper meaning they 
feel resides within the sequence that offers the impression of distance.  
 We are reminded again of Schiller’s The Robbers at this point, namely of 
physical - sensuous meaning that, in reflection, has symbolic meaning. Robber [Karl] 
Moor has arrived at his childhood home as the unrecognizable robber he has become. 
He confronts his father and is about to show himself to be his father’s son, to reveal 
the truth of who he is. But he cannot bring himself to do this. The father, who believes 
his son to have been killed on a distant battlefield, does not understand what truth it is 
that this stranger is grappling with to tell:  
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 ROBBER MOOR [in the most violent agitation]: 
Now it must be – now – leave me [to the ROBBERS]. And yet – 
Can I give him back his son again? – I can no longer give him 
back his son – No! I will not do it. 
OLD MOOR: What, my friend? What were you saying to yourself? 
ROBBER MOOR: Your son – Yes, old man – [Stammering]  
  your son – is – lost for ever. 
OLD MOOR: For ever? 
ROBBER MOOR [looking up to heaven in anguish]: 
O but this once– let not my soul be weakened – but this once 
sustain me! 
OLD MOOR: For ever, you say? 
ROBBER MOOR: Ask no more. For ever, I said. 
OLD MOOR: Stranger! Stranger!  
 Why did you drag me out of my dungeon?222 
 
This sequence of dialogue is intimate in a physical sense: old Moor is close enough to 
Karl and the band of robbers to overhear the violence and agitation in Karl’s words. 
Karl says the words: “Now it must be,” to no particular person. Nevertheless, when he 
speaks to the band of robbers (in a dialogue that sounds more like a conversation with 
himself), he discusses the possibility of offering the truth of his identity to his father, 
thus strengthening their bond, which would result in a physical closeness between 
father and son. Old Moor insists on asking about the meaning of the words that 
Robber Moor has said to himself. At this moment, Old Moor is much like spectators 
of the “Moonlight” sonata’s first movement because the spectators are confused by 
their intuition that they have heard music that contains deeper meaning but are not 
entirely sure they have heard it at all; this meaning, this something, is at such a 
remove that the dynamic levels become symbolic of distance between composer and 
listener – namely the distance between musical expression and the truth it puts 
forward. 
 Robber Moor merely responds to old Moor with an apparent truism “your son 
is lost forever” (this son is, of course, Robber Moor himself). It is the apparent 
simplicity and clarity of this statement that frustrates and confuses old Moor. “For 
ever [ewig]?” he repeats twice, as if this “forever” may mean something beyond the 
definition of the word, where if forever means “eternity” then it may be beyond the 
reaches of death itself. The anguish Karl Moor puts himself through – to keep the 
truth of his earlier statement away from his father – creates a stranger distance 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
222 Friedrich Schiller. The Robbers, act V, scene ii (152-3). 
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between the two men, even when they are physically close to one another. They also 
have an immediate emotional bond with each other, because hours earlier Robber 
Moor rescued Old Moor from a dungeon. Nevertheless, it is as though old Moor had 
been a prisoner in Plato’s cave, but only awarded a partial-view of truth; Old Moor is 
angered that he has been taken out of the confines of the darkness of the physical 
dungeon his other son Franz had put him in. But this is also a figurative dungeon, one 
that does not allow him to see that Robber Moor is in fact his estranged son Karl. The 
listener of Beethoven’s “Moonlight” sonata may not feel like they have been taken 
out of a dungeon to have a glimpse of truth through musical expression; there 
remains, nevertheless, a feeling of frustration and distance that we suffer when we are 
unable to grasp the meaning Beethoven has illustrated in the composition (a meaning 
that we feel in the parallel pianissimo indications).  
 In Hegel we find two crucial aspects of symbols and symbolic meaning: (1) a 
symbol points at meaning and (2) the spiritual is severed from the sensuous. In a 
study of symbolism and symbols in music, we should reflect on what we hear to 
derive meaning. It is important to note that symbolic meaning is usually not explicit in 
our immediate impression (for example, we do not hear a single note and recognize 
immediately that it is a symbol of death); discourse on the symbolic in music is at 
variance with the immediate experience because we are not pointing to a word in a 
poem or to a lion in a painting that can reproduce the immediate experience countless 
times in a spontaneous way. We have to capture the immediate experience of the 
music (pointing to the score is one way, but this does not embody the experience 
entirely) in descriptive words, reflect on that experience in words, and then use these 
descriptions to highlight symbolism therein. Symbols are a way for us to articulate the 
strangeness of certain moments in music, where passages call attention to themselves 
by invoking a characteristic feeling. Other ways of talking about those passages (like 
using technical vocabulary) do not seem to capture the meaning of those passages. 
Thus Marx defends that musical meaning is found through both material and 
“spiritual guidelines.” One way that we can illustrate spiritual guidelines is through 
symbolism, which we explored above in our example from The Robbers. Beethoven 
is not necessarily portraying the scene between Karl Moor and his father. But the 
symbolic meaning we find of distance in both the play and the “Moonlight” sonata 
offers insight with respect to the meaning we feel in the “Moonlight” sonata that is 
difficult to render in a prose description. We can imagine opposition to the claim that 
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a composition can support, and enhance, the idea that music contains symbolic 
meaning. A counterargument might follow Hegel’s position: the two sides of a 
comparison can lose their independent meanings by being roped into a comparative 
relation. We argue here that despite weakened independent meanings, the depth of 
symbolic meaning in the “Moonlight” sonata becomes stronger precisely through 
reflection on this scene in The Robbers. 
 To illustrate this, we will look at another example of symbolic meaning from 
the first movement of Beethoven’s Grand Sonata in B-Flat Major, Op. 106, 
“Hammerklavier.”  
 
Figure 3.4 Ludwig van Beethoven, Grand Sonata in B-flat Major, Op. 106, 
“Hammerklavier” [composed 1817–1818], mvmt. I, Allegro, recapitulation, mm. 
233-249.223  
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
223 Beethoven, The 35 Piano Sonatas Edited by Barry Cooper with fingerings by David Ward © 2007 
by The Associated Board of the Royal Schools of Music. Reproduced by permission of ABRSM. 
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 In Figure 3.4, mm. 240–244, we encounter a moment that first and foremost 
feels sublime on the pianist’s fingers. The first movement of the “Hammerklavier” is 
in B-flat major, which is a relatively uncomfortable key because of the location of the 
black keys in the scale. It is a scale that is crooked, and feels characteristically 
uneven, which may have to do with the fact that we start the scale with our second 
finger in the right hand and third finger in the left hand. We find a wholly different 
position for our hand in mm. 240–244, with all the black keys of G-flat major and D-
flat major. The G-flat major scale has a calm quality about it, perhaps because the 
thumb rests on G-flat, a black key, and almost all fingers are on black keys – it is a 
restful position that evokes innocence because often when children sit a piano for the 
first time, they play only black keys. Beyond the feel of the scale in these measures, 
there is little opposition between the rhythms of both hands. The melody, harmony, 
and accompaniment glide together across a sheet of ice as though mirroring the 
movements of the other. 
 From a performance perspective, the pianist notices the following 
characteristics in these measures: (1) the feel of the key and (2) the lack of opposition 
between parts. For the listener, these few measures pass by exceedingly fast. What the 
spectator hears, whether fully recognizing it or not, is a harmonious instance of joy 
and rest – we can breathe easily with the calming flow of the melodic tones and the 
consonance between parts. This moment is sudden and reserved, without much 
announcement, like sunlight that strikes through a forest canopy. But it is in this 
passage that we find the measures point to meaning outside of the immediate, 
sensuous form. Cloaked in cantabile e legato, the meaning reaches beyond theoretical 
commentary and performance practice to gesture toward deeper meaning. The 
spectator and the performer can usually recognize symbolic meaning equally in 
music, and thus in most cases it is not strictly necessary to strike a difference between 
the two experiences of a piece. In this particular case, performers recognize the 
symbolic meaning first by the feel of the passage under their fingers, like the sensuous 
jolt in Hegel’s example, which issues a secondary and longer lasting invitation for 
reflection. The tempo is such that it is difficult to grab on to this symbolic meaning 
through listening alone. The density of the movement and the (arguably more 
interesting) cantabile / dolce ed espressivo melody in the exposition (Figure 3.5), 
which sits more calmly in our musical memory of the movement, all make locating 
meaning in the work a more difficult task from a listener’s perspective. 
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Figure 3.5 Ludwig van Beethoven, Grand Sonata in B-flat Major, Op. 106, 






 All of the movements of the “Hammerklavier” are notoriously difficult. We 
can find the source of some of the difficulty of the first movement in oppositions: 
shouts of triumph with fanfare figures, counterpoint, and themes that appear to 
contradict a holistic meaning in the sonata. This is the case with the melody we 
encounter in the otherworldly section of the recapitulation we discussed above (see 
Figure 3.4). This theme from Figure 3.4 is not new to the movement. In fact, we find 
a very similar-looking theme early in the exposition (Figure 3.6, mm. 8-16). 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
224 Beethoven, The 35 Piano Sonatas Edited by Barry Cooper with fingerings by David Ward © 2007 
by The Associated Board of the Royal Schools of Music. Reproduced by permission of ABRSM. 
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Figure 3.6 Ludwig van Beethoven, Grand Sonata in B-flat Major, Op. 106, 




In the first measures of the exposition (Figure 3.6), we have a glimpse of the whole of 
the movement: a fanfare juxtaposed with a lyrical melody, and fairly autonomous 
voices. (In mm. 11-15, the bass clef staff is visually separated from the treble clef 
staff above it in virtue of a slur that starts in m. 9 [where the music is also marked in 
the treble clef] until m. 15. The sound creates the illusion that the bass voice is on its 
own mission to see how far away it can move from the other parts.) When we 
consider the recapitulation (Figure 3.4, m. 239), the voices in the left hand 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
225 Beethoven, The 35 Piano Sonatas Edited by Barry Cooper with fingerings by David Ward © 2007 
by The Associated Board of the Royal Schools of Music. Reproduced by permission of ABRSM. 
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complement the right and function together in light of the cantabile e legato 
indication.  
 The cantabile / dolce ed espressivo section from the exposition (shown in 
Figure 3.5) offers a vision of grace that resembles Charles Rosen’s infamous 
evaluation of the sonata’s first movement: “between far-flung dissonance and the 
impetuous force of the details comes not only the sonority peculiar to the work but 
also the combination of stern brilliance and transitory pathos.”226 As Rosen argues, 
the “Hammerklavier” is dominated by the sonority of the interval of a descending 
third. This is not only because of the melodic harmonization, but also because we find 
descending thirds in the main theme and in the harmonic movement.227 At the early 
stages of the recapitulation, the composer slowly dismantles this sonority (or sounds 
to be doing so even if analysis shows triads in inversions and descending thirds) only 
to bring it to the forefront once again (for example, Figure 3.4, mm. 248-249). The a 
tempo section, that precedes the cantabile e legato section in Figure 3.4 (mm. 234-
238), serves as an introduction to the otherworldly solitude to this sonata by pulling 
apart the tight seam of the descending thirds sonority. 
 Measures 240-244 of the recapitulation (Figure 3.4) sound like undeserved 
bliss and a glimpse of peace in the midst of conflict. These measures challenge 
Rosen’s “transitory pathos” and “stern brilliance.” When we do not examine the 
details of the “Hammerklavier,” Rosen’s description of the movement as a whole has 
the ability to undercut the delicate differences between sections as it attempts to unite 
seemingly disparate parts. This particular moment of sublimity and hope in the 
recapitulation, contrariwise to the pressures of rigidity and structure of descending 
thirds, enters the sounding space as though it were from a different musical work. 
And despite this, it is a theme that is familiar throughout the whole exposition. This 
theme, with cantabile e legato, runs into the recapitulation and is suddenly glamorous 
in haute couture. With a pedal tone on the dominant, and a joyous G-flat sonority, we 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
226 Charles Rosen, The Classical Style: Haydn, Mozart, Beethoven (London: Faber and Faber, 2005), 
422. A longer description reads as follows: “Insofar as a musical idea can be circumscribed by words, 
it should be obvious that even in a purely formal description, the central idea of the opening movement 
of the Hammerklavier is not merely a series of descending thirds, but the relation of the large tonal 
structure (with its powerfully dissonant long-range clash of B flat major and B major) to the rhythmic 
and harmonic energy of the sequences formed by the falling thirds. From this relation between far-
flung dissonance and the impetuous force of the details comes not only the sonority peculiar to the 
work but also the combination of stern brilliance and transitory pathos,” Charles Rosen, The Classical 
Style, 422.  
227 Charles Rosen, The Classical Style, 422. The passage is cited at length in footnote above. 
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discover a new dimension of this theme; the theme becomes stunning and rare to the 
extent that it no longer resembles its supposed role in sonata form. The theme, and the 
movement as a whole, point to meaning outside the score at this moment. This 
passage glitters and shines; it does not foreshadow what is to come, but is a vision of 
a singular, precious idea. The movements that follow in the “Hammerklavier,” and 
especially the Adagio, exhibit such a darkness and expressive depth that they are 
untouched by the ephemeral glory of the recapitulation. 
 The passage from the recapitulation (Figure 3.4, mm. 240-244) has such a 
short duration that it gives the impression that it is over before it started, and the fact 
that this section is comprised of four measures (played at a rapid tempo) is only one 
aspect of its ephemerality. But we can derive this significant feeling (where it seems 
the passage almost did not even happen) from the impression that the musical material 
has no impact on the movement as a whole, namely it does not appear to change or 
influence the likely series of musical events after we hear it. To examine the depth of 
symbolic meaning in these measures, we shall make another comparison to The 
Robbers. The relationship between Amalia and Karl Moor that we witness in the 
action of The Robbers is rocky and lived through memories (their few interactions 
together are almost all under the pretense that Karl is “Count Brand from 
Mecklenburg”). In the last scene of the play, a most curious chain of events takes 
place: Amalia knows Robber Moor is her husband (despite that he tries to hide this 
fact from her), and she forgives him. For one exchange in dialogue, Karl Moor shows 
a joyful side; he reveals this quality only once and it will not return: 
  
 ROBBER MOOR: She is pretending to weep, pretending there is a soul that 
   weeps for me. 
[AMALIA throws her arms about his neck.]  
Ah, what is this? She does not spit at me, she does not thrust me from her 
– Amalia! Have you forgotten? Do you know who it is you are 
embracing, Amalia? 
AMALIA: My only one, I shall never leave you! 
ROBBER MOOR [in ecstatic joy]: She forgives me, she loves me! I am pure 
as the heavenly aether, she loves me! Tears of gratitude to you, merciful 
God in Heaven! [He falls on his knees, convulsed with weeping.] Peace 
has returned to my soul, the raging torment is past, Hell is no more – See, 
O see, the children of light weep upon the neck of the weeping devil – 
[standing up, to the ROBBERS] Why do you not weep too? Weep, weep, 
for you are so blessed. Oh, Amalia! Amalia! Amalia! [He hangs upon her 
lips, they remain silently embraced.] 
A ROBBER [approaching angrily]: Stop, traitor! – Let go this arm 
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straightway, or I shall tell you a word that will make your ears ring and 
your teeth chatter with horror! [He parts them with his sword.]228  
 
This unnamed Robber ends the moment of redemption between Karl and Amalia. 
Forgiveness and peace seem incompatible with Karl’s life and works as a robber. 
Additional robbers show up after the unnamed one (quoted above) to remind Karl of 
the sacrifice they made to follow him as their Robber leader. The feel of this scene 
returns to that of similar scenes of anguish in the play, but it only becomes much 
worse. In the dialogue cited above, Karl Moor feels closeness to God, and peace in his 
soul, which is so fleeting that it is nearly superfluous to the play as a whole.  In the 
end, this moment in the scene makes Amalia’s death look all the worse when Amalia 
and Karl seem to finally be speaking the same language and on the same page. 
Previously in the play Karl does not believe Amalia forgives him for all of his 
misdeeds. And even in this very scene, it takes Karl some time to accept that Amalia 
actually does forgive him. 
 The sublime moment in the recapitulation of the “Hammerklavier” 
encapsulates this exchange from The Robbers; it illustrates clarity, peace, and 
redemption. The short sequence in the recapitulation of the “Hammerklavier” is just 
as fleeting as this brief exchange in The Robbers. We are left, as spectators, 
wondering about what just happened: the melodic and harmonic partnership in the 
“Hammerklavier” is suddenly consonant with one another and then, just as suddenly, 
it returns to its previous tone of autonomous musical parts and fanfares.  
 The symbol we have discussed here in the “Hammerklavier” is small, almost 
irrelevant to the whole, and on the surface strikes us as having little in common with 
the musical Idee of the work. In this case, the symbol appears like Hegel’s 
comparison example of the sunset: obvious or empty – but upon closer inspection, we 
see just how deep the meaning goes.  This particular symbol, however, does not recur 
throughout like the idea of distance in the “Moonlight” sonata; we do not feel a 
nagging disappointment of not reaching the truth or meaning in the music although 
we seem so close to apprehending it. In the “Hammerklavier” Beethoven creates an 
oasis that is meaningful, despite its short duration, and is reminiscent of the ephemeral 
quality of music.  
  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
228 Schiller, The Robbers, act V scene ii. 
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Concluding remarks on the symbolic in music 
 
 The way we describe music, offering reflection on its meaning and depth, has 
recourse to symbols because symbols are generally more complex than similes and 
give the impression that they address a deeper meaning. When we consider musical 
meaning beyond material or analytical conclusions, musical meaning becomes 
difficult to grasp no matter what kind of terminology one uses. We argue that this is 
one reason why symbolic meaning finds a home in prose about music. The task of 
writing about music implies reflection on how and why music may mean something 
beyond the formal rules of composition and practice. In this vein, we wonder how 
music manages to speak at all beyond the confines of its material.  
 Furthermore, to understand musical meaning in relation to symbols is not 
beyond the imaginations of those who are experts in the art of music and music 
theory. Contrary to Hegel’s understanding of instrumental music, we argue that we 
can decipher certain aspects of musical meaning more easily in a context that is 
different from normative theory and analysis. Hegel believes that art objects have an 
inner life (which is not measured exclusively by its material), but he makes a curious 
exception for music; Hegel contends that music is only truly appreciated (where one 
experiences complete satisfaction) when one makes an assessment of a work using 
musical rules and laws: 
 
The expert who has at his fingers’ ends the inner musical relations between 
notes and instruments, loves instrumental music in its artistic use of 
harmonies and melodious interactings and changing forms: he is entirely 
satisfied by the music itself and he has a closer interest of comparing what he 
has heard with the rules and laws that are familiar to him so that he can fully 
criticize and enjoy the composition. . . . The mere amateur seldom has the 
benefit of such complete satisfaction, and at once the desire steals over him to 
supplement this apparently unsubstantial procession of sounds and to find a 
more definite meaning for what rings in his soul. In these circumstances 
music for him becomes symbolical, but with his attempt at snatching a 
meaning he is confronted by mysterious enigmas which run swiftly past, 
cannot always be solved, and in general are capable of all sorts of 
interpretations.229 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
229 Hegel, Aesthetics, Volume II, “3. Relation between Music’s Means of Expression and their Content 
(b) Independent Music, (β),” 954. 
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Hegel’s evaluation of an amateur’s experience of music is strictly at odds with Marx’s 
belief that symbols are important for a critical understanding of musical expression 
and meaning. Through Marx’s writings, we recognize that to enjoy meaning in music 
does not explicitly require us to compare the sounding quality to rules; importantly, 
we should engage our imagination and critical faculties to perceive the thought and 
Idee within a composition. The “enigmas… capable of all sorts of interpretations” in 
Hegel’s experience of music are, in fact, the basis of many of Marx’s conclusions 
about musical meaning. How else can Marx construct a heroic narrative in the 
“Eroica” without imagining the “enigmas which run swiftly past”? But, much to our 
dismay, the enigmas cannot be solved. They cannot be solved entirely by rules, and 
they cannot be solved entirely by similes, symbolism, and psychological coherence 
either. This leaves interpretation to be eternally open – a task that is never finished. In 
a recent essay on Schleiermacher’s hermeneutics, Kristin Gjesdal writes: 
“Interpretation is, by definition, fallible and subject to constant revision. Precisely 
because interpretation is fallible and subject to constant revision, is it crucial that the 
interpreter distinguish between the activity of understanding, on the one hand, and the 
application of the insights she arrives at, on the other.”230 We are always searching for 
an adequate explanation of meaning (as Gjesdal alludes to when she states that 
“interpretation is fallible and subject to constant revision”). We seek explanations that 
are more adapted to our current tastes and understanding of music, trends, and 
theoretical apparatuses, but in the end musical meaning cannot be solved like a 
mathematical equation. A passage that strikes us as strange will continue to strike us 
in this way, despite the number of times we have described how to understand it 
through hermeneutic interpretation with the application of material and symbolic 
considerations. In hermeneutic exercises, we get a closer glimpse of meaning in music 
from the tools of interpretation at our disposal; the result is that we offer insights into 
the depth of music not through our inability to completely elucidate the meaning of 
the enigmas running swiftly past, but through the details we successfully trap and 
illuminate. 
  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
230 Kristin Gjesdal, “Hermeneutics, Individuality, and Tradition, Schleiermacher’s Idea of Bildung in 
the Landscape of Hegelian Thought,” in The Relevance of Romanticism, ed. Dalia Nassar, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2014), 92-109, 97. 
	   168	  
Chapter 2: 
 
 Psychological coherence231 
 
 
For an examination of psychological coherence, let us consider Marx’s 
spiritual guidelines once again: 
 
We must respond: direct your search to art—to its material, the sounds, 
symbolism, psychological coherence, all these spiritual guidelines that no 
artist and no person can do without!232  
 
Unlike symbols and similes, which contribute to the formation of descriptions, deeper 
meaning, and the vivid portrayal in words of musical gestures, we argue that 
psychological coherence aims to establish integral connections between performance 
practice, meaningful content in a musical work, form, and the creative process. 
Marx’s determination of psychological coherence addresses, in a general way, 
Hegel’s notion that art “should disclose an inner life, feeling, soul, a content and 
spirit, which is just what we call the significance of a work of art.”233 What we look at 
in a work of art (or specifically music in this case) for evidence of meaning is the 
material object; for this reason psychological coherence234 will not rely on the 
composer’s personality as the only source of its meaning. Marx offers psychological 
coherence as a tool for interpretation specifically when we remove the composer’s 
authority to address the content of a work of music. Therefore, the psychological 
coherence of a work of music will not be equivalent to the psychology of the composer 
where a particular quirk in a composer’s personality will speak to the inner life of a 
composition. The concept of psychological coherence is thereby understood beyond a 
question of emotion. It relates more accurately to the mind and intuition. A study of 
psychological coherence, furthermore, will show us the way a work is able to express 
thoughts and ideas, Marx’s musical Idee, and the concomitant assumption of our 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
231 An earlier version of this chapter was published as: Sara Eckerson, “The Material and ‘Inner Life’ 
in Music: Beethoven, Psychological Coherence, and Meaning,” Humanities 4, no. 3 (2015): 418-435, 
doi:10.3390/h4030418. 
232 A. B. Marx, Musical Form, 178-9. 
233  Hegel, Aesthetics, 20. 
234 The interpretation of psychological coherence put forward here is derived from a Hegelian 
interpretation of psychology, i.e. rational psychology, as described in Hegel’s Encyclopedia – Science 
of Logic. Hegel determines rational psychology in the following way: “it sets itself the task of knowing 
the spirit through thinking and also of proving what is then thought.” G. W. F. Hegel, Encyclopedia of the 
Philosophical Sciences in Basic Outline, Part I: Science of Logic, trans. Klaus Brinkmann and Daniel 
O. Dahlstrom (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), §34, addition, 73. 
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ability to comprehend that content. We will conclude with an example from 
Beethoven’s Symphony No. 9 in D minor, Op. 125, to support the argument that the 
meaning of a musical work, which harbors contradictory moods or thoughts, is 
strengthened and clarified through an examination of psychological coherence. 
 
A. Psychological coherence and thought 	  
In theoretical writings and reviews, Marx pays special attention to the role of 
performance as an audible reproduction of meaning. This serves to broaden the 
horizon of meaning, as Marx challenges us to hear meaning just as much as we might 
glean meaning from analysis. Marx highlights this in a treatise on the proper 
performance of Beethoven’s pianoforte music.235 We can attribute the urgency in 
Marx’s prose to his identification of the “peculiar nature” of the content of 
Beethoven’s music in comparison to the music of other composers. For Marx, a 
proper interpretation of Beethoven’s sonatas requires the pianist to draw out an 
underlying meaning or thought from within the music. An accurate performance of 
meaning in Beethoven’s music  
is not reached by a general subjective feeling (Gefühl) as would suffice 
for the pianoforte works of…Haydn, Mozart, Dussek, Hummel, Chopin, 
Mendelssohn. . . .The peculiar content of Beethoven’s style manifests 
itself in the fact that through his works, instrumental and more 
particularly pianoforte music, attained to idealism and became the 
expression of determined ideal content.236  
 
In fact, the identification of thought, ideas, and ideal content in Beethoven’s 
music is a recurrent theme in Marx’s discussions of music history. For example, Marx 
writes that Beethoven brought about “the spiritualization of instrumental music by 
raising it to the sphere of definite conceptions and ideas.”237  Then, in a description of 
compositional styles in opera, Marx draws another distinction between Mozart and 
Beethoven that calls attention to difference in content. The music of the former 
demonstrates a superficial freedom while the latter is preoccupied with the deeper 
“mysteries” of musical expression. Mart describes “whilst Mozart shows greater 
freedom and lightness of fancy, Beethoven dives more deeply into the mysteries of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
235 See A. B. Marx, Introduction to the Interpretation of Beethoven’s Pianoforte Music, trans. Fannie 
Louise Gwinner (Chicago: Clayton F. Summy Co., 1895). 
236 Marx, Introduction to the Interpretation of Beethoven’s Pianoforte Music, 15, translation slightly 
modified. 
237 A. B. Marx, The Music of the Nineteenth Century and its Culture: System of Musical Instruction, 
trans. August Heinrich Wehrman (London: Robert Cocks and Co., 1895), 84. 
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his art, losing himself now and then in the dialogue of his orchestra, which not only 
entwines itself around the dialogue upon the stage, but often threatens to completely 
overgrow it.”238 In this report, Marx describes how “determined ideal thought” and 
the “mysteries” of instrumental music become vivid in sound. The effect of 
Beethoven’s orchestra, which climbs rapidly from below like an ivy to suffocate the 
opera singers on stage, can only truly be appreciated when witnessing a performance 
of Beethoven’s opera Fidelio (Op. 72). 
Marx addresses a psychological component of ideal content in the essay 
“Etwas über die Symphonie” (1824).239 In this text, Marx writes that Beethoven, in 
Symphony No. 5 in C minor, Op. 67, successfully illustrates “the succession of soul 
states portrayed with deep psychological truth.”240 We can juxtapose Marx’s 
descriptions of Beethoven’s music where we find “ideal thought” and “Deep 
psychological truth,” with Marx’s impression of Mozart’s music that illustrates 
“lightness of fancy.” Psychological coherence offers insight into cases of “deep 
psychological truth” and “lightness of fancy,” but what is more interesting in this case 
is to see how we arrive at meaning in music through understanding this particular 
kind of coherence.   
Scott Burnham points out a more specific division between Mozart and 
Beethoven in the vocabulary Marx uses to identify the general aims of musical 
content. The division is located in the opposition between the terms Gefühl [feeling] 
and Seelenzustand [soul state] in Marx’s texts. With Beethoven’s music, Burnham 
writes: “Marx feels something more momentous than a pleasing array of feelings; he 
feels the succession of states of the soul. By using the expression ‘soul state’ 
(Seelenzustand), Marx implies something deeper than a Gefühl or an Empfindung, 
words he uses when describing the content of Mozart’s music.”241 Psychological 
coherence is a critical intermediary between the parts of a work and its Idee precisely 
because it speaks to ideal content and the “soul state” found in the material of music. 
In interpretation, the identification of psychological coherence is a task that aims to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
238  A. B. Marx, The Music of the Nineteenth Century and its Culture: System of Musical Instruction, 
62. 
239 A. B. Marx, “Etwas über die Symphonie und Beethovens Leistungen in diesem Fache” In Berliner 
Allgemeine Musikalische Zeitung (Berlin: Im Verlage der Schlesingerschen Buch- und Musikhandlung, 
1824); vol. 1, 165-68; 173-76; 181-84. 
240 Scott Burnham, “Criticism, Faith, and the ‘Idee’: A. B. Marx’s Early Reception of Beethoven,” 19th-
Century Music, Vol. 13, No. 3 (Spring, 1990): 183-192, 188. 
241 Burnham, Idee, 191. 
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describe content beyond “feeling” (Gefühl) and “sensation” (Empfindung) because of 
the inherent relation psychological coherence has with both content and form. In our 
study, the soul and psychological content (or “psychological truth”) in music is 
comparable to the inner life of an artwork; the musical work ideally expresses 
thoughts, ideas, and truth in a way that is perceptible through interpretation. This 
becomes clear when Marx claims that many of Beethoven’s works reflect “life.” Marx 
determines this in the interpretation of particular passages and the way in which these 
portray (psychological) states such as anguish or joy.242 These passages then feed into 
the description of ideal content or the Idee, where meaning is constructed from the 
conglomerate of meaning collected from these particular passages. 
Psychological coherence helps to resolve complexities of meaning in a 
musical work even when the content varies from a singular or predominant thought 
throughout the whole (such as the concept of parting and return in the “Farewell” 
sonata, Op. 81a), to works that present concurrent ideas that contrast or conflict with 
each other. The task of psychological coherence, which renders conflicting ideas 
intelligible within the same work in a sense of progress toward the establishment of 
an Idee, mimics an operation in thought (essentially psychological) of dialectic. In 
contrast to the Hegelian definition of dialectic in understanding, where a thesis and 
antithesis annihilate each other in the process of sublation, in a movement toward the 
Absolute, our parts or components in a musical work are not negated in what assumes 
the appearance of an organic process.243 We find, nevertheless, a similarity between 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
242 This is present in Marx’s review of Beethoven’s Symphony No. 9 in D Minor, Op. 105, (see Marx, 
“[Beethoven]: The Final Symphony” in Musical Analysis in the Nineteenth Century, ed. and trans. Ian 
Bent, volume 2: Hermeneutic Approaches [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994], 264-288) 
and also in the Seventh Symphony (see Scott Burnham’s description [“Criticism, Faith, ‘Idee,’” 191]). 
Marx alludes to the notion that the illustration of life is fundamental to musical expression when he 
writes: “Music cannot define in precise terms who and what you are; but it causes all the successive 
emotions of your heart to pass in review before you; and these enable you to unriddle the enigma of 
your existence. It is both a monologue and a dialogue, full of dramatic truth and life,” Marx, The Music 
of the Nineteenth Century, 46, translation slightly modified. 
243 There is little room in the present argument to offer a lengthy discussion of the notion of musical 
dialectic. Adorno has infamously linked Hegel’s dialectics with Beethoven’s work by virtue of 
opposing expressions, forces, or passages, constructing affines between main theme and thesis, second 
theme and antithesis, etc. Adorno expounds on the idea of whole as the strongest entity that illuminates 
the meaning of parts, where “the unity of the whole is mediated” and “not only is the individual 
element insignificant, but the individual moments are estranged from each other. . . . The Beethovenian 
unity is one which moves by means of antitheses; this is to say its moments, taken individually, seem to 
contradict each other. But therein lies the meaning of Beethovenian form as process, so that although 
the incessant ‘mediation’ between individual moments and finally through the consummation of the 
form as a whole, the seemingly antithetical motifs are grasped in their identity.” (Theodor W. 
Adorno, Beethoven: the Philosophy of Music, ed. Rolf Tiedemann, trans. Edmund Jephcott 
[Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998], [Fragment 29], 13) It is difficult to pin down what in music could 
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our view of the co-existence of conflicting ideas, which are considered in the 
formation of a higher principle, and Hegel’s discussion of the dialectic in the 
Encyclopedia where “even feelings, bodily as well as mental, possess a dialectic of 
their own. It is well known how the extremes of pain and joy turn into one another…and 
in some circumstances the most poignant melancholy tends to announce itself with a 
smile.”244 We encounter a problem of comparison to Hegel’s dialectic when we 
examine the verb aufheben, intrinsic to the process of dialectic, that is normally 
rendered as “to sublate” into English. The German word has several different 
meanings and Hegel does not explicitly name a specific definition; perhaps the most 
relevant definition of aufheben for our purposes is “to preserve or maintain” at the 
same time as present notions of annihilation or negation. Even when confronted with 
components in a musical work that are seemingly contradictory to the Idee, we 
maintain these parts as a way to arrive at the final conclusion of the Idee. In this 
sense, although an Idee may unify particular parts and ideal content in a musical 
work, we will vividly maintain particulars that often oppose the Idee as a method to 
strengthen the coherence and integrity of ideal content. From this perspective, we 
regard psychological coherence as the fundamental driving force of meaning of the 
whole, which steers attention away from general subjective feeling (Gefühl) and in the 
direction of determinate ideal content. 
 
B. Content and form through the lens of psychological coherence 
 
 B1. General considerations 
	  
To explore psychological coherence in content and form, we will look more 
closely at the notion of a work as a whole and how the Idee can apply to the whole 
even when contrasting parts emerge. For instance, we can consider a work of music as 
a composite of fragments (a philosophical thought championed by Friedrich 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
correspond to an antithetical theme in Hegelian logic and dialectics, in the logical p / not-p relation; 
this is a notion that Adorno does not directly address. Counterpoint may present a close solution, where 
an antithetical theme could be a theme in retrograde. Yet even a theme in retrograde has a specular 
relation to the main theme; it cannot sustain a p / not-p relationship because of harmonic implications, 
such as how to determine the meaning of a cadence in reverse. In Adorno’s elaboration on the idea of 
dialectics in music, negation (a crucial component of dialectics) has a more abstract representation in 
music than in logic. In Fragment 40, Adorno writes that in Beethoven, “the concept of negation as that 
which drives a process forward can be precisely grasped. It involves a breaking off of melodic lines 
before they have evolved into something complete and rounded in order to impel them into the next 
figure” (Adorno, 19). 
244 Hegel, Encyclopedia: Science of Logic, §81 Addition 1, 131. 
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Schlegel),245 of movements, moments, or parts: the whole is not bound together 
coherently but is essentially unfinished or fragmented. Although many musical works 
appear finished on the page, or sound complete, in many cases we are only analyzing 
or listening to one movement, overture, or arrangement selected from a larger whole. 
What complicates the problem of hearing fragments in performance is that many 
unfinished works are performed with the same integrity as finished ones (Mozart’s 
“Great” Mass in C minor, K.427/417a, and Mozart’s Requiem Mass in D minor, K. 
626, are examples of this).246 Even if the program notes for a performance state that 
the work is unfinished, rarely does the listener distinguish this music as having a 
weaker aesthetic meaning than a finished work. 
On a more elemental level, a musical work can seem fragmented because the 
first and second themes sound at odds with one another as though belonging to two 
different works (such as the first and second themes in the first movement of Haydn’s 
Sonata in D Major, Hob. XVI/51). However, the relentless movement forward that is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
245 “Many works that are praised for the beauty of their coherence have less unity than a motley heap of 
ideas simply animated by the ghost of a spirit and aiming at a single purpose. What really holds the 
latter together is that free and equal fellowship in which, so the wise men assure us, the citizens of the 
perfect state will live at some future date; it’s that unqualifiedly sociable spirit which, as the beau 
monde maintains, is now to be found only in what is so strangely and almost childishly called the great 
world. On the other hand, many a work of art whose coherence is never questioned is, as the artist 
knows quite well himself, not a complete work but a fragment, or one or more fragments, a mass, a 
plan. But so powerful is the instinct for unity in mankind that the author himself will often bring 
something to a kind of completion which simply can’t be made a whole or a unit; often quite 
imaginatively and yet completely unnaturally. The worst thing about it is that whatever is draped about 
the solid, really existent fragments in the attempt to mug up a semblance of unity consists largely of 
dyed rags. And if these are touched up cleverly and deceptively, and tastefully displayed, then that’s all 
the worse. For then he deceives even the exceptional reader at first, who has a deep feeling for what 
little real goodness and beauty is still to be found here and there in life and letters. That reader is then 
forced to make a critical judgment to get at the right perception of it! And no matter how quickly the 
dissociation takes place, still the first fresh impression is lost” (Friedrich Schlegel, “Critical 
Fragments,” in Friedrich Schlegel’s Lucinde and the Fragments, §103, 155). 
246 Richard Kramer writes at length about the interpretation of fragmented and unfinished works in 
light of Schlegel’s theory of fragments. We argue that in Schlegel’s Fragment 103 of the Critical 
Fragments, Schlegel understands even a finished work to be fragmentary, or unfinished. This can also 
refer to the creative impulse, where a composer may always see imperfection and room for 
improvement in a musical work that is “finished.” For Richard Kramer’s account see Richard Kramer, 
Unfinished Music (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 311-44. One of Kramer’s claims is that 
musical fragments offer a vision of the creative process or a composer’s thought. With relation to 
Mozart’s fragment, String Quartet in G minor, K 587a (Anhang 74), Kramer writes on the final, partial 
phrase found in mm. 24-5: “The inclination to complete this unfinished phrase confronts us with the 
ultimate riddle of the fragment as a species, for it assumes access to a process of mind that is 
unfathomable even within itself. It is not the harmonization of the phrase, or even the logical next step 
in its unfolding, that is at question, but a prior matter having to do with the imponderables of the 
mind that could give us this phrase with one hand and take it back with the other” (Kramer, 
Unfinished Music, 316).  
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characteristic of music can overthrow this kind of opposition;247 this flow of sonorous 
impressions is like a rigid current that spirals backwards only with predictable repeats 
(or da capo indications, etc.) written into the form. Hermeneutics provides a freedom 
to compare and contrast nonconsecutive parts, as well as fragments, to illuminate a 
strong, conceptual meaning. To speak of an Idee with relation to this perspective 
appears unfeasible because one is unable to visualize unity among disjointed parts; 
when we focus too strongly on fragments, the fragments’ individuality and their 
ability to function independently from the whole will condition our ability to grasp the 
whole.248 
Psychological coherence, however, rescues the notion of whole and supports 
evidence of ideal content within particular parts. We draw opposition to Schlegel’s 
uncompromising view of a fragmentary nature of art through the comparison of part 
to whole in an example from Hegel’s Encyclopedia. Hegel illustrates the importance 
of unity of the whole in a discussion of the body and its relation to its organs. 
Notwithstanding the body’s strong notion of whole, the organs in the body have 
specific functions and when seen alone they can be self-contained;249 yet they 
maintain a relationship to the whole, to the body, namely, these parts (organs) 
constitute the whole: “The parts are diverse from one another and are what is self-
standing. But they are only parts in their identical relation to one another or insofar as, 
taken together, they make up the whole. But that ‘together’ is the opposite and 
negation of the part.”250 This negative relation of whole to part is immediate, and this 
aspect is crucial for understanding how a whole is perceived: “the members and 
organs of a living body are not to be considered merely as its parts, since they are 
what they are only in their unity, and by no means do they behave indifferently 
towards this unity. These members and organs first become mere parts in the hands of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
247 Janet Schmalfeldt describes the process of becoming, synthesis, and dialectic with relation to 
Beethoven. She achieves this namely through a presentation of views by Theodor Adorno and Carl 
Dahlhaus along with her interpretation of their ideas. In one example, she cites Adorno’s theory of 
multidimensional hearing that allows us to hear forward and backward at the same time. In spite of 
this, we find that a composition’s form will condition Adorno’s progressive view of hearing (see Janet 
Schmalfeldt, In the Process of Becoming: Analysis and Perspectives on Form in Early Nineteenth-
Century Music [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011], 23-57, viz. 32). 
248 The individuality of a musical fragment can be observed when opera arias are sung at recitals. In 
these cases, the performer is able to grant coherence to a particular song through performance 
interpretation even when the meaning of the aria in the dramatic context of the opera is lost. 
249 See Hegel, Encyclopedia: Science of Logic. This is the case, as Hegel describes, from the 
perspective of an “anatomist who has to deal no longer with living bodies but with cadavers” 
(Hegel, Encyclopedia: Science of Logic, §135, Addition, 203). 
250 Hegel, Encyclopedia: Science of Logic, §134 (α), 203). 
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the anatomist.”251 In this construction, Hegel presents us with a “living” or proper 
whole that is characterized by a harmony between its parts. We contrast this with a 
“dead” whole that can be taken apart and fragmented because its inner life and 
identity are no longer relevant. To analyze the difference between fragments and the 
notion of whole is, nevertheless, not as easy as deciphering between the living and the 
dead. 
Marx’s concept of psychological coherence shows how musical parts inform 
and reflect components of an Idee, or ideal content, even if they seem to contradict the 
identity of the Idee; psychological coherence presents the parts as particular ideas or 
thoughts, which can then be absorbed into the whole. To add complexity to the part, 
we establish a foundation in Schleiermacher’s hermeneutics and we maintain the 
integrity of the particular much like Hegel’s anatomist. The parts are not annihilated 
and do not become something else—we can always re-evaluate the Idee in light of the 
parts, and start interpretation again at square one. Also, in the temporary suspension 
of a notion of whole, we can establish meaning for parts that are generally overlooked 
when integrated into a larger whole. It is in this hermeneutic approach that we are 
able to reconcile the dialectic of the whole and analysis of the part in light of 
psychological coherence. The strength of these conclusions resides in the fact that we 
are not attempting to resolve all inconsistencies of meaning into one organized and 
neat whole. A diverse whole will emerge from this hermeneutic interpretation and 
will be demonstrative of the particular unity of the musical work in question. From 
this perspective, we solidify our notion of whole in music through a peculiar “hanging 
together” of parts that demonstrates psychological and thoughtful coherence and 
meaning. 
 
     B2. The creative process and “specific materialization”  	  
We can examine psychological coherence at a fundamental level of the 
creative process as what essentially gives shape to unmediated, creative content. From 
a Hegelian perspective, a work of art is created through, and reflects, the spirit. By 
“spirit” we understand Hegel also signifies mind or intellect as representative of the 
subjective inner life that is universal. In a comparison of works of art to objects that 
occur in nature, Hegel states: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
251 Hegel, Encyclopedia §135, Addition, 203. 
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Our imaginative mentality has in itself the character of universality, and what 
it produces acquires already thereby the stamp of universality in contrast to 
the individual things in nature. In this respect our imagination has the 
advantage that it is of wider range and therefore is capable of grasping the 
inner life, stressing it, and making it more visibly explicit. Now the work of 
art is of course not just a universal idea, but its specific materialization; but 
since it has been produced by spirit and its imaginative power, it must be 
permeated by this character of universality, even though this character has a 
visible liveliness.…Now here it is the task of the work of art to grasp the 
object in its universality and to let go, in its external appearance, everything 
that would remain purely external and indifferent for the expression of the 
content. The artist therefore does not adopt everything in the forms or modes 
of expression which he finds outside him in the external world and because 
he finds it there; on the contrary, if he is to create genuine poetry, he grasps 
only those characteristics which are right and appropriate to the essence of 
the matter in hand.252  
 
In the context of Hegel’s conclusion, we find a composition (a particular, 
artistic, “specific materialization” of a universal idea) by Beethoven can reflect a 
subjective, interior state (such as unrest, suffering, or strife) particular to Beethoven 
and Beethoven’s life. While a composition can reflect a subjective thought through an 
expression of unrest, it also simultaneously speaks to a universal aspect – e.g., unrest as 
common to humanity. In this passage, Hegel shows that a work of art reflects the 
inner life or mind of the individual who created it at the same time as portray the 
universality of that content. Hegel closes this thought with a discussion of the form 
the artist will choose in order to best portray that ideal content. The artist 
subsequently engages in an activity that transforms a universal idea into a material 
object. It seems natural, then, that the form the artist selects will reflect content in a 
complex way, through a dialectical relationship.253 
We find this spelled out in what Marx writes regarding the Ninth Symphony, 
where both the form and the material exhibit psychological content. An inner 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
252 Hegel, Aesthetics, 164. 
253 See Hegel’s Encyclopedia: Science of Logic, 200. Marx describes how sonata form embodies an 
aspect of content in the following: “If the artist has experienced a deeper transformation within himself 
and then turns his gaze from his interior submersion back out into the world, then even the world itself 
will seem foreign and alienating to him. He knew it before and recognizes it again—and it appears as 
an Other to him, for he has become other. This schism, softened by the feeling of his own elevation and 
ascendancy over that which has become alien, finds its expression in the humor of the scherzo (the 
final movement of a sonata)” (Marx, “Form in Music,” in Musical Form in the Age of Beethoven, trans. 
Scott Burnham [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997], 50-90, 87). Marx illustrates an ideal 
artist in this passage (although not entirely explicit, Marx appears to be thinking of Beethoven), and 
sonata form is consequently based on the coherence that emerges from psychological evolution. The 
psychological evolution we encounter in the changing movements of a sonata will assist in our ability 
to establish psychological coherence of content, even though psychological evolution and 
psychological coherence are not identical. 
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necessity, derived from the symphony’s portrayal of a universal, elucidates this and 
shapes both content and form. The Idee will grant coherence to the apparent “total 
freedom of all parts,” and constitute the “sure foundation” that predicates the work’s 
content and form. Marx makes the following comment regarding the conclusion of the 
first movement, Allegro ma non troppo e un poco maestoso, of Beethoven’s 
Symphony No. 9, in D minor, Op. 125: 
 
The living world of musical instruments harbours awful secrets within its 
bosom. What must their creator have had to endure in his fateful solitariness, 
imprisoned in eternal silence within his own breast! To unlock the enigma of 
his own interior existence there was only the enigmatic language of music—
one mystery as solution to another! But he stood unbowed though profoundly 
shaken. What control and self-possession does this total freedom of all parts, 
among other things, bear witness to, each line appearing to exist in its own 
right alone, while yet he holds them all on course and steers them with a tight 
rein! What sure foundation does this perfectly stable and lucidly formed 
structure evince in the depth and richness of its musical ideas! . . . The first 
movement of each of the symphonies is decisive for the idea (Gedanke) of 
the work. In the Ninth it is more so than ever. What does it convey to us? 
This ceaseless complaint of eternal discontent from which he is no longer 
able to free himself in his kingdom of musical instruments—he who has 
imbued and inspired this kingdom with his creative spirit. . . . Man is always 
closest to man; man’s voice is the most familiar, the most sympathetic, the 
most intelligible. That is a general truth. . . . It was here that the outward plan 
to give the symphony a new shape by incorporating a final chorus must have 
become an inner necessity. What was a general truth, what was an experience 
peculiar of Beethoven, became now the Idea of the Ninth Symphony.254  
 
 
In Marx’s trenchant remarks, he describes a “living world of musical 
instruments” where these instruments bear some semblance of complete 
independence. Yet these parts, despite apparent independence, are bound together 
with a blind stitch. As a living whole that breathes with vitality, its parts struggle for 
recognition at the same time as they show their unity in the form of a dynamic whole. 
To fully comprehend the meaning of the symphony’s first movement, Marx must 
reach beyond the confines of the movement’s double bar to reflect on the significance 
of this part to the symphony’s finale. The leap over two intermediary movements (the 
scherzo, Molto vivace, and the Adagio molto e cantabile) shows us the complexity of 
the symphony where one must refer to another part in order to make sense of the first. 
But of even greater importance, Marx demonstrates the universality of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
254 Marx, “[Beethoven]: The Final Symphony,” Ludwig van Beethoven: Life and Creative Output, In 
Musical Analysis in the Nineteenth Century, ed. and trans. Ian Bent, volume 2, 227-28. 
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symphony’s Idee and how it serves as a floodlight to illuminate meaning in the 
darkest and most obscure parts of the music. 
Marx recognizes the Idee of the Ninth Symphony as a complex entity. The 
contradictory aspects within its definition are precisely what forge its relationship to 
diverse parts throughout the work. He addresses the opposition within the Idee of the 
Ninth in the following: “We can detect a particular elemental quality of sound 
reverberating within the work – one so mighty, so gigantically forceful, and yet so 
tender and full of sorrow.”255 If we use this statement as a glimpse into the work’s 
psychological coherence, we can then apply its insight to both performance and 
critical interpretation. The “elemental quality of sound” speaks to the proximity of the 
finished work to the creative impulse embodied in the Idee. Beethoven composed the 
symphony in such a way that a rudimentary quality of sound (that is “gigantically 
forceful”) is perceptible in the same expression of tenderness and sorrow. 
 
C. Psychological coherence, the Ninth Symphony, and expressive indications 
 
C1. The Finale 	  
To show the relevance of psychological coherence beyond nineteenth century 
criticism, we will set it in motion in a fresh examination of Beethoven’s Ninth 
Symphony. In particular, we will use psychological coherence as a device to 
investigate expressive indications or indications of mood. Notation that involves 
expressive word cues (dolce, espressivo, cantabile, etc.) pose a sui generis quandary 
for performance interpretation. Generally the complexity involved in the 
interpretation of these indications is overlooked. If doubt arises, one is referred to 
musical lexicons and contemporary or historical treatises on performance practice. In 
broad daylight, nonetheless, with great visibility in the score, we encounter expressive 
indications that are at odds with the musical context we find them in. Conflict 
suddenly arises between the overall psychological coherence of the whole, specific 
passages, and these descriptive musical instructions. 
Beethoven’s Symphony No. 9 in D Minor, Op. 125, provides us with a 
number of examples of this conflict. In accordance with Marx’s criticism, the 
symphony is able to maintain psychological coherence that sustains its “elemental 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
255 Marx, “[Beethoven]: The Final Symphony,” 219. 
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quality” of a mighty force, juxtaposed with tenderness and sorrow. This same 
coherence supports an Idee of a fundamental sympathy found in humanity that is 
expressed through the feeling of familiarity and intelligibility when one hears 
another’s voice. The contrasting elements that serve as the foundation for the Idee are 
exemplified in a passage at the Allegro assai of the Finale directly following the 
baritone recitative, “O Freunde, nicht diese Töne!” (Figure 3.7). This particular 
passage presents us with indications of piano and dolce for oboes, dolce for clarinets 
and bassoons, and piano for first and second horns. The oboes have the most complex 
theme with respect to expression (they must play dolce and piano) while the vocal 
parts bellow in a dramatic exchange. The strings’ pizzicati melt away in the 
interjections from the bass members of chorus; the strings’ lack of dynamic 
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Figure 3.7 Ludwig van Beethoven, Symphony No. 9 in D Minor, Op. 125, Finale, 




The dolce parts do not call attention to themselves in the same way as the 
baritone and basses’ “Freude”–“Freude!” pairing. (Naturally the basses’ forte will 
sound louder because there are more voices singing these notes than the baritone 
soloist’s part.) The woodwinds quietly murmur the first two measures of the “An die 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
256 Urtext edited by Jonathan Del Mar, Kassel: ©1999, Bärenreiter-Verlag. Reproduced with kind 
permission of Bärenreiter. 
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Freude” melody as many of these same instruments did one hundred sixty measures 
before, in the thematic parade of the symphony that precedes the baritone recitative. 
Be that as it may, at measure 237, there is a change in the air – we have entered into 
the choral part of the Finale. 
During the recitative (Figure 3.8), the baritone has essentially told the 
instruments of the orchestra to go home: “No more of these tones!” This outburst in 
the Finale has perplexed many critics, music historians, and philosophers. Stephen 
Hinton presents an argument for how to interpret these words that hinges on the 
negation embedded in the baritone’s words. From our perspective, the baritone does 
not reject musical (or instrumental) tone insomuch as he rejects the mood of the 
symphony; we thus arrive at a conclusion that is more literal (the instruments 







 	    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
257 It seems dangerous to bring Friedrich Schlegel’s concept of irony to bear on the negation expressed 
in the baritone’s recitative (see Stephen Hinton, “Not which Tones? The Crux of Beethoven’s Ninth,” 
19th-Century Music, Vol. 22, No. 1 [Summer, 1998]: 61-77, 75-7). Schlegel’s irony tends to turn 
meaning on its head, with arguments rooted in ultimate expressions of Fichtean ego, freedom, and 
subjectivity. Hegel describes the spiral of negation that comes with this irony: “The ironical, as the 
individuality of genius, lies in the self-destruction of the noble, great, and excellent; and so the 
objective art-formations too will have to display only the principle of absolute subjectivity, by showing 
forth what has worth and dignity for mankind as null in its self-destruction. This then implies that not 
only is there to be no seriousness about laws, morals, and truth, but that there is nothing in what is lofty 
and best, since, in its appearance in individuals, characters, and actions, it contradicts and destroys 
itself and so is ironical about itself” (Hegel, Aesthetics, 67). One way to counter the irony argument is 
to show that despite the symphony’s expressions of unrest, which are metaphorically parallel to aspects 
of Beethoven’s life, Marx is able to construct an Idee within the Ninth Symphony (and thus assert the 
presence of universal content). The universality of meaning locked within this symphony, and the 
diverse interpretations it affords, suggests that subjectivity and ego are far from the baritone’s words. 
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Figure 3.8 Ludwig van Beethoven, Symphony No. 9 in D Minor, Op. 125, Finale, 
Recitativo, mm. 216-227.258  
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
258 Urtext edited by Jonathan Del Mar, Kassel: ©1999, Bärenreiter-Verlag. Reproduced with kind 
permission of Bärenreiter. 
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For a material demonstration of a literal interpretation (where the baritone to 
demands the instrumentalists to desist), we encounter the oboes, clarinets, and 
bassoons at m. 237 (Figure 3.7) softly persuading the baritone of their necessary 
presence. It is as though the woodwinds plead “please do not call in an army of 
singers, the ‘Freunde,’ to overpower us with their ‘joy!’” The first and second horns, 
normally a source of strength and valor, are even less conspicuous than the 
woodwinds: they sound an octave pedal point, at a piano dynamic, that seems to 
disappear into the darkness as the baritone and basses yell across to each other in the 
open space. The vocal effect is then pulled downward by the basses of the chorus 
singing “Freude!” and the string section’s double basses command the tone even 
lower through their sounding register to a tone two octaves below the notes in the 
vocal part. The mysterious contour of the sonorous gesture is so great that it hardly 
seems we are hearing the string section at all. We witness, instead, a superhuman 
group of voices create a spontaneous black hole into which all the forte sound 
descends. Beethoven allows the vocalists one measure to recover in between the two 
instances of this curiosity (Figure 3.7, m. 239). 
By m. 241, the baritone finally concedes to lower his voice a bit, at least to an 
angenehm or “pleasant” level. This indication directly reflects on the baritone’s words 
from earlier, in the recitative (Figures 3.8 and 3.9) “Sondern lasst uns angenehmere 
anstimmen, und freudenvollere!” (But let us strike up more pleasant/pleasing and 
joyful [tones]!). The angenehm indication in m. 241 (Figure 3.7), as a parenthetical 
remark, offsets the mood of the previous passages, and demonstrates an adjustment in 
expression away from the invasive “Freude,” to the longer phrases that begin the 
“Ode to Joy.” It is an about-face in expression when the baritone soloist chooses to 
shift gears to a style that mocks the woodwinds dolce at mm. 237-240. The angenehm 
baritone at m. 241 marks a significant crux in the symphony, and a point of no return 
with respect to the timbre of the orchestra. 
To fully grasp the instability that the appearance of the vocal parts creates, we 
refer to the start of the recitative at m. 216 (Figure 3.8). The baritone solo lacks any 
dynamic indication, but emerges out of what seem to be the longest three beats of 
silence.259 The orchestra is suddenly reduced to only the string section. Measure 215 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
259 The last beat of measure 215, not shown, is a rest in all instruments. The lack of dynamics is rather 
unremarkable, as the vocal parts in recitatives generally do not have dynamics written into the part; 
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finds all sounding instruments at fortissimo, thereby suggesting the same for the 
baritone soloist (who enters the symphonic space with the vigor of a police officer 
who has burst onto the scene to break up a noisy party). The strings cautiously rejoin 
the sounding space to support the recitative at a piano level (Figure 3.8, m. 221). The 
baritone resounds triumphantly above their submissive colla voce. The colla voce 
concludes with almost all instruments of the orchestra exclaiming a short forte motif 
at mm. 229-230 (Figure 3.9) that modulates the recitative into D major. As this motif 
accumulates with dramatic changes from piano to forte (sforzando in the strings) and 
the forte interjection once the baritone has concluded the recitative (m. 236). We find 
at this moment that it as though the members of the orchestra were assuring each 
other they were still in the room. The recitative has a laborious quality about it, 
exacerbated in its sustained tones and the relative independence of the vocalist; it 












 	    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
measure 238 does provide dynamic indications that call attention to the opposition between the voices 
and the other instrumental parts. 
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Figure 3.9 Ludwig van Beethoven, Symphony No. 9 in D Minor, Op. 125, Finale, 
Recitativo, mm. 228-236.260  
 
 
Once we reach m. 237 (Figure 3.7), a new instrumental section has entered the 
symphony: a full chorus and a quartet of vocal soloists. The instrumentalists of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
260 Urtext edited by Jonathan Del Mar, Kassel: ©1999, Bärenreiter-Verlag. Reproduced with kind 
permission of Bärenreiter. 
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orchestra, with the woodwind section at dolce, seem desperate to strike a balance. At 
m. 241 the baritone sings of joy, apparently renewed, and drastically changes the 
dynamic and expression of the execution. Measure 241 marks the point of a new 
stability, as the chorus and soloists will dominate the sonority of the symphony from 
now on. This angenehm passage sets the tone that the singers will have control of the 
Finale because the baritone soloist no longer needs to sing aggressively at forte, 
which gives the impression that the baritone is interrupting a conversation. (The 
sentiments the word angenehm recalls and the dynamic of forte seem to cancel each 
other out, even if the vocalist sings this section at forte; it would appear unnecessary 
for the baritone to sing at forte considering the few supporting orchestral voices are 
sounding at piano or pianissimo.) The instrumental sections on the whole, for the rest 
of the Finale, merely shore up and exalt the expression of the singers’ words and 
passages. In the Finale, once the baritone has relaxed enough to sing at an angenehm 
level, the tables have turned and all of the parts of the orchestra serve the message of 
“Freude” and its vocal representatives. 
 
C2. The timpani, the Finale, and the whole 	  
In this short interpretation of the entrance of the vocal parts, we have explored 
the contrasting expressions in mm. 216-242 (Figures 3.7-3.9) through a perspective 
where Marx’s psychological coherence is a unifying thread. The unity between parts, 
forged through this method, reflects on the particular nature of the symphony as a 
whole. Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony, nevertheless, continues to challenge critical 
interpretation that aims to establish coherence. David Benjamin Levy specifically 
addresses the meaning of the Finale with relation to the whole. Levy writes that the 
structure of the Finale “is a microcosm of the entire Ninth Symphony itself.”261 The 
hermeneutic significance Levy draws from an analysis of the symphony’s 
“microcosm,” a mini-whole within the whole, shows how the meanings of the 
symphony’s earlier movements are systematically reflected in different sections of the 
Finale. Levy’s argument, nevertheless, is only one component of coherence of the 
whole that we can locate in the Finale. With relation to ideal content – and this is 
where Marx’s psychological coherence facilitates the construction of meaning – we 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
261 David Benjamin Levy, Beethoven: The Ninth Symphony, revised edition (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2003), 93. 
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find the expressive polarization of orchestral sections in other crucial moments of the 
symphony. For example, the opposition we found in the baritone’s exclamation at the 
beginning of the recitative (Figure 3.8, mm. 216-221) recalls the timpani’s paroxysm 
of assertiveness in the opening of the symphony’s second movement (Figure 3.10). 
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Figure 3.10 Ludwig van Beethoven, Symphony No. 9 in D Minor, Op. 125, mvmt. II, 
Molto vivace, scherzo, mm. 1-12.262  
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
262 Urtext edited by Jonathan Del Mar, Kassel: ©1999, Bärenreiter-Verlag. Used with permission of 
Bärenreiter-Verlag, Kassel. 
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The sensation of a loud, intrusive voice in contradistinction to a harmonious 
orchestral timbre is experienced first at this moment in the symphony (Figure 3.10, m. 
5). A spotlight is fixed on the timpani: firstly, it sounds an unanticipated tone;263 
secondly, it has become the most curious object of our attention – through its bold and 
prominent position in the orchestration, it clearly has something to say. The assuming 
figure of the timpani throughout the second movement foreshadows the imminent 
entrance of the baritone in the recitative. We connect the outbursts from this 
unsettling creature, which has asserted the authority of the percussion section (albeit 
the timpani’s tone integrates into the tonal arrangement of the other parts), to the 
ruckus of the chorus’s “Freude!” (see Figure 3.7, m. 238). Richard Taruskin jocosely 
calls the Ninth Symphony “something of a timpani concerto among symphonies”264 and 
focuses on the timpani’s rambunctious contribution to the first movement’s 
recapitulation. On the one hand, many scholars interpret the scherzo as a joke – Levy 
suggests humor as a fundamental guide for the interpretation of this movement due to the 
Italian definition of “scherzo.”265 On the other hand, we find the seriousness of the 
timpani adds to the general instability of the entire symphony. The timpani attempts 
to speak the Idee of the symphony through a mouthpiece that reproduces only one 
tone (and this tone reflected in an octave relation) dressed in an ardent sense of 
rhythm. It is not until we reach the vocal section of the Finale that we can recognize 
deeper meaning in the timpani’s truncated phrases. At first sight, the timpani solos 
and the baritone recitative seem ironic, comical, and naïve. Upon closer inspection, 
however, the refractory aspect of their expression instills a strong sense of dialectic 






	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
263 “The kettledrums in m. 5–tuned in a most unorthodox way to octave Fs–leave no doubt that the 
present movement is in D minor. This tuning–the same Beethoven used in the finale of his Eighth 
Symphony–is as unexpected as it is audacious,” Levy, Beethoven, 70. 
264 Richard Taruskin, “Resisting the Ninth,” 19th-Century Music, Vol. 12, No. 3 (Spring, 1989) 241-56, 
241. 
265 See Levy, Beethoven, 69-70. 
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 Concluding remarks on Marx’s psychological coherence 
 
In this study, we have tried to illustrate the relevance of Marx’s principles for 
uncovering musical meaning, specifically psychological coherence, in the context of 
Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony. The concept of psychological coherence takes 
interpretation in a direction beyond purely formal coherence (derived from normative 
rules of composition), and toward meaning as ideal content. The musical parts we 
base our conclusions upon, which when analyzed appear disjointed from the whole, 
are threaded together in a hermeneutic analysis that highlights the continuity between 
part and whole. Our activity aims to identify hints of ideal content within the diverse 
material components of music; the impression of ideal content is like a unique blind 
stamp that has been worn away on the score and its sounding quality – the vague 
shadows inspire us to look more closely at these material parts and temporarily 
separate them from the whole. 
In a final move of comprehension of ideal content, or a work’s “inner life,” we 
step back and observe the connections between the finely moving parts of a particular 
and the whole of the work. As we have shown in examples from the Ninth Symphony, 
the opposition between orchestral sections and expressive notation in the Finale offers 
insight regarding similar expressions of unrest in earlier movements of the symphony. 
Beethoven presents polarity between instruments within the same passages, which 
mirrors Hegel’s dialectic in thought, and unveils glimpses of an Idee. The form of the 
symphony, its orchestration, the notation Beethoven has chosen, and the sound of 
these together as a whole, provide the material foundation for psychological 
coherence. This seems to suggest that ideal content (or a musical Idee) is not a 
psychological immaterial entity independent from musical expression but rather the 
image of the whole as produced by it. The universal meaning, or ideal content, of the 
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The chief task of music consists in 
making resound, not the objective 
world itself, but, on the contrary, 
the manner in which the inmost self 
is moved to the depths of its 
personality and conscious soul. . . . 
The same is true of the effect of 
music. What it claims as its own is 
the depth of a person’s inner life as 
such; it is the art of the soul and is 
directly addressed to the soul. 
  G. W. F. Hegel, Aesthetics 	  	  	  
Conclusion: 	  	  
A. B. Marx and the Musical Idee: Are Material Considerations of Music 
Important for a Principle Derived from Idealist Aesthetics? 
  	  
In Scott Burnham’s seminal article on A. B. Marx’s Idee, a few characteristic traits of 
Marx’s musical Idee emerge: (1) its elusive quality;266 (2) it speaks to the “spiritual 
content” of a musical work;267 and (3) it is “that aspect of a musical work which 
guarantees the individuality of the work.”268 We are able to overcome this elusiveness 
in the material of the musical work, as Scott Burnham points out, because the Idee is 
both ideal and material; in the same way that we located symbols and psychological 
coherence in music, we can find instances of the Idee in the score.  These examples, 
nevertheless, are primarily derived from our critical reflections that go beyond the 
confines of the material of music. In the following, we will show how the term 
“material” in Marx’s writings includes the musical score and also the instruments 
themselves. The concept of “material” ties the musical Idee to a notion of truth, and 
fundamentals in Idealist aesthetics, when we reflect on the content the objective 
material puts forward. Through considerations of philosophy, we will seek to answer 
how important the material considerations of music are for Marx’s Idee from a 
philosophical perspective with relation to performance practice.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
266 Burnham describes this in Scott Burnham, “Criticism, Faith, and the ‘Idee’: A. B. Marx’s Early 
Reception of Beethoven,” 19th-Century Music, Vol. 13, No. 3 (Spring, 1990): 183-192, see 186-7. 
267 See Burnham, Idee, 186. 
268 Burnham, Idee, 185. 
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 Burnham writes the Idee “must have a palpable connection with sensuous reality in 
order to be suitable for musical representation.”269 When we consider this comment, 
we might ask: what kind of content has a “palpable connection with sensuous reality 
in order to be suitable” for expression in music? Although Hegel and Marx differ in 
their opinions about the possibilities of musical meaning, the two seem to agree that 
musical meaning is not simply any idea that might pop into one’s mind. In the 
lectures on aesthetics, although he does not mention it explicitly, Hegel pronounces 
certain restrictions on the possibilities of content that music can express on its own. 
Within the realm of absolute music, he describes: 
 
In the series of the developments of the kinds of instrumental music the 
composer’s own caprice becomes the untrammelled master along with, in 
contrast to the fixed course of melodic expression and the textual content 
of music as an accompaniment, its fancies, conceits, interruptions, 
ingenious freaks, deceptive agitations, surprising turns, leaps and flashes, 
eccentricities, and extraordinary effects.270 
 
 Hegel’s identification of musical meaning in instrumental music initially looks 
unintelligible, but we can sense a more profound idea behind Hegel’s opinion of 
musical caprice. Furthermore, Hegel does not say that musical meaning in these 
instances can be anything under the sun, but has something to do with caprice where 
the composer has the freedom to write music without being bound to an extramusical 
text. Hegel, moreover, insists on characterizing these odd turns of musical expression.  
This does the service of showing that music is not about nothing; music is almost 
always about something, but Hegel is unable to put his finger on it.271  
 
To get to the bottom of a clear understanding of Marx’s musical Idee – that is musical 
meaning that seems to escape Hegel’s imagination with respect to instrumental music 
– Scott Burnham pronounces a concept that is a cornerstone in the debate of music 
and meaning: time. From this basic principle, Burnham offers a broad playing field 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
269 Burnham, Idee, 187. 
270 G. W. F. Hegel, Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art, trans. T. M. Knox, Volume II (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1975), 955. 
271 When Isaiah Berlin describes the depth of meaning in Romantic art, Berlin elucidates an aspect of 
the difficulty involved when rendering musical meaning into prose: “If I am Proust, if I am Tolstoy . . . 
I might succeed in giving you some kind of version of your actual emotions when listening to a 
particular piece of music. . . . But in the cases of works that are more profound the more I say, the more 
remains to be said,” Isaiah Berlin, The Roots of Romanticism, second edition (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1999), 119. 
	   194	  
for content related to the temporal, forward-moving quality of music.272 
Notwithstanding the far-reaching determinations of time in music, the deeper meaning 
in a musical work (the Idee) must still have a “palpable connection with sensuous 
reality.” When we find that a musical Idee has a time-progress aspect to it, or even 
reflects life,273 this sheds light on only certain kinds of musical meaning. Content that 
has an explicit time-progress component limits other possibilities for meaning, such 
as a generalized concept of conflict. We often hear conflict in music represented 
through melodic and harmonic progressions that are not necessarily sequential. (We 
observed this with relation to Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony where we compared the 
timpani of the scherzo to the baritone of the Finale. The relation of the temporal, 
forward-moving quality of music becomes a latent component of a larger notion of 
conflict in the symphony.) 
 
Irrespective of an explicit, or implicit, time relation between a musical Idee and the 
material of music, meaning should be present in a sensuous reality – in the listener’s 
ear and experience. Musical meaning is consequently subjective, because it is based 
in our unique aesthetic experience of the musical work. The aim of a critical approach 
is to analyze the experience, and the material of music, and ultimately render any 
conclusions into an objective form where more than one person can grasp the musical 
Idee. Accordingly, a performance is an important tool for the expression of deeper 
meaning because a performance is the score’s mouthpiece and transfers the meaning 
of the score into an audible experience. 
 
As Marx explains to a skeptical critic, in order to understand musical expression 
through similes, symbolism, and psychological coherence, one must find how the 
music communicates by means of its material. It seems to follow, then, that the 
content of this communication (namely the content of performance) will provide us 
with the work’s deeper meaning (the Idee), which reflects a universal. We have 
examined Marx’s comments about symphonic scores and meaning in performance 
through practical exercises of explication (throughout Part III of this dissertation) 
where we considered how one particular work can impart universal meaning. Marx, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
272 Burnham goes further to define this idea as connected to content that can be “unfolded in time,” 
Burnham, Idee, 187.  
273 See Burnham, Idee, 187. 
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however, also finds the material of music, and its ability to express spiritual content, 
is partly correlated with the specific properties of the instruments in the orchestra. A 
successful composer will draw on knowledge of timbre, tessitura, and the capabilities 
of orchestral groups in different combinations, to better illustrate the greater meaning 
of the work itself. This knowledge, which is engaged during the creative process, is an 
antecedent to the construction of the finished musical work and necessarily informs 
our understanding of a musical Idee.  
 
In this vein, we suggest that Marx defends an argument where musical instruments 
themselves have something of a Hegelian inner life.274 We observe this in one 
example of Marx’s praise of Beethoven’s compositions; the passage we draw from 
captures Marx as he admonishes critics to challenge their first impressions of 
Beethoven’s music. Marx addresses the following comments to an unnamed philistine 
who is unable to appreciate meaning in instrumental music: 
 
If the Pastoral Symphony, the Eroica, the fifth, the seventh, and the ninth, 
the trio in D major [“Ghost,” Op. 70, no. 1], the romantic andante in the 
grand quartet in C major [Op. 59, no. 3], the sonatas in C# minor 
[“Moonlight,” Op. 27, no. 2] and F minor [“Appassionata,” Op. 57] and the 
one entitled, “Les Adieux” [Op. 81a] – if these and others do not at once 
convince the hearer that more was felt and meant by Beethoven than a play 
with lifeless “instruments of music,” the hearer has only to read the 
composer’s own superscriptions and annotations in order to learn that it was 
a world of living and spiritual beings which spoke to him out of the strings, 
the wood, and the reeds.275  
 
Marx is adamant that a musical score will convince skeptics, as though the score were 
a scientific proof; essentially Marx expresses the same advice to critics that a parent 
might offer to a child about crossing train tracks: if you don’t hear it, look! The 
superscriptions and annotations Marx mentions are, as he supports elsewhere, “a first 
clue for interpretation.”276 Even when Marx relegates superscriptions to a position of 
first impressions or “first clues,” these superscriptions are decisive because they will 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
274 The interpretation of sounding instruments ultimately has a subjective component, as we will 
discuss in the following pages. It recalls Hegel’s general view on the content of music: “[Music] forms 
the real centre of that presentation which takes the subjective as such for both form and content, 
because as art it communicates the inner life and yet even in its objectivity remains subjective,” Hegel, 
Aesthetics, 889. 
275 A. B. Marx, The Music of the Nineteenth Century and its Culture: System of Musical Instruction, 
trans. August Heinrich Wehrman (London: Robert Cocks and Co., 1855) 49. Translation slightly 
modified. For clarity, we have added opus numbers and commonly known titles to the works Marx 
describes in brackets. These opus numbers and titles are absent from the translation. 
276 Marx, Musical Form, 171. 
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point us in the direction of meaning. If we maintain our analogy between analyzing 
superscriptions and what to do when crossing train tracks, these superscriptions are 
like a distant light at the horizon – the more I reflect on this light, the more time I take 
looking at it, the meaning will become more pronounced in my sight. Superscriptions 
and annotations, moreover, suggest a source of meaning by shaping our aesthetic 
appreciation and hinting at what we should pay attention to when listening to the 
work. Much like our train analogy, however, these superscriptions threaten to 
overcome us with the weight of their compositional history – for example, they have 
entries in historical lexicons, which we explored with relation to the terms dolce and 
cantabile in the staff. The superscriptions and annotations offer up visible clues of a 
work’s deeper meaning, but this kind of notation does not explicitly divulge meaning. 
It is the score and the performance of the score that build a greater context and body 
of work, and are the actual sources of deeper meaning.  
 
Marx describes the instruments of the orchestra as “a world of living and spiritual 
beings,” as instruments that “speak.” With this insight, we find instruments impart 
expression in music that is beyond technical descriptions of how they are made or 
what constitutes them as material objects. To view the orchestra as “a world of living 
and spiritual beings” is a clue regarding the foundation of ideal music, the Idee, and 
“spiritual guidelines” in Marx’s thought. For example, we cannot point to a cello’s f-
holes, or the soundboard of a piano, and say it is here that we find ideal meaning in 
music. First, performers revive the inanimate objects – it is their touch, breath, and 
experience that cause the instruments to produce music and communicate with 
listeners; second, conclusions about the “spirituality” of instruments is a result of 
reflection on a performance. The quality of the wood and other materials used in 
construction, as well as craftsmanship, are important for an individual instrument, and 
can be cited as part of what gives a musical work a particular tone; these qualities 
alone, nevertheless, do not offer sufficient information to inform a critic’s “spiritual 
guidelines” to understand musical meaning. An instrument will, without a doubt, have 
influence on the meaning of the work due to the instrument’s specific timbre and 
clarity of sound. (For example, if we hear Beethoven’s Sonata in F Minor, Op. 57, 
“Appassionata” performed on a new Bösendorfer piano versus Beethoven’s own Graf 
piano [1826], the way we understand different musical passages may vary depending 
on the instrument.)  
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To grasp the significance of Marx’s claim that the orchestra spoke to Beethoven as “a 
world of living and spiritual beings,” we will take a closer look at how the orchestra 
can inform Marx’s musical Idee. To begin, we will start with the premise that the way 
a work of music is able to portray a spiritual idea, or an Idee, is through coherence of 
expression. Marx’s Idee has a philosophical look about it, although it is not Hegel’s 
Idea.277 Notwithstanding that the aims of Marx and Hegel’s respective projects are 
different, Marx illustrates that music and its Idee reach for deeper meaning much in 
the same way that philosophical texts try to grasp truth. To comprehend the deeper 
content of music, which we can place into a larger context of inquiry into the deeper 
content of the world around us, requires a similar reflection on principles of 
understanding and what it is to know. For this reason, Marx’s theory about musical 
meaning in a symphonic work sets store by the material of the orchestra itself, the 
material of its instruments, and the material of its score. (Marx regards this material 
much like a philosopher observes the materiality of our world, or analyzes specific 
things that happen in life and the attitudes people have toward those events in order to 
make claims about the truth or falsity of certain beliefs about the material world. In 
this way, the material score and observations of this kind inform a critical or 
“spiritual” pursuit of meaning in music.)  
 
When the orchestra grew to include more instruments under composers such as 
Giacomo Meyerbeer [1791-1864], Hector Berlioz [1803-1869], and Richard Wagner 
[1813-1883], this led Marx to question these composers’ abilities to express a spiritual 
Idee in comparison with Beethoven and Beethoven’s considerably smaller orchestra. 
Marx’s response to larger orchestras is inspired, to a certain degree, by the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
277 Hegel’s Idea is a more complex entity than Marx’s Idee, as Hegel’s concept is rooted in Hegel’s 
logic. The Hegelian Idea is truth in an ultimate, absolute sense. The idea is the true in and for itself, the 
absolute unity of the concept and objectivity (Hegel, Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in 
Basic Outline, Part I: Science of Logic, trans. Klaus Brinkmann and Daniel O. Dahlstrom [Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010], §213). With respect to art, Hegel writes of the idea implicitly by 
describing truth through a true artwork: “By truth, one understands at first that I know [wisse] how 
something is. In contrast to this, truth in the deeper sense consists in this, that objectivity is identical 
with the concept. It is truth in this deeper sense that is at stake if, for example, one is speaking of a true 
state or a true work of art. These objects [Gegenstände] are true if they are what they should be, that is 
to say, if their reality corresponds to their concept” (Hegel, Encyclopedia: Science of Logic, §213, 
Addition). Marx’s musical Idee may touch upon truth, but that is not necessarily its ultimate goal 
because part of Marx’s project is to describe how we identify the Idee in a musical work (which might 
be almost as important as the meaning of the Idee itself). Marx’s Idee captures an essential dimension 
of aesthetic experience and musical meaning, where Hegel’s Idea functions in the context of logic and 
the natural world. 
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connotations certain instruments have in historical literature and usages.278 When we 
consider the material of orchestration, especially over the course of the nineteenth 
century, we refer to elements beyond the composition itself. This includes thoughts 
about why certain instruments are better suited to one genre than another, and the 
identification of components in a composition that have normative associations with 
specific ideas.279 To current sensibilities, Marx’s disapproval of the inclusion of the 
“mellow brass chorus” (cornets, saxophones, tubas, et cetera)280 into the orchestra and 
other innovations with respect to instruments (including valves added to trumpets), 
strikes us as the antiquated taste of a stick-in-the-mud. Marx’s oppositions, however, 
directly relate to what he determines to be the orchestra’s ability to express an Idee. 
We can detect this ultimate end in Marx’s complaints about modern alterations that 
were made to the trumpet, French horn, and trombone. Marx determines these 
instruments have been “emasculated” through the additions of “valves and pistons.” 
Then Marx shifts gears and his discussion about new orchestral timbre suddenly turns 
into a debate on ethics: 
 
When we cease to aim at truth, we also cease to discern and appreciate that 
which is characteristic; for every character is satisfied with, and true to, 
itself; it tries to be, and to appear, nothing else but what it really is. Now 
there are in the entire series of tonal personification (Tonpersonificationen) 
no characters of a more decided cast than the heroic trumpet and the 
enthusiastic horn, as they appear in their natural condition. Even the 
incompleteness and limited extent of their scales… is necessary to their 
being and character… neither would the clarinet’s multitude of notes be of 
use to the trumpet, or the pliable serviceableness of the bassoon befit the 
sylvan horn. The peculiar character of these instruments, and even the very 
defectiveness of their compass, has never failed to lead the penetrating 
composer to more or less characteristic turns and combinations, and often 
rewarded his faithful adherence to nature with deeply interesting results. It 
was sufficient to drag these children of nature out of their original sphere of 
sound, and convert them into cosmopolitan creatures by depriving them of 
all their innocent peculiarities, in order to entangle the perpetrators in a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
278 Emily Dolan describes this with relation to the trombone: “The trombone, likewise, was a functional 
instrument, but one that came out of a very different context: before becoming a regular member of the 
orchestra (which it did not, of course, until the nineteenth century), it was used in sacred music, where 
it served as an intonation aid, helping singers maintain their pitch, without specific emphasis on the 
particularities of its sonority,” Emily Dolan, The Orchestral Revolution: Haydn and the Technologies 
of Timbre (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 156. 
279 “The artists employs [rhythm, sound and tone] for certain spiritual and, in his case, artistic purposes. 
This he could not do, unless these fundamental forms were associated with certain ideas and sensations 
in his own mind. Moreover, if they had not a certain definite meaning, they could not produce upon 
other persons a certain definite effect” (A. B. Marx, The Universal School: A Manual for Teachers and 
Students in Every Branch of Musical Art, trans. A. H. Wehrhan, [London: Robert Cocks, and Co., 
1853], 271). 
280 See Marx, The Music of the Nineteenth Century and its Culture, 70. 
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maze of half truth and half falsehood. The introduction of valves has, 
undoubtedly, completed and expanded the scale; but the new notes are 
mostly impure, the natural notes have lost their characteristic clearness and 
peculiar coloring and the sonorous power of the instruments is broken.281  
 
Although Marx’s comment about a trumpet sounding heroic is neither new nor unique 
to his treatment of the orchestra, his identification of “tonal personification” resides in 
a sphere where an instrument’s character is decided upon its timbre, its 
imperfections, peculiarities, and incompleteness. These tonal personifications give the 
appearance of truth, or at least guide the construction of musical meaning and critical 
discernment of an Idee. In the course of Marx’s discussion, Marx states that 
instruments have a “natural” state, an “original sphere of sound.” When we take a step 
back from Marx’s prose, we find that Marx’s affirmation about the “natural state” of 
musical instruments is actually quite curious. We come to this conclusion namely 
because instruments are material things, made out of other material objects. Our 
interpretation of their sound, however, seems to surpass the material itself and touch 
on something more fundamental – that is, something more “natural” in our perception 
of music. For this reason, we can fathom that it would seem “unnatural” for a string 
quartet to play a fanfare.  Contrariwise to previously held beliefs about timbre and 
orchestration, through the modernization of certain instruments, composers began to 
find new relations between instruments and timbres in the orchestra that were 
previously unavailable. Modernization in itself is not necessarily unethical in Marx’s 
thought; thus modernization and, by the same token, innovation are not at the heart of 
Marx’s complaint. But what is central to Marx’s discussion is that he finds the truth 
of the instruments, and the truth of what they express, has become corrupted through 
modernization. If the material instrument itself has become physically (i.e. materially) 
corrupted, then what the instrument communicates will be corrupted as well. We draw 
from this that in discussions of musical meaning, and the Idee, what Marx is really 
after is truth. And this truth is discovered through “spiritual guidelines” and 
considerations of the musical material. 
 
In light of this, the “spiritual” element of Marx’s Idee is the part of the critical 
investigation into musical meaning that is most like a search for truth. The “spiritual 
content” of music demands sensitivity with respect to the artist’s spiritual exhibition 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
281 Marx, The Music of the Nineteenth Century, 70. 
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in the work and one’s own spirit.282 This activity of the spirit resonates with 
Schleiermacher’s concepts of intuition or sympathy (concepts discussed in Part II of 
this dissertation). Scott Burnham elaborates on the similarity between truth and 
Marx’s Idee in the context of spiritual activity: 
 
The recognition of an Idee is not unlike an act of faith – both require a 
spiritual surrender, a relinquishing of the normative criteria for judgments of 
truth. Knowledge of an Idee is like knowledge of oneself…or knowledge of 
God, true in a personal sense but not verifiable by means of human reason. 
Marx’s Idee is thus a concept imported from Idealist aesthetics but employed 
as a symbol of the critic’s intuition about the wholeness and spiritual 
elevation of the musical work.283 
 
When Burnham writes that one relinquishes “normative criteria for judgments of 
truth,” we find that to judge meaning or a musical Idee is not like evaluating 
counterpoint or what characteristics make a “good” fugue. The connection of the Idee 
with the material of music binds reflection, at least in part, to the objective world and 
our subjective perception of music. We can detect an aspect of “spiritual surrender” in 
Marx’s claim that the instruments of Beethoven’s orchestra spoke as living and 
spiritual beings, and this is recognized (at least to some extent) in Beethoven’s 
inscriptions. But these inscriptions, even at their most descriptive, communicate real 
and not spiritual things. Even the word “Le-be-wohl,” with each syllable spread over 
the first three notes of the “Farewell” sonata, Op. 81a, does not speak to a spiritual 
dimension on the surface of the notation. 
 
At this point, nevertheless, we agree that Marx’s Idee is “a concept imported from 
Idealist aesthetics.” One of the texts of reference for the study of Idealist aesthetics is 
an anonymous document entitled, “Earliest Program for a System of German Idealism 
(1796),”284 and this text corroborates one of the significant similarities between 
Marx’s Idee and Idealist aesthetics with respect to the concept of freedom. We can 
detect the concept of freedom in Marx’s Idee on a rudimentary level through contrast 
between normative, functional rules of interpretation (both in criticism and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
282 See Burnham, Idee, 186.  
283 Burnham, Idee, 190. 
284 “The Earliest Program for a System of German Idealism (1796)” in Theory as Practice: A Critical 
Anthology of Early German Romantic Writings, ed. and trans. Jochen Schulte-Sasse, et al. 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), 72-3. There is no agreement as to who was the 
author of the “Earliest Program.” The document is written in Hegel’s hand, and most scholars believe 
the document is Hegel’s authorship. However, Schelling and Hölderlin have also been named as 
possible authors. See editors’ note, 146n1. 
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performance), where one feels mechanically restrained by these rules versus the 
freedom to choose how to interpret a passage in virtue of one’s will and deliberation. 
The “Earliest Program” differentiates between freedom as an idea285 – and ultimately 
an absolute expression of humanity – versus a machine,286 which is mechanical, 
manipulative, and restrains individuals from recognizing the value of their own 
intuition and ability to think for themselves (“the absolute freedom of all spirits that 
carry the intellectual world within themselves and must seek neither God nor 
immortality outside of themselves”).287 When we reflect on the “normative criteria” 
for judgments about music that we must relinquish in order to grasp the musical Idee, 
we find that analysis, at its worst, is a machine in the way the “Earliest Program” 
describes; it is a system to find meaning in music that is prescribed by external 
principles and rules, with little room for one’s own interpretation of how one should 
use those rules. But even on its best days, analysis denies an idea of musical meaning 
derived from the freedom as set out in Idealist aesthetics. This notion of freedom 
corresponds with Hegel’s way of hearing instrumental music as symbols and enigmas, 
where we release interpretation from strictly “normative criteria” and venture out into 
a highly subjective landscape (that is grounded, nevertheless, in material reflection).  
 
Marx’s Idee resonates most with the larger notion of an idea put forward in the 
“Earliest Program.” We remember Burnham’s characterization, where the Idee is 
envisioned “as a symbol of the critic’s intuition about the wholeness and spiritual 
elevation of the musical work,”288 when we read about the idea that unites all other 
ideas in the “Earliest Program”: 
 
The idea that unites them all, the idea of beauty, taken in the higher Platonic 
sense. I am now convinced that the highest act of reason is an aesthetic act, in 
that reason embraces all ideas, and that in beauty alone are truth and 
goodness joined together.289 
 
The freedom we find in Marx’s Idee is found also in Marx’s symbolism [Symbolik], 
which we determine as localized reflections of “spiritual content” that sustain the 
Idee, as free individual ideas (or subsidiary ideas) in themselves. The music is not 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
285 “Earliest Program,” 72. 
286 “Earliest Program,” 72. 
287 “Earliest Program,” 72. 
288 Burnham, Idee, 190. 
289 “Earliest Program,” 72. 
	   202	  
mechanical thereby symbols are not mechanical even if located in the material of 
music. The material serves interpretation to the extent that we can point at a score or 
at a piano’s soundboard and state how these things shape our ability to comprehend 
beauty or an Idee. But to point at material things is not the same as to look at truth or 
beauty itself. This step must be taken in the mind, to find unity in the parts, and 
understand what grants coherence to seemingly disparate parts.  
 
Scott Burnham argues that Marx describes Beethoven’s music by associating it with a 
“higher reality…with the kind of transcendent human values manifested in the great 
social conflicts of [Marx’s] age, values such as heroism and the courage of the 
fatefully oppressed individual.”290 From our perspective, the meaning of the value 
Marx attributes to Beethoven’s music in the form of an Idee is not limited to only one 
particular moment in history. Our understanding of those values, and our ability to 
recognize an Idee in musical works (not only Beethoven’s music) comes through the 
universality and truth of those ideas. When we recognize that Marx’s notion of an 
Idee speaks to a “higher reality…of transcendent human values,” even if Marx uses 
events of his era to describe their appearance in music for his audience, this kind of 
critical description does not take away from the truth and eternal nature of those ideas 
and values. 
   
Beethoven writes in a letter to a young student: “Persevere, do not only practice your 
art, but endeavor also to fathom its inner meaning; it deserves this effort. For only art 
and science can raise men to the level of gods.”291 What Beethoven wishes to say with 
“inner meaning” echoes the ideas of the “Earliest Program” and A. B. Marx’s Idee. 
Beethoven’s student is asked to fathom the inner meaning of the music she plays – 
this is not a task only for a serious composer, but for a performer and for critical 
interpretation. To “fathom inner meaning” in music, to reach the “level of gods,” one 
endeavors to know truth and embrace all ideas in a unity.   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
290 Burnham, Idee, 191. This statement recalls the concept of mythology described in the “Earliest 
Program,” see “Earliest Program,” 73. 
291 Translation of a letter from 1812, “Emilie M. at H., July 17, 1812.” See Emily Anderson, The 
Letters of Beethoven, Volume I (London: Macmillan & Co Ltd, 1961), L. 376, To Emilie M. at H., 
380-381. 
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Marx’s Idee is such that it requires us to not only fathom the inner meaning of a 
musical work, but also to explain this meaning through symbolism, similes, and 
psychological coherence. Although Marx’s tone when explaining this task may be 
matter-of-fact, the task in itself is extraordinary. Isaiah Berlin describes why this trend 
was common to Idealist aesthetics and why it was that devices like symbolism were 
important for the writers, philosophers, composers, and artists of the Romantic 
movement: “The romantic doctrine was that there is an infinite striving forward on the 
part of reality, of the universe around us, that there is something which is infinite, 
something which is inexhaustible, of which the finite attempts to be the symbol but of 
course cannot.”292 To truly capture the desperation of this doctrine, Berlin writes from 
the first person: 
 
I wish to convey something immaterial and I have to use material means for 
it. I have to convey something which is inexpressible and I have to use 
expression. . . . I know in advance that I shall not succeed and cannot 
succeed, and therefore all I can do is to get nearer and nearer in some 
asymptotic approach; I do my best, but it is an agonizing struggle in which, if 
I am an artist, or indeed for the German Romantics any kind of self-conscious 
thinker, I am engaged for the whole of my life. 293   
 
To describe something infinite with the finite, to convey something immaterial with 
material means, is essentially Marx’s itinerary from the get-go, and nevertheless, he 
finds any opposition to his ability to succeed in this to be ill-founded. Berlin’s 
depiction of the Romantic doctrine reveals why Scott Burnham calls our attention to 
this peculiarity of Marx’s “spiritual” Idee.294 How can the spiritual be in the material 
when it will continue to elude us precisely in the material? How can Marx be so 
confident about the existence of an all-embracing, recognizable, transcendent Idee in 
music?  
 
The reason why Marx can be so confident about this idea is quite simple and we find 
the answer in Beethoven’s letter to Emilie M. at H. : Persevere, do not only practice 
your art, but endeavor also to fathom its inner meaning. With “practice” we 
understand Beethoven to mean: to know how to play, to know the technical aspects of 
music, and also to fathom its inner meaning. This practice, for a performer, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
292 Berlin, 117. 
293 Berlin, 118. 
294 “And what governs the curious contradictions of his notion of the Idee, a spiritual essence that 
seems all too material?” Burnham, Idee, 189. 
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pedagogue, and anyone who teaches music in any form, is precisely what they do. 
Even analysis requires a certain amount of critical thinking about the inner meaning – 
for example, to know whether a sequence of measures modulates completely into a 
new key or not, we should contemplate the meaning of the music and content of the 
phrase(s) beyond normative criteria (for instance, we may ask ourselves what the 
phrase is trying to say and our answer to this may have relevance for determining 
whether the key has modulated or not). For this reason, we do not feel the Romantic 
doctrine’s agonizing struggle in Marx’s writings about music; the rigorous endeavor 
to find meaning in music is actually just business as usual. It is business as usual for 
Marx because this critical and philosophical exercise plays such an integral role in 
pedagogy and performance, which we easily recognize in Beethoven’s own remarks. 
And so just how important are material considerations for Marx’s Idee? We find they 
seem indispensable, because they form, in a general way, the very foundation of our 
musical experience and practice. Although material considerations may pale beside 
deeper meaning and ideas about truth, the material of music – its instruments, the 
orchestra, the score, the sounding music itself – is our recourse and the starting point 
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